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Despite several approaches to the study of democratic consolidation, launching 
democracy consolidation in consociational democracies has been considered problematic due 
to the fragmented nature of such societies which is not conducive to democratic stability. 
Notwithstanding the logjams confronting democracy consolidation in divided countries, this 
thesis considers an alternative approach through which the consolidation of democracy can be 
attained in Africa, particularly in Ghana and Nigeria.  
The argument of this work aligns with the views of other scholars like Gaetano 
Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and others who believe that political elites play major roles in 
democracy consolidation and that differing attitude among the political elites can account for 
democratic outcomes. This thesis aimed at providing a deeper insight of what the political 
elites in one country do to reach democracy consolidation, and what the elites from another 
country have done differently to stifle democracy consolidation. Understandings of these 
differences are obtained through interviews and secondary data analysis, building on the 
theoretical frameworks on elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence in order to 
understand how these factors influenced the political elites in polarised societies, such as 
Ghana and Nigeria. 
The choice to compare Ghana and Nigeria emanates from their histories and 
geographical locations. The two countries are from the West African continent; both are 
British government colonies, had histories of long military regimes cum counter coups, had 
various ethnic groups and had their independence almost at the same in 1958 and 1960 
respectively. While the political elites in the two countries don’t differ in their coherence, 
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1.1 Research Focus and Background of the Study 
There have been various approaches suggested by the scholars of democratic 
consolidation on the possible ways of attaining democratic consolidation. Civil society and 
foreign influence have been considered by some scholars to facilitate democratic 
consolidation. In the context of this thesis, emphasis is placed on the political elite unity and 
willingness to compromise on their differences, while in societies with ethnic divisions and 
fragmented political elites, unity and willingness of the elites to compromise their differences 
are pre-conditions for consolidation of democracy, Africa in particular. 
Despite successful transitions in many African countries, consolidation of democracy 
has been a huge problem confronting political elites (Van de Walle & Butler, 1999:16; 
Barkan, 2000: 228-231; Sandbrook, 1996: 70-71). Donor countries have encouraged African 
political elites through aid to establish democratic consolidation to ensure that these emerging 
democracies don’t fall back into the authoritarian regimes that governed these countries 
before the early 90s. However, while many African countries struggle to get their 
democracies on the right path, a few have succeeded. The political elites in these successful 
countries may have exhibited an attitude conducive to give credence to the existence of the 
democratic features that made consolidation possible. On the other hand, the expectation 
people believe that democracy might bring to many African countries, such as Nigeria, after 
several military take overs has not yielded any meaningful results in consolidating 
democracy, especially when compared to the giant strides that Ghana, a fellow West African 
country, has made. 
This study is set out to inquire into how political elites have shaped the transition to 
democratic consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria. This research focuses on the attitude of the 
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political elites, as they are considered by this thesis as the lynchpin through which regimes 
can attain consolidation.  However, this thesis is of the view that the attainment of democratic 
consolidation cannot be possible where there is elite fragmentation. The thesis argues that the 
consolidation of democracy is possible when these elites shun their differences and embrace 
an attitude that would help democracy thrive. Elite commitment to democracy and elite 
coherence are considered to be the fulcrum of the theoretical framework through which 
consolidation is possible, especially in emerging democracies in Africa, Ghana and Nigeria in 
particular. Therefore, it is important to analyse what the political elites in these countries have 
done to accomplish democratic consolidation, and also how they can serve as a mirror, 
through which struggling African countries might learn from. 
1.2 Research Question 
On the basis of the above discussion, this research seeks to answer one major research 
question: Why there is variation in the consolidation of democracy in Ghana and 
Nigeria? 
In investigating and answering this question, this research carefully considers the 
recent nature of democracy in Ghana and Nigeria. The true importance of this research lies in 
the hunt for change within the democracies of these countries since transition in the early 90s. 
This research will investigate how elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence can 
attain democratic consolidation in ethnically divided societies in Africa, especially in Nigeria. 
For example, the thesis will look into what the political elites in one country have done to 







1.3 Profiles of Selected Countries  
1.3.1 The Ghanaian State 
Ghana was the first country in West Africa to be decolonised in 1957 from British 
rule. It has made its liberal democratic constitution a trademark since the military disengaged 
from politics. Before this, the post-colonial elites violated many principles enshrined in the 
country’s post-independence constitution by restricting civil liberties, closing down 
opposition political parties, and not respecting the independence of the judiciary. Ghana’s 
first, second, and third Republics failed due to military coups in 1966, 1972, and in 1981. 
Describing the situation, Gyimah Boadi (1994) notes that the First Republic stumbled after 
the 1966 military coup as the constitution was reversed, limiting civil liberties as the Kwame 
Nkrumah regime adopted a one party system under the Conventional People’s party (CPP). 
Ghana’s chequered political path to establishing its liberal democratic constitution came to an 
end in 1991, when pressures mounted from internal and external sources for a return to 
constitutional rule. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), an administrative 
body created in the regime of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, was initially meant to be a 
revolutionary body, as it incorporated both civilians and ex-military officers. But the PNDC’s 
actions and functions began to degenerate into malicious infringements on the freedom of 
expression of the media and civil society groups, who requested for a return to civilian rule. It 
is noteworthy that this body (PNDC), was intended to focus on transition, but was indirectly 
working for Rawlings as they tried to stop any media that criticised their actions. Agyeman-
Duah (1987:618) states that the PNDC cabinet was made up mostly by civilians who thrived 
on the ‘direct’ support of the military. The government thus selected members of this body 
for top administrative offices in the country. Rawlings claimed that he was reluctant to take 
power, but that the PNDC created a pathway for him to return to power as demand for 
civilian rule grew stronger. Agyeman-Duah (1987:619) notes that the Interim National 
4 
 
Coordinating Committee (INCC) was created to carry out the duty of the National Defence 
Committee (NDC), in order to check other associations and social groups rising against the 
existing structure.The NDC was empowered to monitor the activities of various bodies 
created as the country planned to move into constitutional rule. The NDC was established to 
ensure that the rights of the people are protected; bring to book people that are involved in 
corrupt activities and as well try to disrupt the revolution geared towards maintaining a 
collective national discipline where everybody in the country has the equal right to take part 
in decision-making (Daily Graphic, 1982). 
However, domestic agitation for democratic rule grew stronger, as well as global 
support for democracy through the imposition of ‘political conditionalities’ on aid recipient 
countries by the International Financial Institutions (IFI), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank and other external donors. Gyimah-Boadi (1994:84) notes that in 1989 the IFI 
and Western donors’ idea to include political conditions (like transparency, accountability, 
and good governance) as requirements for granting grant loans and development aid which 
are helpful in making the PNDC to consider transition.  
  Rawlings, having surrendered to the people’s demands, supported a Presidential/ 
representative general election which he eventually won and became the president, having 
contested from the platform of National Democratic Congress (NDC). The election of 1992 
was fiercely contested the opposition political party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), rejected 
the outcome on grounds of massive rigging. Gyimah-Boadi (2001) posits that the NPP 
refused to accept the results of the presidential elections because of alleged irregularities, and 
then boycotted the next parliamentary elections. In the next election of 1996, the NPP 
nominated another candidate to challenge the incumbent-Rawlings, who re-contested through 




1.3.2 The Nigerian State 
 After gaining its independence from the British in 1960, Nigeria’s First Republic of 
1963 was short-lived due to the military incursions into politics. The history of military 
incursions in Nigerian politics dated as far back as 1966, when the military violently aborted 
the First Republic that was in the process of creating a road map for Nigerian democracy. The 
first military coup of 1966 resulted in the outbreak of civil war (Biafran) in 1967, which 
unfortunately lasted for thirty months. 
 After the civil war in the early 70s, General Murtala Mohammed carried out another 
coup against the regime of General Yakubu Gowon. But General Murtala did not last in 
office, as he was killed February 13
th
 1976 in an abortive coup attempt led by Lt. Col. Buka 
Suka Dimka. After his death, his second in command (General Olusegun Obasanjo) took over 
the mantle of power and drafted a new constitution to put the country back on track for 
democratic transition. General Obasanjo’s quest to return the country to a democratic state 
was temporarily successful, when his government lifted a ban on politics in September 21, 
1978 where five political parties registered and contested for power. 
In the Second Republic of 1979 to 1983, the system of government (Westminster 
system) that was adopted in the First Republic was amended to resemble an American-style 
Presidential system. The Second Republic saw the end of thirteen years of military rule after 
the success recorded by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the election under the party 
flag bearer of President Shehu Shegari in an election of 1979, which many described as 
violence-prone and involving all forms of electoral malpractices (Ogbeidi, 2010:47; 
Ugoh,2004:172). The aftermath of the election made some contestants feel that they were 
cheated of victory, especially when Shehu Shegari was declared the winner by the Federal 
Electoral Commission (FEDECO), and some went to court to contest the victory. 
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With regards to the irregularities surrounding the elections, the chairman of the 
Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), Michael Ani, conceded that the process was 
rigged and stated: “I got the hint that the presidential ballot paper had leaked because it was 
to be the last election. The papers had already gone out but how it got leaked, I don’t know, it 
was being forged on a very large scale” (Joseph, 1981: 84). The implication of this statement 
is that presidential ballot papers must have gone into the wrong hands, even before the 
election was conducted, and that the perpetrators possibly thumb printed those papers 
beforehand. There is another obvious reason to believe that the 1979 general election was a 
manipulated process. In the words of Joseph (1981), the announcer of the presidential 
election results (Frederick Menkiti) was not even a member of FEDECO. 
In 1983 the military overthrew the Second Republic, accusing the government of 
gross misconduct and embezzlement from the treasury. The military returned back to power 
as democracy became history once again. This time, it was General Muhammed Buhari who 
truncated the democratic process and removed the elected President. After almost two years 
in office, another military coup occurred, led by General Abacha and General Babangida. 
 The Third Republic began in 1989, when a new constitution was drafted under the 
regime of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (a military Head of State), who assured 
Nigerians that he had come into power for just four months, after which he would return 
power to a democratically elected President in 1990. Notwithstanding his promises, he 
delayed transition until 1993, when he formed two parties, namely; the Social Democratic 
Party and the National Republican Convention. In Nigeria’s previous elections, people were 
allowed to form their own political parties, but the new political parties formed under the 
regime of Gen. Babangida were imposed on Nigerians. Babangida’s idea of floating his own 
two parties on Nigerians did not augur well to many Nigerians, and it was challenged on the 
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basis that it would not be helpful in the overall search for sustainable democracy in short and 
long term processes ( Ofeimun, 1989). 
Nevertheless, the two political parties went to the poll and Chief Moshood Abiola of 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP) emerged as the winner and waited for the government to 
hand over power. What made the June 12 presidential election unique was the way in which 
the election was conducted. Among the scholars who wrote on how free and fair the election 
was, Ifukor (2010) states that the presidential election of Nigeria in June 12, 1993 will go 
down in the history for being the most free and fair election ever conducted even though it 
was aborted by the military as well as bringing in political turmoil and deaths among 
Nigerians. Despite the generally acclaimed fairness of the election, the military government 
surprisingly annulled the election. As a result, Moshood Abiola declared himself the 
President of Nigeria and went into hiding. In 1993, the military regime of Sani Abacha 
unseated an interim government of Ernest Shonikan, through a palace coup, which looked 
like an underground plan by Ibrahim Babangida’s regime to pave the way for Sani Abacha. 
Moshood Abiola was captured and thrown into prison. The Fourth Republic started in May 
29, 1999 after the death of Gen.Sani Abacha while he was in power. This Republic brought 
the country onto the path of another transitional journey, under the regime of Abdulsalami 
Abubaka. The Fourth Republic witnessed the election of yet another retired military general, 
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo. The selection of Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo by the outgoing military 
officers was seen by Nigerians as a strategy to compensate the people of Western Nigeria, 
where the winner of the June 12 election (Moshood Abiola) came from. In summary, 
Adekanye (2005) describes Nigeria’s transition as “pacted democracy” because the retired 
military officers in collaboration with other principal elites from the north and with the 
support of the international influence reached an agreement that the ongoing crisis as a result 
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of the June 12 election in the country can only be resolved if they agree on electing someone 
from the Yoruba ethnic group.  
Therefore, looking at various military regimes that took over power during the 
processes of transition before 1999, scholars think that none of those regimes brought the 
transition to a reasonable conclusion. This aligns with the view of Osaghae (2002), who states 
that successive military regimes in the country see themselves as providing the solution to 
Nigeria’s problems, by restoring stability, saving the nation, and correcting the mistakes of 
previous regimes.  
In chapter one, this research has identified areas of focus; it is important to give an 
account of each country’s background. The concluding chapter addressed the main research 
question to. After that, the thesis outlines the remaining chapters. 
1.4 Plan of the Thesis 
Chapter two of this thesis gives cursory details on the research dilemma and outline 
how this has affected the consolidation of democracy. Also, the history and overview of 
democracy in Africa are discussed, starting from the post-colonial governments of the two 
countries. This section also gives a detailed description of the research argument, as well as 
full details of the research method and design. 
Chapter three offers a review of the literature on democratic consolidation, elite 
commitment to democracy, and elite coherence. It then outlines the theoretical framework 
and research hypothesis. This chapter aimed at setting out a detailed review of other scholarly 
works on democratic consolidation, and see if the political elites actually play a key role in 
the process. The theoretical framework builds on elite coherence and elite commitment to 
democracy, and discusses some variables like democracy consolidation, consociational 
democracy, pseudo-democracy, and competitive authoritarianism. These reviews are needed 
to understand how the consolidation of democracy plays out in other countries, and to see 
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how elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy can help achieve democracy 
consolidation in Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. The research’s theoretical 
framework shall be discussed in this chapter as well.  
Chapter four analyses Ghana. It focuses on elite commitment to democracy and elite 
coherence, in order to comparatively analyse the role of the political elite in the consolidation 
of democracy in Africa. The research builds on indicators mentioned above, in order to 
understand the role of elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence. All these 
indicators shall be systematically discussed, especially to reflect the activities of the political 
elite in Ghana with regards to democratic consolidation. 
Like in chapter four, chapter five shall focus on elite commitment to democracy and 
elite coherence as they affect Nigeria. Some indicators identified in theoretical framework 
shall be discussed, to see how they played out in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. 
The main objective is to discover if the role and influence of the political elites contribute to 
Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. This thesis argues that elite choices determine 
democratic outcomes. The attitude of Nigerian political elites will be examined, with 
reference to the data gathered during fieldwork and other important secondary data. 
Chapter six summarises the key results gathered in the research and bring the research 
to a logical conclusion. It reviews the key argument emerging from the indicators, methods, 
and theoretical framework, and discusses the results from the interview findings, determining 
if they systematically answer the research question. The main variables which serve as the 
benchmark for this analysis must reflect the problems and lasting prospects of democratic 
consolidation in Africa, in particular Nigeria and Ghana. The research provides some 
recommendations which, if adopted by policy makers, will help address the various problems 
facing democratic consolidation in the subject countries. This thesis contributes to the 
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existing knowledge on consolidation of democracy as many African countries, like Ghana 



























Research dilemma, Historical Overview, Argument, Method and Design 
2.1 The Research Dilemma 
The scholarly work by Samuel Huntington (1991:16) for global democratisation 
(Third Wave) came as a shock to many authoritarian regimes in the early 90s. The fear of 
these authoritarian leaders was because across the globe, few of them had been persecuted, 
some faced trials and many decided to step down from their positions in order to give room 
for competitive elections. For example, after watching a televised execution of a friend, 
Nicolae Ceausescu (Romanian autocratic president), President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, as 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is known as at the time, conceded to allowing other two 
parties to stand against his own party in 1993 elections (Huntington, 1991:16). His appeal to 
opposition forces led many authoritarian regimes in many third world countries, especially 
Africa, to arrange multi-party elections. Manning (2005:709) agreed that by 1995, almost all 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had arranged at least one multi-party election. But while few 
countries have attained democratic consolidation, many countries still struggle. This study 
intends to understand why there is difference in democratic outcomes of these countries.  
The debate among scholars has been about what facilitates democratisation and its 
consolidation. Emphasis has been on either the civil society or foreign assistance as 
facilitating factors (Resnick,2012:4; Levitsky & Way, 2005:22; Carothers, 1999). Other 
scholars have opined that parties and party-systems’ institionalization can facilitate 
democratic consolidation (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Sandbrook, 1996; Randall & 
Svassand, 1999). This thesis is in agreement with other scholars such as; (Di Palma, 1990; 
Higley and Gunter, 1992; Bunce, 2000) who argued that the political elites have major roles 
to play if a country is to attain democratic consolidation. But while the political elite is one of 
the important factors that made transition and democratic consolidation possible, scholars 
12 
 
have not adequately advanced this area to reflect on the African democratic consolidation 
literature, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. With this vast gap in the scholarly discourse, this 
thesis is devoted to analysing systematically the activities of the political elites in democratic 
consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria.  
Over the years, Ghana and Nigeria’s rating in the world freedom indices have 
remained contradictory to each other even when the two countries were victims of military 
rule before transition. Apart from 1998 when Ghana was rated partly free; since 1999, 
Ghana’s political rights scored within 1, civil liberties scored within 2, and its freedom rating 
scored within 1.5. Generally, the country has remained free. In the case of Nigeria, since 
1999, the country's world freedom index status has remained partly free, even in 2017. 
Nigeria’s political rights were within 4, civil liberties rated 3 and political freedom stood at 
3.5 in 1999. In 2017, the country was still partly free with political rights of 3, civil liberties 
of 5, and its freedom rating in the region of 4. Compared to Nigeria, Ghana has done pretty 
well because after Ghana’s transition in 1992, it took the country until 1999 for the country to 
change its freedom index from partly free to free. Compare to Nigeria, since 1999 when the 
country completed its transition, the freedom status of the country has remained partly freely. 
It took Ghana just six years to reverse its freedom status, but after almost seventeen years, 
Nigeria has remained in the same freedom status it was at the time of transition. 
No doubt, the histories of Ghana and Nigeria are marred by the appearances and 
disappearances of democracy due to various military takeovers. However, it is pertinent to 
note that the two countries differ in their paths toward democratic consolidation. For 
example, among the fifty-four (54) countries in the continent of Africa, Gilbert and Allen 
(2014:524) describe Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania as 
countries where democracy is most possible. The legacy that Ghana has achieved in its 
evolving democracy led Gyimah-Boadi (2009:138) to address Ghana as the ‘hope’ and ‘role 
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model’ for other African countries struggling to consolidate their democracies. Subsequent to 
the two decades Jerry Rawlings was in power, Ghana has developed into one of Africa’s most 
liberal and vibrant democracies, regaining a position of political leadership in the African 
continent (Diamond, 2008:253). Other scholars agree with Gyimah-Boadi (2009), that in 
Africa, Ghana is seen as a model for other aspiring democratic countries in the continent 
(Ayee, 1997; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Daddieh, 2009; Abdulai and Crawford, 2010; Gyimah-
Boadi and Prempeh, 2012; Gyimah-Boadi, 2015). 
The praise Ghana’s democracy success has enjoyed may be due to the desire of the 
political elites to allow the democratic system to work. Gyimah-Boadi (2015:101) rightly 
observed that the obstacles facing democracy in Africa is the declining commitment to the 
democratic task from the political elites. He regretted the deplorable state of ‘government 
responsiveness and accountability’ (Gyimah-Boadi,2015:101). From his points, it is 
important to argue that the path the political elites take can determine their democratic 
outcomes. For this thesis, commitment to democracy encompasses the political elites’ ability 
to ensure that Electoral Commission is giving the necessary autonomy so it can carry out its 
duty without the influence of anyone; political elites’ compliance to the rules and regulations 
guiding party financing and an establishment of a resilient impartial body to check political 
corruption. 
 Ghana has made some positive headway in transforming its democracy, and this is 
attributed to the political elites who have accepted democracy as the only way of ensuring 
stability.  Over the years, Ghana has continued to consolidate its credentials as an outstanding 
democratic African country, which has culminated in the holding of national elections every 
four years since 1992 (Whitfield, 2009). Jockers et al. (2010) demonstrated that the successes 
recorded in the Ghanaian elections of 1996, 2000, 2004 and, 2008 were responsible for the 
two transfers of power between the two main opposing parties (in 2000 and 2008). This also 
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reflected on the ‘improvements in the performance of Ghana’s formal institutions, 
particularly, the Electoral Commission, the judiciary and security forces’(Jocker et al.2010). 
It is important to state that the success the Electoral Commission in Ghana has made so far 
stem from the autonomy the body has enjoyed since 1992. On the autonomy of the electoral 
commission, the constitution of Ghana spelled out that in performing of its duties the EC is 
not answerable or under the influence of anyone irrespective of the person’s position 
(Republic of Ghana 1992:39). 
In an effort to ensure stability among political parties in Ghana, in 1994 the Inter-
Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) was created by the Electoral Commission (Ayee, 1996; 
Jeffries, 1998 & Gyimah-Boadi, 1999). Debrah (2011:37) notes that the establishment of 
IPAC was meant to achieve two primary goals including to diffuse conflict and tension 
arising from the ruling party and opposition parties, and to ensure that all political parties in 
Ghana establish a common compromises on the rules of the electoral game. The importance 
of IPAC in promoting understanding between the ruling party and the opposition is discussed 
by Jeffries (1998:197) who opined that Rawlings’ government went into dialogue with the 
opposition party on how to manage elections in Ghana through the help of IPAC. In order to 
build consensus among political parties, the EC meet with party representatives on monthly 
basis (Jeffries, 1998:197). This is possible to help in cementing the understanding of the 
ruling party and the oppositions in Ghana. It is reasonable to deduce that the understanding 
and willingness of the political elites to tolerate themselves and commitment to democracy 
are built by the Electoral Commission through IPAC. This atmosphere could be due to a 
certain level of coherence and commitment to democracy to which the elites in Ghana had 
become accustomed to, which largely promoted the country’s democratic stability. The 
autonomy of the Electoral Commission is derived from the Constitution of Ghana which 
stipulates that once a member is appointed, the person keeps his or her position for life and 
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cannot be dismissed by anyone except the person is incapacitated due to ill-health or on gross 
misconduct of office (Republic of Ghana 1992:27). It looks like the post-colonial elites in 
Ghana knew from the beginning where they wanted to go, and made some useful political 
calculations that would take them in the direction they envisaged. 
Once the military in Ghana decided on a transition to civilian rule, the first thing the 
government did was to constitute a committee representing all the geo-political zones, tasked 
with drafting a new constitution for the emerging democracy. Linz and Stepan (1996) suggest 
that democracy is consolidated if actors “play to the rules”. To this end, Ghanaian political 
elites demonstrated such commitment to the emerging democracy. There have been several 
significant developments in the history of Ghana’s democracy to suggest the commitment of 
the elites. Take for instance, recent study on party financing in Ghana by Nam-Katoti et al. 
(2011) resulted in two contrasting views. According to them, there is dispute between party 
executives and the civil society with regards to party financing. Party executives are in 
support that political parties receive their funding from the state and the civil society 
criticised that state funding of parties will bring about political corruption among politicians 
but party executive refused to concede to their claim(Nam-Katoti et al.2011:90). 
However, majority of the interview respondents in Ghana believed that public 
financing has helped in improving democratic consolidation in Ghana. In structuring of 
democracy in Ghana, the elites has promoted an independent Electoral Commission, 
equitable party-financing, an unbiased anti-corruption commission, and this thesis is of the 
view that all these are possible hence a certain level of coherence and commitment among 
political elites in Ghana. In other words, available literatures suggest that CHRAJ (The 
Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice) responsible for crime control has 
been successful in winning public trust. This is mainly due to its readiness to bring to justice 
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any government officer who engages into corruption (Bossman, 2006; Short, 2015). CHRAJ 
created in 1994 has ever since handled over 127 corruption cases (Bossman, 2006:4). The 
results so far show that Rawlings (1993-2000) and Kufuor (2001-2008) have complied with 
the two-term presidential limit as stipulated in the 1992 Constitution. Since the 1996 
elections, a candidate that has lost an election has readily accepted the result of the election 
and conceded defeat, with a congratulatory message to the winner (Abdulai and Crawford, 
2010). Ghana’s level of democratic consolidation is evident in the country’s expansion of 
political freedom, regular free and fair elections, the gradual institutionalisation of 
constitutional bodies, and peaceful alternation. However, the politics of Ghana before this 
period are characterised by incessant military take overs, and the unwanted ferocious 
competition among the political elites for public office, which undermined the unity and 
cohesiveness of the elites. 
 It is unfortunate that some countries in Africa, like Nigeria, have not fared well when 
it comes to moving its democracy forward. Addressing the situation of democracy in the most 
populous country (Nigeria) in the continent, a scholar posits: 
In Africa's most populous country, the promise of 
democratic reform was squandered in the early 2000s by a 
combination of gross electoral fraud, rising levels of 
political violence and criminal penetration of politics and a 
relentless effort by President Olusegun Obasanjo and his 
supporters to amend the constitution to permit him to run 
for a third term… The democratic spirit survived in 
Nigerian society, but it was sorely disillusioned, and it 
lacked a democratic state and political class to give it 
room to grow (Diamond 2008:70-74). 
For example, the electoral body that has fared well in Ghana is struggling in Nigeria. 
Agbaje & Adejumobi (2006:31) observes the autonomy and capacity of the electoral 
commission in Nigeria has been suspect and the endless renaming and restructuring of the 
body from successive governments are confusing. According to them, few factors are 
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highlighted to impinge the autonomy of the electoral commission in Nigeria, including the 
arrangement and the manner through which members of the commission are appointed, legal 
outline through which those members derive their powers (Agbaje & Adejumobi, 2006: 31).  
Kurfi (2005) reckons that since these members of the commission are direct appointees of the 
federal government of Nigeria, there is a possibility that these members would be vulnerable 
to the manipulations of the president. In such circumstance, it is doubtful that the electoral 
commission can conduct a free and fair election. 
Many scholars are of the view that the Nigerian transition election of 1999 was 
massively rigged right from the onset, and that the outcome did not represent the will of the 
people, and that the electorate ignored the flaws in the processes because they were bent on 
getting rid of military rule (Ihonvbere, 1999; Mustapha, 1999; Enemuo, 1999). Even after 
that, nothing has actually changed with regards to violence in Nigerian elections. In the 
general elections of 2011, Bamgbose (2012:209) reported several cases of electoral violence 
and irregularities in some states in Nigeria. It is unfortunate that the political violence and 
irregularities that many expected to stop after transition elections still reared their ugly head 
in subsequent Nigerian elections. In the 2007 Nigerian general elections, Collier and Vicente 
(2014) reported that within two days of the elections, over three hundred (300) people were 
killed as a result of electoral violence. 
In his study of Nigerian democracy since the country’s independence, Lewis 
(2011:61) adjudges Nigeria’s political history to be a failure. This is due to ethnic 
polarisation, violence and electoral misconduct in the First Republic; massive corruption, 
factionalism, and flawed elections in the Second Republic; and the toppling of an elected 
civilian government in the Third Republic. Voting was marred by disorganisation, 
misconduct, fraud and violence in the 2011 elections witnessed ‘divisive communal politics’ 
with ‘corrosive violence’ in some polling stations, all these pose challenges to the Fourth 
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Republic of Nigerian democracy (Lewis,2011:61-62). 
Describing the state of democracy in some countries, including Nigeria, one scholars argues:  
Some countries such as Nigeria…occupy an ambiguous or 
disputed space between democracy and overt 
authoritarianism. They have a multiparty electoral system, 
with significant opposition. They have some space for 
civil society and intellectual dissent. However, individual 
and associational freedoms are under such mounting 
pressure, or elections are so riddled with fraud, or the 
arenas of political opposition and competition are so 
constrained and intimidated by the domineering power of 
the incumbent, that it is difficult to call the systems 
democratic, even in the minimal sense (Diamond,2008: 
26).  
The political elites are yet to accept the rules. Elections, which are seen by some 
scholars and many Africans as one of the essences of democracy, have lost their substance in 
Nigeria. Civil society groups in Nigeria are yet to assume their primary function of regulating 
the activities of the ruling elites, because in some cases they are not given the needed 
freedom to operate. With regards to elections, Gyimah-Boadi (2015) notes that the use of a 
ballot box, which has been generally accepted as the only means through which a political 
power gets its legitimacy, has been severely weakened by ‘violence and conflict that so often 
accompany the electoral process’ and that political elites, in most cases, see elections as do-
or-die affairs, campaigns are often hostile and fierce. Still focusing on elections in Africa, 
Omotola (2010) notes that the post-independence African nationalists have engaged in all 
forms of electoral violence, like “assassinations, attempted assassinations, confinement, 
battering, arson, looting, political thuggery, destruction and damage of property”. In most of 
these elections, other stake holders have suffered from unnecessary stifling from the ruling 
elites. Therefore, as some of these elections were organised by leaders who reluctantly did 
not want to leave office, one would expect that these elites might sabotage the process. Of 
course, when an incumbent organises election where he is one of the contestants, the chances 
of the process going in his favour could increase and this has been a case in most African 
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countries. For instance, scholars such as Joseph (1997:62), Carothers (1997), and Brown 
(2005:184), posit that ruling elites agreed to: give opposition parties a chance for 
competition, but did not allow them to win; gave the independent press freedom to work, but 
not actively; gave its civil society groups the right to function, but not successfully; accepted 
that elections be conducted, but did not provide the opportunity to dislodge the ruling 
political party. On the other hand, political elites who participate in malicious displays with 
impunity have not been restrained by democratic constitutions, and in many parts of Africa, 
the media and civil society operate under the constant threat of closure or severe restriction 
(Gyimah-Boadi,2015). 
Though Nigeria has fared well in its economy looking at its status as one of the 
highest crude oil producers in the world but Lewis (2011:61) notes that despite Nigeria’s 
economic status, the country still lag behind due to ‘institutional weakness, poor 
infrastructure, rent-seeking, and corruption’. It is on this note that this thesis intends to also 
look at the anti-corruption agencies established by the political elites and see attempts these 
agencies made to control corruption in Nigeria. In his inaugural speech to Nigerians when he 
was elected the president in 1999, President Obasanjo promised that his new regime would 
fight corruption. He recognised that the greatest calamity that faced military rule in Nigeria 
was their inability to prevent and check corruption even when it was obvious to everyone 
(Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011:190). It was on this backdrop that the government of President 
Obasanjo deemed it necessary to establish two anti-corruption agencies including the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2000, and 
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003. However, it does not mean 
that other previous regimes in Nigeria have not made attempts in checking corruption but 
Riley (1998:142) argued that their efforts were ‘largely ineffectual’. Yet, the new established 
anti-corruption agencies by the Obasanjo regime did not live up to the expectation. Scholars 
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described  EFCC as an agency established to paying lip service to combating corruption due 
to the dictate of the president or as ‘inquisitorial’ aggressive campaign of selective 
prosecution’.(Jason, 2005; Reef, 2007:1). Under this circumstance, it is not possible to accept 
that government is really serious about fighting political corruption and other related vices 
and it is still worrisome to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Another problem 
facing Nigerian democracy which this thesis intends to address is party-financing. While 
scholars have highlighted the importance of money to political parties (Ilo, 2004:23; 
Anyadike, 2014), it also prevent the chances of smaller parties winning elections. With 
regards to curtailing big man’s party and small man’s party in Nigerian’s democracy, there 
has been effort to regulate and monitor party-financing. Research shows uneven finance 
between the party that is led by the ruling government and the party from the opposition 
(Kura,2011; Centre for Social Justice, 2015). Maybe, this situation is likely to create envy 
which may result in political violence, which of course, not well for Nigerian democratic 
consolidation. 
2.2 African Democracy: Historical Overview 
 The African states were affected by the obvious challenges to the authority of the 
majority of world’s incumbents, which happened during the time that Eastern European 
countries surrendered to competitive politics. The rebirth of competitive politics created 
protest against the one-party model in many African countries. Examples of such countries 
were Benin, Madagascar, Kenya, and Ghana, which all had successful elections in the late 
90s (Gyimah-Boadi,1998). Before this period, Africa was known as a continent of autocrats, 
dictators, military governments, and one-party states where the economic situation was in 
decline. The situation of African states was described by Bratton and Van de Walle (1992) 
who reason that the living condition was very bad for civil servants and other government 
workers as well as graduates who could not afford a job, while many without a job live in 
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abject penury. Autocratic rule in Africa was very bad for the civil servants in particular 
because salaries are delayed or are not paid at all. 
However, political experts argue that there was greater political space for voluntary 
associations due to the fact that African states had become very weak, both politically and 
economically, especially when recalcitrant leaders began to lose their positions as transition 
loomed (Kasfir, 1998). This situation, however, created the impetus for popular demand of 
systemic change and the rejection of one-party states in Africa. The masses reasoned that the 
poor economic situation in the continent originated from the embezzlement and 
mismanagement of African economy by the ruling elites, and that the large national debts 
were the creation of the national leaders. It was easy for the protesters to mobilise the citizens 
who were in abject poverty against the state, using corruption among the ruling elites as their 
strategy, the protesters believing that the lack of accountability among African leaders was 
responsible for the economic decline (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). 
 In 1990 and 1991, demand by many for change in a system of government grew 
stronger due to deepening economic hardship which they blamed on their nationalist leaders 
(Bratton & Van de Wall, 1992:424).This movement became popular  in the mid-90s when the 
new era  broke the previous form of leadership succession in Africa, thereby allowing a 
pattern where the electorates voted out sitting presidents in eleven countries, and also ,‘three 
more turnovers’ where the sitting presidents declined to contest (Bratton,1998:53-54). This 
was remarkable because the old-guard political leaders were unable to survive true 
democratic contests (Bratton,1998). The clamour for democratisation came about because 
democracy was adjudged to bring about economic growth, with many scholars supporting 
this view (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2014). 
Chabal (1998) notes that some groups argue that democracy will bring about a free market 
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economy that could trigger economic growth.  Some see democracy as the only means 
through which necessary development can be fostered. Gerring et al. (2005), supported the 
link between democracy and economic development, reasoning that a good relationship 
between the elites and electorates was necessary for good economic policy, the economic 
situation playing an important role in the voting choices of the masses. So, it seems that the 
new politicians are largely going to face some economic problems, and any government 
capable of improving the economy is likely to gain the support of the masses that were bent 
on making away with authoritarian regimes that brought hardship on them.  
According to Ekeh (1975), these problems are “the backwardness of the African past, 
the lack of contributions by Africans to the building of Africa and inter-tribal feuds”. The 
colonialists may have claimed that their presence in Africa was to help civilise or develop 
Africa, but clearly their reason for being there in the first place was to help their empires 
flourish. Ake (1973) draws on the distinction posited by colonialists: “a people too weak to 
protect them, and a people strong and generous enough to offer protection; a people who 
were uncivilised or even just less than humans and a people who were civilised and willing to 
lift those who were primitive to the pale of civilised community”. According to Ake (1973), 
these unequal characteristics justified a heavy battering on the liberties, resources, and living 
conditions of the colonised. Africans were blessed with mineral resources and other essential 
goods, but their primitive nature, claimed colonialists, could not give them the insight to 
harness the resources they were endowed with.  
However, it is unfortunate that Africa’s transition was established in the context of a 
poor economy, a highly factionalised weak dominant class, and a weak small working class, 
and was without an institutionalised structure capable of resolving conflicts (Adedeji, 1993; 
Ihonvbere, 1999: 347).  In seeking a new regime, Ihonvbere (1996:347) notes that Africans 
desired stability, industrialisation, development, and practical and viable institutions that 
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would be responsible for resolving conflicts that democracy promised. Before transition in 
African countries in 1990s, the continent is known as a place where changes are made in 
government through coups, conflicts or other forms of violence. The more recent transition 
give the masses the political right to choose the best candidate, from various contestants that 
would represent them. It also give them the right to go to the poll at regular basis to elect new 
leaders.  
During some of the early 1990s transitions in African countries, civic groups were 
restricted from organising, as post-colonial leaders and post-independence military elites 
reasoned that they might pose a challenge to their regimes. Bratton (1994) notes that the 
priorities of the African ruling elites before transition were mainly to build one-party and 
military regimes. Despite this, they were unable to discourage independent organisations 
from emerging through a strong civil society, even when some elites sought to undermine 
them. For instance, some elites made some civil society groups part of the governing parties, 
while other leaders banned them completely. Yet all these manipulations could not make 
voluntary associations succumb to the whims and fancies of the ruling elites. Rather, these 
civic groups served as a substitute recognised mechanism for governance, as they provided 
ordinary Africans with a channel through which they could express their political interests. 
Nevertheless, the gains that accrued during the transition regimes included widespread 
societal inclusion in decision-making, freedom of association, and freedom of speech, which 
was never tolerated in previous regimes. 
The preference for one-party systems by post-colonial elites was not just intended to 
rebuff opposition to their positions, but to also reinforce political instability in piecing 
together disparate populations under unified post-colonial states. The struggle for competitive 
democracy was not given legitimacy, as many autocratic leaders felt that such a move could 
undermine their official impunities. In reality, they had made so much money while 
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remaining in power, and conceding this would have been way too difficult for them.  
Nevertheless, African ruling elites of this period like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who also 
master-minded a single party system, claimed that a single party was not a good system, 
especially when it was not close to the people. This de facto kind of power control by a small 
group of elites, clique or ethnic based who possessed ruling authority accounted for the 
impoverished nature of the African economy and promoted the continuous quest for 
democratic transition. For this reason, Ake (1993:240) points out that the quest for 
democratic government in Africa was a result of the bitter experience of have high 
expectations about independence and post- independence plans dashed, which ended in 
painful disappointment, largely due to poor leadership and structural constraints. 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (2006) agrees that nationalist leaders showed a commitment to 
democracy, economic development, and the spirit of Pan-African solidarity. But they then 
started serving their narrow interests, which resulted in authoritarian rule and corruption, 
which invariably made them ignore the principles of liberal democratic regimes that had been 
established at independence. The predicament Africa had at the time stemmed from the 
inability of the nationalist leaders to promote democracy, and the dashed expectations of the 
people, which hampered the legitimacy of post-colonial leaders (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2006). In 
his view, Ajayi (1982) notes that the post-colonial leaders were preoccupied with how to 
retain power, without identifying a clear ideology or goals for the new government. Because 
of this, many interest associations began to see the military as a more effective substitute for 
the post-colonial elites. Nzongala-Ntalaja (2006:13) points out that “the democracy 
movement in Africa today is a social protest against the failure of the neo-colonial state to 
live up to the people’s expectations of independence, including the fulfilment of their basic 
human needs”. Democracy was expected to solve the problems of poverty, reduce human 
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right abuses, and bring about development. But early democracy dividends could not deliver. 
Describing the nature of democracy that Africans witnessed, a scholar posits: 
Totally indifferent to the character of the state. Democratic 
elections are being held to determine who will exercise the 
powers of the state as if it has no implications for 
democracy. But its implications are so serious that 
elections in Africa give the voter only a choice between 
oppressors. This is hardly surprising since post-colonial 
Africa largely retains the colonial state structure that is 
inherently anti-democratic, being the repressive apparatus 
of an occupying power. Unchangingly, this structure has 
survived, reproduced and [been] rejuvenated by the legacy 
of military and single party rule. So what has been 
happening now by way of democratisation is that self-
appointed military or civilian leaders are being replaced by 
elected dictators (Ake 1993:4). 
Like many other third world countries, the demand for democratic rule among African 
countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, was not just for mere transitions. It was also about 
forcing accountability among the ruling elite, and ushering in political liberalism. Stressing 
the importance of a democratic government, Carothers (2002) notes that transition elections 
will accord the new elites democratic legitimacy, and also hopes they would restore popular 
participation and enforce accountability among the elites to their citizens. According to 
Lonsdale (1986), “political accountability, or public morality, is the chief end of political 
freedom”. It is from this point that it became very important for there to be a political 
cleansing among the post-colonialist leaders who subjected the African states to abject 
poverty. 
  In order to correct the political problems introduced by the nationalist leaders, armies 
in Africa started overthrowing nationalist governments, promising to bring about order, 
reduce mismanagement and, in a short time, return the country to civilian government. The 
issues that the military came to address ranged from economic crisis, unbearable poverty, 
exploitation, regional/ethnic disunity and relegation, political suppression of opposition, 
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maladministration, foreign interference, personal and corporate interest protection, and so on 
(Gutteridge, 1975; Baynham, 1992; Adeshina, 1999; Lugman and Omede, 2011). For 
instance, discussing why the military took power during the first military coup in Nigeria in 
1966, Joseph (1987) reports that Major Nzeogwu who led the first coup in Nigeria reckoned 
in his speech that coming into power was to stop the civilians he described as enemies due to 
the way they involved in all kinds of impunities, make development difficult due to bribes 
they take as well as play ethnic politics which has made the country more divided.  
As a consequence of such an assertion, with open-arms, many African countries who 
shared the same fate as Nigerians had from their extravagant nationalist leaders began to 
welcome military involvement in African politics, with the hope that they would serve as a 
protective measure, and restore political stability, returning the country to democratic rule as 
promised. Unfortunately, what was expected to be a corrective measure worsened the 
situation. African countries not only experienced economic and political woes, but human 
right abuses became common under the various military regimes. Mindful of the history of 
incessant military coups, scholars have identified several military interventions to have been 
huge threats that challenged Africa’s democracy (Onwumechili, 1998; Kieh and Agbese, 
2004; Lindberg and Clark, 2008). Nevertheless, military rulers cannot be blamed completely, 
as they managed to fulfil some of their promises, such as returning power to their civilian 
counterparts, though this happened under the auspices of internal and external pressure. 
Lugman and Omede (2011) note that despite their achievements, the performances of military 
regimes were not so different when compared with their civilian predecessors, noting that 
military regimes in African continents were guilty of the same crimes as their civilian 
counterparts. This is the reason that many countries across Africa provide proof of the 
plundering and bad governance associated with military rule. 
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Given the example of the situation of military regimes in Africa, Joseph (1987: 67-8) 
reasoned that military involvement in African politics was intended to play curative role to a 
system already in collapse due to anomalies associated with post-independence politicians. 
However, the military that was considered as a quick remedy to the already existed problem 
could not put bad governance to a stop instead extended their stay in power as well as 
brought more hardship (Joseph, 1987). It was obvious that the armies of many African 
countries were not ready for democracy, but were largely interested in sharing the political 
spoils. Having tested the importance of power, the military persisted in remaining in 
government and consolidate power. As a result, Ake (1994) decries that the continent of 
Africa thrived on the setting up of a rebranded colonial state that was shaped by personal 
rule, a one-party system, and military rule, but that his ‘form of state cannot be bent to the 
service of democracy’. An author argues: 
The self-appointed agents of democratisation in Africa are 
implausible. They are not so much supporting democracy 
as using it . . . the African elite support democracy only as 
a means of power, the international development agencies 
support it as an asset to structural adjustment and western 
governments support it ambiguously torn between their 
growing indifference to Africa and their desire to promote 
their own way of life ( Ake 1993: 4). 
It is especially disappointing that nationalist leaders, who saw the harsh experiences 
imposed on the people by the colonialists, could not make amends and instead continued in 
the same direction. There were injustices and various human right abuses during colonial 
rule, which necessitated the constant demand to end colonial rule. Ihonvbere (1996) notes 
that the post-colonialists not only neglected the economy, but violated all established rules 
guiding politics and its competition in African states. It can be recalled that just after political 
independence, African leaders rationalised that one-party could help build national unity 
which would eventually set the pace for economic prosperity. A one-party system was 
supported because it resembled Africa’s traditional forms of democracy, which encouraged 
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consensus building, and was antithetical to the Western form of democracy, which 
encouraged opposition.  
Without any doubt, post-colonial politics was hugely influenced by the colonial 
experience. On the other hand, the exclusion of the people from government and decision 
making were wrong approaches taken by African nationalist leaders who saw themselves as 
equal to their colonial administrators. The political struggle that characterises African politics 
today stems from the fact that the excluded majority have continued to struggle for inclusion, 
while those in political positions stifle political space and, by so doing, make the political 
struggle highly contentious. Therefore, to encourage inclusive or participatory democracy 
towards consolidation, this thesis argues that the unwillingness of political elites to 
compromise over their differences ruined every effort to achieving democratic consolidation. 
Elite compromise, through coherence and commitment to democracy, can foster democratic 
consolidation in African countries, especially in Ghana and Nigeria.  
Nevertheless, in a few cases during the 1990s, post-independence ruling elites have 
responded positively from societal pressures, in an attempt to providing democratic values 
and consolidation. However, apart from the success stories recorded in some African 
countries, the euphoria and hope that arose during transitions have not been reflected 
positively in some African countries. Irrespective of the vibrant civil society groups across 
Africa, and the various financial assistance and moral support, building a lasting democracy 
(that involves the consolidation of democracy) in Africa has remained a nightmare. It looks 
like some political elites have failed to replicate the efforts made by other political elites in 
some of the successful countries. This current study is geared towards understanding what led 
to the different political outcomes in African countries, with regard to democratic 
consolidation. Given the vast difference between African countries, it is important to 
29 
 
understand whether the historical perspective of some African countries can help identify the 
divergences and differences in the attitudes of the elites. 
Since the African transitions in the 1990s, ruling elites and the opposition have had 
one political culture in common. The political elites have played politics of acrimony and 
hardly cared about the fundamental principles guiding elections. This kind of culture makes 
the elites show less empathy towards the democratic process. Elites sometimes do not 
maintain a general agreement on the rules of the game, tolerate the position of the opposition, 
or embrace an open and transparent electoral process. Nzongala-Ntalaja (2006), thinks that 
this kind of political culture is a consequence of opportunism, which takes precedence over 
democratic principles, as most leaders have failed to hold to accepted agreements after 
negotiations. For instance, John Jerry Rawlings failed to honour the electoral principles in the 
Ghanaian general presidential elections of 1992, which led to the opposition party’s boycott 
of the subsequent parliamentary elections. Several other countries have also violated 
democratic principles, largely in order to consolidate the interests of the ruling elites against 
the opposition. In an attempt to outsmart other elites, politicians have used their ethnicities as 
benchmarks for political portfolios, and this has jeopardised politics of national unity.  
Transition in Africa came with suspicion among the elites, which increases the 
importance of elite compromise if democracy is to survive. Despite the fact that post-
independence elites in Africa have failed to establish liberal democracy in most of Africa, 
some African elites have made giant strides towards democratic consolidation. While this 
work considers that several other factors have contributed to the low level of democracy in 
Africa, it maintains that the major problem facing democracy in Africa is the role of the 
elites. In a divided society like Africa, democracy can thrive only when the political elites 
design a structure capable of turning the fragmented societies in Africa into stable 
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democracies. This thesis argues that this is achievable when there is elite coherence and 
commitment to democracy. 
2.3  Research Argument 
The central argument of this thesis is that differing attitudes among political elites in 
Africa can explain a good deal about democratic outcomes. This argument aligns with several 
other scholars who have debated at length on the importance of political elites in a 
democracy, starting from the scholarly works of Mosca and Pareto. Addressing the nature of 
elites and how they come into political limelight, Mosca (1923/1939:51) refers to them as 
tiny minorities that outwit groups of majorities by using influential factors, by means of 
material, intellectual, or even moral superiority over the governed. According to Mosca 
(1939) “in all societies, from less developed to the most advanced, there is a class that rules 
and a class that is ruled.... the class that rules is few, whereas the second, the more numerous 
class, is directed at and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now 
more or less arbitrary and violent” (p.50). In his words, Pareto (1916/1935) describes political 
elites as the most talented and deserving individuals, who use their unrestricted mobility as 
their main feature of political rule in a society, in order to force, persuade and enjoy special 
advantages over others, from their inherited wealth or family connections. Their wealth and 
family connections make them stand out among others, and this makes them influence certain 
issues, even though such issues may be against the public’s interests. Still focusing on the 
political elites, Bunce (2000: 709) argues that “if political leaders, for various reasons, are 
understood to be the founders of democracy, then they also often function, after that initial 
breakthrough, as its sustainers or its underminers”. The argument from Bunce (ibid) 
maintains that the elites actually play a large role in democratic outcomes, as their actions 
could either promote or hinder the processes. Diamond (1999) identifies the elites as the most 
crucial group in democratisation, and specifies that consolidation includes two factors: norms 
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and behaviour. He places these two factors into three main levels of consolidation: elites as 
the top decision makers; the intermediary level (parties) as the organisations; and movements 
as the last level which consist of the masses (Diamond, 1999). According to him the highest 
level are made up of “the country’s elites, top decision makers, organisational leaders, 
political activists and opinion shapers in politics, government, the economy and society” 
(Diamond, 1999 p:66). In agreement with Diamond’s view on the elites, Bunce (2000) posits 
that “democracy is understood to be a by-product of elite actions, which are understood in 
turn to be a by-product of larger social forces”. In his view, “elites are seen as summarisers of 
long-term developments and as well, serve as the representatives of larger social forces” 
(Bunce, 2000:708). 
However, the arguments from scholars about the possibility of democratic 
consolidation through external assistance and civil society group are not made in isolation. 
This is because some countries have democratised and consolidated through civil society, 
foreign influence or aid. The thesis supports the bulk of transition and consolidation 
literatures that favour discussion of democracy as an instrument brought about by the elites. 
The reason for this stand is because the elites are always the ones that take responsibility of 
whatever happens in a society and takes blame for whatever goes right or wrong in day-to-
day country’s political outcomes. The attitude that the political elites exhibits accounts for 
how unsuccessful or successful democracies become. The question is, what is the link 
between the political elites and democratic consolidation? The importance of elites in the 
consolidation of democracy is illustrated in the work of Diamond (1999), who sees elites as 
the lynchpin in consolidating democracy in developing nations like Ghana and Nigeria. 
In his seminal paper, Rustow (1970:356) argues that democracy “is acquired by a 
process of conscious decision at least on the part of the top political leadership… A small 
circle of leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role”. Huntington (1984) notes  that 
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“democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. 
Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is 
as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy” (212). In the words of 
Rustow (1970): “Democracy, like any collective human action, is likely to stem from a large 
variety of mixed motives. … In so far as it is a genuine compromise it will seem second best 
to all major parties involved… What matters at the decision stage is not what values the 
leaders hold dear in the abstract, but what concrete steps they are willing to take” (357).  
In the Latin American countries of Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Colombia the political 
elites showed a commitment to establishing and maintaining democracy (Hartlyn, 1988; 
Peeler, 1985; Mainwaring, 1989). These political elites decided to commit to democracy as 
they had some misunderstandings and divisions in the past which were likely to jeopardise 
the political elite’s relationship. For this reason, the political elites considered that for them to 
effectively work together in getting democracy right, there was a need to compromise and 
develop ways of institutionalising a structure capable of preventing democracy from 
decaying. Mainwaring (1989) notes that commitment from the political elites and established 
institutions makes democracy more likely to survive in difficult times. Commitment to 
democracy in the words of Bratton and Mattes (2001:448) refers to both intrinsic and 
instrumental commitment to democracy which they maintain is necessary for democratic 
consolidation. According to them, when people support democracy intrinsically, their 
commitment to democracy is ‘for better or worse’ where such regime has the potentials to 
endure a fragile political regime notwithstanding economic problem and social disturbance. 
When citizens support democracy instrumentally, that means, such commitment is 
conditional and they are likely to withdraw their support if democracy fails to provide them 
with some dividends (Bratton and Matt, 2001: 448). However, whether intrinsic or 
instrumental, nobody ever does something just for doing sake. People always have mixed 
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motivations for doing things and instrumentalism probably is one reason but not the only 
reason. If it is instrumentalism, people can develop networks, skills, experience and 
cooperation despite reasons. All these inculcate coherence among the political elites no 
matter whether the starting point is instrumentalism or not. 
This thesis agrees that other factors, external or internal, can make some recalcitrant 
political elite leaders succumb to democracy, but this does not apply to all cases. This is 
because some ruling political elites or authoritarian leaders might ignore whatever pressure is 
asserted on them. For example, some political elite leaders like Biya of Cameroon have 
experienced a great deal of internal and external pressures for full transitions in their 
countries, yet they have failed to succumb to such pressures. However, there are cases where 
such pressures might make the political elite initiate a transition, such as Ghana, where the 
military regime and civilian governments of Jerry Rawlings and the international agencies 
and civil society played dominant roles. 
Many scholars have proposed theories of democratic consolidation and noted how 
countries in Southern America have successfully used consociationalism to build a strong 
commitment to democracy, which results in democratic stability. By consociationalism the 
thesis means a state with various internal divisions comprising of ethnic, language and 
religious differences, where no single division is large enough to form a government, and 
elites from those divisions manage to create a stable government after compromising on their 
differences. This thesis argues alongside (Berman, 1998; Branch & Cheeseman, 2008; 
Lindemann, 2008) that the problem confronting African democracy has been the acrimony 
resulting from fragmentation among the elites who hold close to their ethnic groups. African 
countries are ethnically diverse which made them vulnerable to conflict as the elite live in 
suspicion and fear due to inherited and ugly experiences from the past, such as the civil war, 
like in Nigeria in the late 1960s. For this reason, Lindemann (2008:1) describes Sub-Saharan 
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Africa as doomed states where violent conflict is almost unavoidable.  Problems associated 
with ethnic diverse, elite fragmentation, and conflict may put the elites at loggerheads with 
regards to which ethnic group controls the government, especially when each elite holds unto 
its ethnic cleavage and in this situation, democracy suffers. Various researchers have written 
much about how other factors have facilitated democratic consolidation, no scholar has 
considered the impact of the political elites to democratic consolidation through elite 
commitment to democracy and elite coherence. So, there is limited research in this area, 
especially as no scholar has been able to establish what role the political elites in Africa have 
played towards the consolidation of democracy. While this thesis is in agreement with the 
various theoretical studies on democratic consolidation, it deviates a little to cover the 
loophole other scholars have neglected with regards to the role of the political elites in 
African democratic consolidation. This thesis argues that if there is elite coherence and elite 
commitment to democracy, it will boost the chances of democratic consolidation, especially 
in ethnically divided countries such as Ghana and Nigeria. 
The research gap links with the ongoing scholarly debate on democratic consolidation 
where answers diverge. However, there are two distinguished points of agreement. Majority 
of the scholars who have written about democratic consolidation ask the same kind of 
question and support their answers with similar type of proof. The question they seek to 
provide an answer for is not how democracies come into existence but how democracy in 
existence can be consolidated. The proof scholars have provided through various scholarly 
works, all consist of recent information on this topic. While these scholars have proposed and 
explained ways through which democratic consolidation can be actualized, like the study 
about elite commitment to democracy in the Latin American countries where the elites 
commit to ensuring democratic stability and consolidation, none of these scholars recognised 
the importance of the political elites toward democratic consolidation in Africa, especially, in 
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Ghana and Nigeria. It is on this backdrop that this thesis has identified a gap and seeks to 
close it. 
The study intends to address the existing gap in the democratic consolidation 
literature. So, the thesis examines how elite coherence (coalition/alliances, tolerance) is being 
used by the African political elites to promote social relationship and compatibility among 
fragmented political elites. It analyses how their relationship through alliances and tolerance 
have enhanced their coherence which is necessary for democratic consolidation. The study 
also looks at how elite commitment to democracy can promote democratic consolidation. The 
rationale is that the political elite may have not shown the needed commitment that would 
make some institutional and structural factors to flourish and allows for democratic 
consolidation. To this effect, electoral commission, party-financing and anti-corruption are 
the benchmark used for this analysis to measure political elite commitment to democracy. 
Finally, the study explores and explains how the combination of elite coherence and elite 
commitment to democracy can help facilitate democratic consolidation.  
Having stated this, the next section discusses the approach taken to tackle the research 
problems. 
2.4  Research Method and Design 
2.4.1 Method of Data Collection: Interviews and Semi-Structured interviews 
This research makes use of interviews because the thesis intends to get detailed, 
complex information from the respondents. However, this kind of data collection does not 
give respondents any opportunity to look for already existing answers, though existing 
answers may be correct, it can be misleading at the time as some of the data analysis already 
existed online. It is important to use interviews to understand the actual feelings of the 
respondents. Another reason why this research considers interviews to be preferable to any 
other method of data collection is that interviews help the researcher gather both verbal and 
non-verbal queues from respondents, as body language can actually show when a respondent 
is interested or uncomfortable while reacting to semi-structured interview questions. 
However, this kind of research is capital intensive. As this research compares two 
West African countries (Ghana and Nigeria), the research quest for well-informed answers 
incurred personal costs in an attempt to get the right interviewees. The size of the sample this 
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thesis wants to cover can be a problem too. It would take a lot time to key down the data 
gathered. Interviewing government officials, serving and none serving military officers, or 
other top ranked officers, was very problematic as some of them would not allow direct 
quotations. In such situations, respondents can be assured that their names would not be cited, 
and that symbols would be used to identify them. 
In this research, semi-structured interviews are used. A semi-structured interview of 
this type is important because it fosters understanding about how the individual views a given 
set of problems. Semi-structured interviews are generally organised around a set of 
established open-ended questions, with other questions likely to emerge as the discussion 
between the interviewer and respondents goes on. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews are 
the most used interview style when conducting qualitative research, be it with an individual 
or a group of people (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). Alvesson and Deetz (2000;194) 
note that semi-structured interviews are most common when it comes to all qualitative 
research methods. This is the reason Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) reckon that gathering 
information is much easier and more effective using semi-structured interviews. It helps to 
unfold unknown ‘facets of human and organisational behaviour’ (Qu and Dumay, 2011). 
According to Cohen and Crabtree (2006), semi-structured interviews help the interviewer 
determine the direction of the discussion, which helps provide reliable comparable qualitative 
data. 
Cohen and Crabtree (2006) note that jotting notes while respondents give information 
can be difficult, due to the interviewer’s inability to concentrate. Taking notes in such a 
situation results in poor note taking, and will distract from effective understanding between 
the interviewer and respondent. 
 The kind of question that this research used while conducting the interviews was 
open-ended. According to Granato (2002), “asking open-ended questions encourages a source 
to open up topic areas you might not have considered”. Pelto and Pelto (1978) note that the 
various dimensions of data derived from open-ended questions allows a researcher an 
understanding of organisational patterns, that is empirically in existence under the course of 
study. 
 In this kind of data collection, it is not important to interview everyone in the state to 
be able to reach a valid finding, but a sample of the subset of the population in the two 
countries, especially as they are both diverse. In conducting the interviews the thesis 
37 
 
considered balancing it so as to reflect the views of the minorities in both countries. The 
interviews were largely open-ended to enable the generation of ideas on the differences 
between how elites operate and behave, with regards to democratic consolidation in the two 
countries. The thesis used a quota sampling method, where it was able to decide the number 
and characteristics of the people it would interview. In this regard, twenty-five (25) 
politically-informed personalities in each country were carefully selected for an in-depth 
interview in order to uncover salient areas of the teething problems that this study seeks to 
examine.  Each appointment lasted between 30 and 45 minutes, and answers were given in 
English, the official language of both countries. Information was gathered using a tape-
recorder. 
 Notwithstanding several secondary materials online, this thesis believes that 
interviews will help uncover what elites do. The elite interview is considered above 
everything else because there is a need to hear from the horse’s mouth, from the elites 
themselves. In their definition about elites, Higley and Burton (2006) identify them as 
‘people who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and 
movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially’. The significance of 
interviewing the elites in this research is because they are in a position to give accounts of 
their actions and inactions. In every society some people speak for others, and because the 
elites have the knowledge, political status and power to stand on behalf of others, this thesis 
considers them appropriate for interview. By the political elite, this thesis refers to those who 
can influence popular decisions, because of the position they occupy or because they are 
endowed intellectually. The political elites in this sense include traditional rulers, current and 
past government officials, party leaders, election official, members of the civil society group, 
university lecturers, lawyers, retired military officers, and serving military officers. 
Traditional rulers in Africa played a prominent role during the colonial era. They 
served as the link between the local people and the White men. They are a symbol of 
authority and are well respected because of their royalty. Their initial role of representing 
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their people during colonialism still affects day-to-day activities in their communities, as they 
remain spokesmen in their communities and command obedience. Government officials in 
both Nigeria and Ghana run the government and understand it better than others, because of 
this interviewing them was useful. Meanwhile, civil society groups are known for their strong 
opposition to the ruling government and they have served as government watchdog in order 
to advance public opinion. Because civil society groups represent the interests of the public, 
their inclusion in the interviews in Ghana and Nigeria is necessary. The university lecturers 
are academicians and their wealth of knowledge singled them out as elites that understand 
politics and are able to shape the views of others. In African political context, especially in 
Ghana and Nigeria, university lecturers serve as political advisers and consultants to the 
politicians. By this standard, the thesis referred to them as the political elites. The thesis 
argues that in Africa, during elections or in times of political discussions, some of these 
lecturers are called upon to debate on political matters in the national television channels and 
by doing so, they are in effect, impacting on political consciousness of the politicians and the 
citizens. Some of the retired army officers were the ones who relinquished political power to 
the civilians and as such had a stake in the democracy in Africa. So, it is important to ask for 
the opinions of the retired military officers when democracy matters are discussed. It is 
believed that the ideas of all the participants interviewed in this research will reflect the 
general opinions of Nigerian and Ghanaian citizens regarding democratic consolidation in 
their countries, as they have remained pivotal in the political activities of the two countries. 
2.4.2 Sampled Countries Selection Procedure 
The conditions for selecting the two postcolonial states for comparative study was 
informed by the understanding that Ghana and Nigeria are both located in the West of Africa. 




The two countries are similar in that each has experienced a series of military coups. 
Boafo-Arthur (2008), highlights the various military interventions in Ghana, occurring in 
1966, 1972, 1978, 1979 and 1981, as well as in Nigeria in 1966, 1975, 1983, 1985 and 1993. 
They also share some similarities in their electoral systems. The two countries have an 
electoral body responsible for conducting elections. The two countries have both made use of 
secret and open balloting. The systems of government in both countries have been 
presidential with representative governments. In this regard, people elect their lawmakers, 
who are in return accountable to them. In both countries, there are the upper (The Senate) and 
the lower (House of Representatives) chambers that are elected to serve for a tenure of four 
years, and are constitutionally entitled for another four years in a re-election. 
Notwithstanding the similarities between Ghana and Nigeria, the two countries have 
experienced differences in how successfully they have undergone attempts to consolidate 
democracy. While Ghana has had three turnovers since 1992, Nigeria has managed just one 
in 2015. 
 Figure 1 Case Selection in Comparing Nigeria and Ghana 
Dimensions of comparison 
 
Similarities between Nigeria and 
Ghana 
Difference between Nigeria and Ghana 
 
 English speaking countries 
 West African countries 
 British colonies 
 Military rule with short 
civilian regimes 
 Counter military coups 






One of the primary assets of the case study is its ability to provide in-depth analysis. It 
gives details on issues researchers witness when studying cross-unit analysis. A cross-unit 
case can satisfactorily explain the reason for consolidating democracy in a country, a case 
study of the same country will explain the specific reason for its occurrence, but will also 
give a detailed analysis. When such occurrences take place, the ways they happened, and the 
factors that led to such occurrences, can also be examined. 
2.4.3  Research Design 
In order to avoid producing data that is unclear, this thesis intends to use the “Most 
Similar System Design” (MSSD). In a comparative research method, there are two types of 
system designsthe “most similar system design (MSSD) and the “most different system 
design” (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Landman, 2003). In contrasting MSSD and 
MDSD, scholars  posit:  
The most similar system design is based on a belief that a 
number of theoretically significant differences will be 
found among similar systems and that these differences 
can be used in explanation. The alternative design, which 
seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is 
based on a belief that in spite of intersystemic 
differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to 
only a limited number of variables or relationships 
(Przeworski and Teune,1970) 
 
In a social enquiry of two countries, MSSD compares political systems that are identical in 
their features, so that the differences between the two countries can be eliminated while 
highlighting other features. This comparative method is important for this thesis because the 
two case study countries share almost everything in common, and the idea here is to 
understand what led to the differences in democratic consolidation. In the works of John 
Stuart Mill (1843), “method of difference” MSSD recognises basic differences between two 
similar countries, which explain the differences in the political outcome under examination. 
Scholars are of the view that the number of explainable variables that emerge can be reduced 
so as to achieve explanation during empirical analysis (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Hopkin, 
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2002; Landman, 2003). Hopkin (2002:254) notes that when some variables are held constant, 
this does not necessarily mean that they are the cause of the difference between them. For this 
reason, Hopkin (2002:254) concludes that: “There will always be enough difference between 
cases to over-determine the dependent variable”. On the other hand, Theda Skocpol (1979), 
in her research on why revolutions occurred in China, Old Russia and France, provides a 
good example of Most Different System Design (MDSD). In this comparative method, it 
helps to reduce variables by disregarding irrelevant systemic factors, that is, where there are 
evidences of similar relationships between dependent and independent. In this situation, the 
systemic differences can be ignored. 
However, the appropriate comparative design method for this thesis is the MSSD as 
the aim is to understand the areas of difference between the two cases. In this work, I want to 
know how and why democratic consolidation occurs.. The two countriesthis research is 
comparing must have had transitions, and conducted at least two elections in their political 
histories since transition. This study is about the political elite, and understanding what the 
elites in one country have done to achieve democratic consolidation, and why elites in 
another country struggle to do the same. The thesis is interested in understanding the level of 
elite coherence, looking at indicators like alliances/coalitions and tolerance. Other indicators, 
like electoral commission, party financing, and anti-corruption, will be used to understand the 
level of elites commitment to democracy in both countries. All these indicators shall be used 
to explain differences in democratic consolidation between Ghana and Nigeria. 
 In comparing the elites in the two nation-states of Nigeria and Ghana, and their 
respective plural societies with regard to democratic consolidation, we are in effect dealing 
with a continuous and dynamic historical process that has various manifestations across time 
and space. It is imperative to note that there is evidence that demonstrates, beyond reasonable 
doubt that the two countries vary significantly in the behaviour of the political elites towards 
democratic consolidation. This is viewed within the context of how democracy fares in the 
two countries under study. While the elites of the two countries share similar national 
characteristics, the differences between them remain quite profound and are manifested in 






The concluding chapters have carefully addressed the research focus and the backgrounds 
of the two country’s cases as it affects democratic consolidation in Africa, Ghana and Nigeria for 
example. It also discusses the main research question which as well as the detailed profiles of the 
two countries and the research plans. The problem that this thesis seeks to solve was also 
discussed in the concluding chapter. The chapters also cover the historical overview of 
democracy and democratic consolidation in Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. The 
argument of the thesis, the method and research design is discussed in the concluding chapters. In 
the next chapter, this research shall look into some review of literatures on democratic 
consolidation, elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence. It will also discuss how some 


















Rethinking Democracy Consolidation via Elite Commitment to Democracy and Elite 
Coherence 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on democratic consolidation, focusing on elite 
commitment to democracy and elite coherence, in order to understand how the connection 
between these two factors can promote democratic outcomes. As many African countries, 
during their times of transition into democracy battled military regimes amidst ethnic 
polarisation, this research argues that with elite commitment to democracy and elite 
coherence, democracy would be consolidated in emerging democracies like Ghana and 
Nigeria. After reviewing literature on democratic consolidation, literature on elite 
commitment to democracy and elite coherence shall be considered further. It is from these 
two factors that the theoretical framework for this research is developed. 
Democratisation has four stages: the decay of the autocratic regime; transition; 
consolidation; and the maturation of a democratic political order (Shin, 1994: 143). This 
thesis is interested in one stage, consolidation. These two stages according to Huntington 
(1992) are the most closely examined topics among scholars of democratisation. However, 
the main concern of this thesis is to understand what makes democratic consolidation 
possible in countries, and why some countries struggle to consolidate. The processes that 
drive this change in these stages, as Huntington (1992) points out above, arise from the 
preferences of elites, pressures from the masses or civil society groups, as well as the impact 
of external pressures. On this backdrop, it is necessary to consider the various approaches in 
the democratic consolidation literature, and then understand how political elites can use elite 
coherence and elite commitment to democracy to achieve democratic consolidation in Africa, 
especially in Ghana and Nigeria. 
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3.1.2 Democratic Consolidation 
This thesis has argued alongside other scholars that for democracy to be consolidated, 
the political elites have huge roles to play (Higley & Gunther, 1992; Burton et al.1992; 
Gunther et al. 1995). This does not mean that democratic consolidation is dependent on 
political elites alone, so it is important to study other factors. 
  Scholars have debated on what factors facilitate democratic consolidation. While few 
scholars have  seen the civil society or foreign assistance as facilitating factors (Resnick, 
2012:4; Levitsky & Way, 2005:22; Carothers, 1999). Other scholars have argued that parties 
and party-systems’ institutionalisation can facilitate democratic consolidation (Mainwaring & 
Scully, 1995; Sandbrook, 1996; Randall & Svassand, 1999). Before further discussion on 
democratic consolidation, it is important to understand what authors mean by democratic 
consolidation. Consolidation of democracy is likely when several conditions exist, “a free and 
lively civil society”, an independent and valued political society, an existence of rule of law, 
a strong state bureaucracy, and an institutionalised political society (Linz & Stepan, 1996:7). 
In other words, scholars observe: 
A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate 
political alternatives and to monitor government and state 
can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help 
push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and 
help deepen democracy. At all stages of the 
democratisation process, therefore, a lively independent 
civil society is invaluable (Linz and Stepan,1996:9). 
 Linz and Stepan’s (1996) postulation on civil society wonders whether there are 
factors that make civil society groups strong in one country, and weak in another, or whether 
civil societies in countries can be completely independent. For Diamond (1994:15) 
“Consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly 
legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioural 
and institutional changes that normalise democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty”. To 
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both Linz and Stepan (1996), the factors they consider as necessary for consolidation are 
effective where no antidemocratic forces stand in the way of democratic survival. One puzzle 
is to capture what Diamond (1994) refers to as the "process”, because the word process 
connotes something ongoing. So at what stage will democracy reach an end point or will it be 
a perpetual process of no return? Clarifying this concept, Linz and Stepan (1996:6), highlight 
three important aspects to consider when analysing whether a regime could be deemed 
consolidated: behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional(1996). The behavioural aspect states 
that no political actor or group of persons embark on any selfish attempt to create a 
nondemocratic regime or resort to violence or foreign intervention to overthrow the 
democratic regime. The attitudinal aspect stipulates that the regime is consolidated when the 
generality of the people are in consent and show their strong belief that democratic means are 
the most appropriate way of governing a society, and where anti-government alternatives are 
meagre or isolated from pro-democratic forces. Finally, the constitutional aspect states that 
the regime is consolidated when the government, together with the whole country’s 
nongovernmental forces, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict 
through the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic 
process (Linz and Stepan, 1996:6). In other words, a regime that commands legitimacy 
among the citizens, is supported and respected and as a matter of fact, commands compliance 
and obedience among the citizens, is consolidated. 
Among other theories of democratic consolidation, emphasis has also been placed on 
party institutionalisation (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Randall & Svasand, 2002:6). Scholars 
like Lewis (1994) and Diamond (1989) highlight the importance of institutionalisation. 
Scholars actually mean that a certain level of organisation is important in individual parties. 
This will help parties behave and a culture that will make them relate to other parties against 
been violent. It is on this backdrop that the work of Zmerli, et al.(2007), reason that mutual 
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trust is the engine of every political process. According to them, political trust can flourish 
where social trust emanates from mutual reciprocity which encompasses social participation 
and helps build political institutions which in turn constitute the necessary conditions that 
enhance efficient government (Zmerli et al., 2007). This is because democratic consolidation 
includes transforming individual cultural values and building political institutions.  
From the minimalist point of view, Linz (1990:158) argues that “a consolidated 
democracy is one in which none of the major political parties or organisations, interests, 
forces, or institutions consider that there is no any alternative to the democratic process to 
gain power, and that no political institutions or group has a claim to veto the actions of 
democratically elected decision makers”. It seems Linz is advising that in a democratic 
system, gaining political power must come through the process of election and any other 
means contravenes the democratic process. 
Diamond (1999) discusses two conditions that are required to consolidate democracy. 
First, it will take place only where all the major actors in politics agree to follow the rules of 
the democratic process. Second, democracy consolidates if the elites, parties and other 
interest groups believe that the democratic system is legitimate, and accept it as the only form 
of government. The cornerstone of Diamond’s (1999) proposition is that the ruling party, 
oppositions, and the common people must accept the system as the best form of government, 
believe in it and respect the laws. Consolidation takes time and the processes come in stages, 
as asserted by Carothers (2002) who posits that it is “a slow but purposeful process in which 
democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state 
institutions, the regularisation of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall 
habituation of the society to the new democratic “rules of the game”. Schedler (2001), who 
termed “behavioural consolidation” notes that the behavioural aspect receives widespread 
support among scholars like Diamond (1999:65-72), Linz and Stepan (1996:5-6), and 
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Gunther et al. (1995:7). By antidemocratic behaviour, authors refer to those actions that 
negate the full compliance of democratic behaviour, or what Schedler (2001) sees as leaving 
“democratic consensus” to accommodate “antidemocratic behaviour” through resorting to 
“the use of violence, rejection of election and transgression of authority”. According to these 
theorists, violence subverts the core values of democracy which require that all actors should 
play according to the rules. Schedler (2001) warns that politically motivated violence, such as 
incessant assassination of political opponents, infringement on individual liberty, political 
intimidation of the electorate and opponents, attempts to overthrow elected members, and 
riots, are evidence that democracy is far from consolidation and falls short of behavioural 
conditions. With regards to rejection of elections, Diamond (1995:65) advises on the need to 
“conform to the written and unwritten rules of the game” in a representative democracy as 
these give credence to accepting the basic principals that promote ‘free and fair competitive 
elections’. When these conditions are respected, Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that the three 
related conditions would guide the newly emerging democrats in their attempt to consolidate 
democracy. If everyone develops the attitude that democracy is the best form of government 
and has come to stay, then there is a need to stick to the rules guiding it. If this perception is 
valued, there is a tendency for democratic values to be respected.. Therefore, when everyone 
exhibits the habit of respecting the fundamental values of democracy, no person or group of 
persons can go contrary to the rules enshrined in the constitution. No one will take laws into 
their own hands by creating a government of the few which opposes democracy or makes the 
transitional regime breakdown. 
Przeworski (1990) suggests that democracy can only survive where all major political 
actors have a stake in it. This demands that ‘no major political actors violate basic democratic 
rules anymore’ (Schedler 2001:72), as any negative attitude might put democracy at risk. 
Schedler (2001) advocates for normative elements to guide the attitudes of actors. These 
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include democratic legitimacy and non-instrumental basic support for democracy by the elites 
and the electorates. Schedler (2001) is emphasising the importance of legitimacy for a newly 
emerging democratic government and the need for the people’s support. When a democratic 
government is deemed legitimate by the people, both the electorates and the elites will 
respect and obey the general decisions taken by the government. This normative element 
guide will help mediate and transform any conflicting outbreak between democrats and non-
democrats in a consensus manner to permit democratic interests (Schedler 2001:75-80). 
Gunther et al. (1995) agree that democracy can be consolidated if a democratic consensus is 
established which permits all politically significant groups to hold fast to democratic rules of 
the game. Diamond (1999) concurs that obedience to the law, the constitution, and 
acceptance of the common norms of political conduct, all help democratic consolidation. If 
the constituted authorities that guide the conduct and behaviour of individuals are respected, 
and people become afraid of going contrary to them, this would help stimulate democratic 
consolidation. 
For Valenzuela (1992), democracy consolidates when the actors see non-corrupt 
means of election as the only way in which a government can be created and not controlled 
by the state policies. No government policy should influence the decisions of the electorate 
during elections, or use a government institution like the electoral body to subvert electoral 
outcomes. He deems democracy to be consolidated when both legislative and other 
governmental bodies are fairly elected, are properly established without limitation, and when 
political elites and the electorates expect that the regime will last into the foreseeable future. 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) see consolidated democracy as involving a general 
acceptance of rules, that in return guarantees political participation and political competition. 
This means that the candidates selected by the citizens will help further the interest of the 
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electorates and create rules that protect the citizen’s social, economic, and political rights/ 
against resorting to none-democratic attitude.(Linz & Stepan, 1996).  
 Arguably, these rights have not been achieved anywhere in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, where elected elites often turn their backs on the electorates once they are declared 
victorious at the polls. In Africa, irrespective of Linz and Stepan's (1996) warnings against 
creating a non-democratic regime, it can be argued that about 70percent of elections since 
transition periods were hijacked and manipulated by some elites. Laakso (2007) notes that in 
the competitive elections held in Africa after the second elections, transition remains difficult 
because democratic participation is undermined by authoritarian rule and political 
suppression. Therefore, in recent times, election rigging has become a norm among African 
political elites.  
 In a minimalist view, Huntington (1991) considers democracy to be consolidated 
when two government turnovers have occurred, especially, when an opposition party has 
defeated the incumbent and in the subsequent election, the incumbent defeats the opposition 
party. From a maximalist school of thought, Beetham (1994) warns that winning political 
office is not the yardstick, but that losing it and accepting defeat is, as the ruling elites and 
their supporters must prepare to uphold and respect the rules of the game against power 
continuation.  Beetham (1994) argues that this is challenging because there is a possibility of 
having elections that reach a certain level of electoral minimum standards, but where power 
transfer may not occur because voters are bent on voting for one political party, like the cases 
of Botswana since independence, and Japan and Italy for over fifteen years (Beetham, 
1994:130). He summed up that “democracy is consolidated when a government that has itself 
elected in a free and fair contest is defeated at a subsequent election and accepts the result” 
(ibid.). The maximalist perspective received criticism from Linz and Stepan (1996) for 
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expanding a definition of democratic consolidation to include many features that are 
important when improving the general quality of democracy. 
Literature on elite pacts and democratic consolidation focuses on the adherence to the 
rules of the game by the competing elites during the processes (Rustow, 1970; Dahl, 1971; 
Higley, & Moore, 1981; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Burton, 2006). These scholars 
consider unity among the political elite to be a major role consolidating democracy, 
especially in making the elites compromise on their differences in an attempt to achieve 
democratic consolidation. 
So far, scholars have debated over the conditions necessary for democratic 
consolidation. Consolidation of democracy, we are told, is when democratic principles are 
strongly entrenched in such a way democracy survives any situation and also incapable of 
reversal or breakdown. Old and recent literatures on democratic consolidation favour three 
types of explanation. One of these, proposed by Diamond (1999) connects democratic 
consolidation to two factors, norms and behaviour. A second explanation dwells on the need 
to institutionalise political parties and party-systems (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), a third 
explanation is supported by a long line of authors including Linz and Stepan (1996) and 
Diamond (1999), who stress that the civil society influence determines democratic 
consolidation. Of course, Higley and Gunther (1992), Burton et al. (1992), Gunther et al. 
(1995), also study how the elite brought about democratic consolidation in Southern 
European and Latin American countries. Some of these explanations are compatible with 
each other, though they may also be held independently. To reconcile the argument on what 
facilitate democracy consolidation, This thesis supports the bulk of literature that favours the 
political elites. While some scholars suggest party system institutionalisation and other 
suggest involvement of the civil society. On top of these faciltating factors, the political elites 
stand out. Diamond (1999:65) is on point when he defines democratic consolidation as “the 
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process of achieving broad and deep legitimation” across class, ethnic and other boundaries. 
A new normative commitment to democratic procedures is internalised so that the actor 
“instinctively conforms to written (and unwritten) rules of the game even when they conflict 
and compete intensively”(Diamond, 1999). While scholars have written extensively on 
democratic consolidation and how it comes about, particularly in Southern Europe and Latin 
American countries, there is scant scholarly work on how political elites in Africa help in 
democratic consolidation, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. In the African context, elites are 
those who command influence in the society, including the military elites, party leaders and 
politicians, academic lecturers, and religious and traditional leaders. These elites build 
government structures and determine whether they are to function properly or not. They also 
form political parties, where they compete for the peoples’ votes. Elite coherence and elite 
commitment to democracy are used in this research to uncover how the political elites in 
Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria, transform non-democratic regime to democratic 
consolidation. 
In his seminal book, Groups in Conflict, Horowitz (1985) notes that the greatest 
serious ethnic conflicts will arise in countries where there is ethnic domination of the major 
ethnic groups against the ethnic minorities. Several scholars (Huntington, 1997; Moynihan, 
1993) have written extensively on the relationship between ethnic divisions and occurrences 
of political violence. With regards to a workable democracy in conflict-prone or divided 
societies, Reilly (2001) in his book, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering 
for Conflict Management, discusses a number of divided societies like Sri Linka, Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea, Northern Ireland, Estonia, some European countries, North America and 
Australia. He finds that an electoral system that encourages bargaining between conflictual 
political actors endorses wide-ranging political parties, and gives political competitors room 
to attract votes from various ethnic cleavages are a condition for easing communal political 
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competition among politicians in divided societies. This paragraph is important because it 
shows the likely danger countries that are ethnically divided could face if the political elites 
in those countries fail to compromise their differences. So, if political elites settle their 
differences, they are likely to form political parties that represent various ethnic groups and 
by so doing, create a goivernment that embodies national look as well as reduce political 
rancour among ethnic groups. 
However, for post conflict and ethnically divided societies to continue to work 
together, elites must learn to reconcile their differences and show trust in one another, in 
order to tolerate each other despite their rivalry. The needed unity is what allows the country 
to withstand further conflicts and at the same time binds the elites together. Kymlicka (1996) 
is of the view that for a certain level of unity to be assured, people who live under collective 
political institutions must organise themselves in such a way that they can share a mutual 
national uniqueness. If a country or society must march forward as one entity, especially in 
societies with ethno-cultural diversity, there is a need for such societies to undergo the 
process of political re-organisation, which must promote national unity in place of the ethnic 
diversity already in existence. 
This is true in Africa, where there are incidences of conflicts, wars, and political 
violence. With regards to ethnic fractionalisation, scholars discuss the primitive nature of 
ethnic divisions and conclude that these hinder sustained political stability in states 
(Huntington, 1997; Moynihan, 1993). For instance, Whitfield (2009:629) gives an example of 
the ethnic perception with regards to two major political parties in Ghana (NDC and NPP) 
where the former is referred as the Nkrumahist, and is perceived among Ghanaians as 
ethnically and socially inclusive, populist and left-wing. The NPP is perceived by Ghanaians 
as followers of the Danquah/Busia, who are elitist, ethnically exclusive, comprised of the 
Ashanti and Akyem sub-groups of the Akan tribes, liberal-democratic, and right-wing 
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(Whitfield, 2009). In a situation like this, it is possible that the political elites who identify as 
either a populist left-wing or a liberal democratic right-wing are likely to cleave unto his or 
her own ethnic group. This kind of elite fragmentation might create politics of ‘us and them’ 
which might not be good for democracy.In their study, Democratisation, Sequencing and 
State failure in Africa, Branch and Cheeseman (2008:1) identify elite fragmentation as one of 
the factors that promotes crisis in the region. Fragmentation of the political elites in Africa is 
a result of the policy of ‘divide and rule’ established in the ex-British colonies and the 
presence of ethnicity and inter-elite competition in Africa, because the political elites in the 
region are fragmented along ethnic identities (Osaghae, 1991:50). This situation is likely to 
make political elite coherence very difficult. Nevertheless, Brown (1993:112) believes that 
elite cohesion brings about political stability. It is on this basis that this thesis focuses on how 
coherence among elites in divided and fragmented societies, such as Nigeria and Ghana, can 
help facilitate democratic consolidation, despite the notion that democracy is 
characteristically difficult in societies with deep ethnic divisions. In the next discussion, this 
thesis shall review what it is meant by cohesion. It shall also discuss how elite coherence and 
democratic commitment can help facilitate democracy consolidation in ethnically divided 
societies with fragmented elites such as Ghana and Nigeria. 
3.1.3  Elite Cohesion: Empirical Review 
Literature on the concept of cohesion is not new. There have been various research 
approaches on the subject. “Coherence has to do with the degree of consensus within the 
organisation on its functional boundaries and on procedures for resolving disputes that arise 
within these boundaries” (Randall & Svasand, 2002:10). One major problem facing most 
researchers with regard to this concept is reaching an agreement on an acceptable definition 
and measurement (Duncan, 1979:180; Gibbs & Martins,1964:7; Zander, 1979:433; Siebold, 
1999:6; Mudrack, 1989:39; Bollen & Hoyle, 1990:480-481). This point is highlighted by 
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Mudrack (1989:38-39), who posits that “no definition of cohesiveness has become a 
generally accepted standard, and no uniformity has characterised the measurement or the 
operationalisation of the construct”. Siebold (1999: 5-6), notes that notwithstanding the 
misunderstanding among scholars with regard to the concept of cohesion and measurement, 
scholars still agree that cohesion is a concept that is apparently easy to understand as an 
abstract, but difficult to comprehend in the concrete. 
 The debate about the concept of cohesion resolves around a disagreement in the 
literature over whether cohesion is unidimensional or multidimensional (Cota et al.1995:573). 
A multidimensional approach to cohesion is centred on two dimensions describing 
cohesiveness from a primary point of view as cohesiveness of most groups, and the 
secondary dimension view which maintains that cohesiveness is applicable to specific types 
of groups (Cota et al.1995). The unidimensional approach is influenced by Festinger, 
Schachter and Back’s (1950) scholarly work. According to them, group cohesion was “the 
total field of forces which act on members to remain in the group”(Festinger et al.1950:164). 
They also identify two main factors that bring about group cohesiveness including the 
attractiveness of the members and their readiness to help the group reach their goals 
(Festinger et al. 1950). This hypothesis is criticised by Lott and Lott (1965), who doubt that 
attraction to a group is the same thing as cohesion. 
 With no widely accepted definition of cohesion, scholars have provided their own 
theoretical definitions of the concept. Following the definition of cohesion by Festinger et al. 
(1950), Mudrack (1989:41) deduces that cohesiveness is a result of forces that act on 
members to remain in a group, or those that attract membership to a group. In their work, 
Bollen and Hoyle (1990:482) define cohesion as a “perceived cohesion that encompasses an 
individual’s sense of belonging to a particular group and his or her feelings of morale 
associated with membership in the group”. One important thing about these definitions is that 
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each definition emphasises the individual’s connection to the group, and the ability to remain 
in the said group to achieve a certain goal. For this thesis, cohesion connotes political elite 
congruence. 
Though Weinstock (1999) notes that the relationship between cohesion and unity is 
somewhat different, he maintains that it is difficult to see a cohesive society that is not united. 
Cohesion, according to him, is a demanding goal which is not as important as an attempt to 
achieve unity, but warns that when cohesion is instantiated, it is likely to bring about unity, 
that is, there is a correlation between cohesion and unity (Weinstock, 1999). According to 
Weinstock (1999), unity is an ongoing yearning in the minds of the people in a given society 
to keep living under the same political institutions, and is without any desire to split the 
bonds holding political affiliation together. On the other hand, cohesion connotes the extent 
to which members of the society share broader ethical standards or a religious, cultural and/or 
ethnic identity above and outside their political philosophies (Weinstock, 1999). Noting the 
importance of cohesion as it affects to a country, Osaghae (1999) posits that “national 
cohesion is a process of constructing a we-ness or a sense of belonging amongst members of 
different groups in a polity, through the regulation and reconciliation of differences as well as 
competing interests and demands”. The primary aim here, according to Osaghae (1999) is to 
establish an all-embracing national community which reduces loyalty to competing ethnic, 
racial, regional and religious communities.  
With reference to the unity and national cohesion that Weinstock (1999) and Osaghae 
(1999) talk about, another scholar holds a contrary veiw and  describes the polarised nature of 
Africa as:  
...political divisions would increasingly fall along ethnic or 
regional lines, heightening tensions and, ultimately, 
threatening national unity. The volcano of ethnic or clan 
strife remains dormant throughout much of subsaharan 
Africa. But it could erupt - as it has in recent years in 
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Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan - should ethnicity 
become the leading factor in the struggle for power 
(Lancaster 1991:158) 
 
Before the third wave of democracy many African countries had civil wars, one 
problem that generated these wars was ethnicity. Ake (1993: 1) reasons that ethnicity is 
remarkably a big problem in the African continents and it results in challenges towards 
developmental projects, political instability and weak national identity. African countries are 
arguably the most divided and most conflict vulnerable in the world, the African continent 
being home to many ethnicities with different languages. Ghana and Nigeria account for over 
three hundred and fifty (350) ethnic groups between them. These ethnic divides have resulted 
in different forms of crisis, be it economic or political. Ake (1993:6) decried that 
democratisation built on ethnic struggle for power might unleash ethnic conflict which will 
not be good for democracy. The chronic instability that emanates from the deep divisions 
among these ethnic groups poses a huge challenge for the political elites as they attempt to 
achieve democratic consolidation after successful transitions in the two countries. The elites 
in Nigeria and Ghana are faced with the challenge of implementing a democratic system 
capable of national integration, that is also truly representative of all the ethnic groups, and 
then consolidating it, that is, creating a democracy that is not vulnerable to collapse. 
This work reckons that a successful consolidation of democracy is achievable in 
countries where the political elites have found a way to settle their differences and show their 
commitment to democracy by supporting government structures and institutions. This entails 
the formation of elite solidarity and common national integration, which is the fulcrum for 
elite cohesiveness in search of consolidation of democracy. Coherence among the elites is 
important in democracy because through coherence, all factions of the elite can settle their 
differences. Bollen and Hoyle (1990) see cohesion to mean individual sense of belonging. 
Festinger (1950) argues that group cohesion enable members remain in a group. According to 
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Anderson in Janda (1980) coherence is “the degree of congruence in the cultural orientations 
of various individuals and groups comprising an organisation” the degree of congruence 
referred to in this definition reflects the attitude and behaviour of the political elites especially 
in fragmented societies.  
People cannot have a sense of belonging if they are not tolerated or remain in a group 
where they are not recognized or tolerated. Living in harmony or agreement requires that 
individuals are willing to tolerate others no matter the person’s origin and before they agree 
to coexist, they have already decided to agree on their differences. Based on the definitions, 
this research defines coherence as the ability and willingness of the fragmented political elites 
to form government of alliances/coalitions and tolerance to help them tackle political 
problems even when they remain in opposition. When there is political elite coherence, 
Sartori (1995) notes that it “tames” politics of aggressive logjam into nonviolent rivalry, 
which promotes an elite settlement. Huang and Higley (1998) note that where this does not 
exist, elites are likely to disagree about some governmental institutions, and may engage in a 
harsh political rivalry with a winner-takes-all attitude. This of course does not promote 
democratic consolidation. This is why scholars like Friedrich (1942), Schatschneider (1975), 
Crick (2005), and Lijphard (1968) maintain that conflict reconciliation is important to 
democracy. Considering the history of ethnicity and elite fragmentation in Africa, this thesis 
argues that elite coherence is necessary for democratic consolidation in Africa, Ghana and 
Nigeria in particular. In the next chapter, the thesis discusses literature on commitment to 
democracy. 
3.1.4  Commitment to Democracy: Literature Review 
Few theories have been advanced on why people chose to show commitment to 
democracy. Scholars are of the view that democratization promotes living standards, supports 
the growth of the private sector, develop the urban middle class and increases the level of 
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education (Linz 1988; Lipset 1960; Lipset and Schneider 1987). On the other hand, Almond 
and Verba (1963) , Easton (1965, 1975), Wildavsky (1987),  Eckstein (1988), Inglehart 
(1990) are of the view that democratic tradition is paramount in societies where there is a 
high level of communal trust, tolerance of diversity, political interest and willingness for 
political participation.  
All the above are ingredients for democracy which largely account for various reasons 
why citizens are committed to democracy. What is commitment?  Commitment is a complex 
phenomenon. Many scholars have written on this subject and employed different meanings, 
but for this thesis, it will provide some working definitions by a few scholars. For Kanter 
(1968) commitment is seen to be a process through which individual interests become 
devoted to carrying out socially organized patterns of behaviour which are seen as rewarding 
those interests, as articulating the nature and needs of the person. Kanter’s definition of 
commitment resembles Parson and Shils’ concept of “institutionalization”: "the integration of 
the expectations of actors in a relevant interactive system of roles with a shared normative 
pattern of values."(Talcott & Shils, 1962:20).  The conception of commitment here connotes 
that actors are not just committed because of their attachment to the norms but involves other 
areas of social life. Kanter’s definition shows that individuals get committed to a course of 
action because they have basic needs motivating their involvement. In his view: 
Commitment of actors to group solidarity, to a set of 
social relationships, (cohesion commitment) involves 
primarily their forming positive cathectic orientations; 
affective ties bind members to the community, and 
gratifications stem from involvement with all the members 
of the group. Solidarity is high; "infighting" and jealousy 
low. A cohesive system can withstand threats to its 
existence; members "stick together." Commitment of 
actors to uphold norms and obey the authority of the group 
(control commitment) involves primarily their forming 




 According to Gaubatz (1996) “a state makes a commitment to a course of action 
when it creates a subjective belief on the part of others that it will carry through with a certain 
course of actions. Commitments may be trivial and involve doing things that are clearly in 
one’s interest to do. The more interesting commitments are those that bind the state to take 
some set of actions that do not look to be in its narrow self-interest as an international actor”. 
What about commitment to democracy? This question has been considered by a few 
authors. For example, Lijphart (1977) is of the view that a political elite’s strong commitment 
to democracy can help overwhelm otherwise opposing conditions in building democracy. He 
argued the unresolved characteristic feature that explains the early democracies in Latin 
America found in Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica is the commitment of political elites 
to creating and preserving a democracy (Hartlyn 1988; Peeler 2014; Levine 2015). After 
prolonged acrimony in those three countries, the political elites decided to reconcile their 
differences for their survival; as such, they constructed an institutional framework capable of 
sustaining the democracy above everything else.   
In their study about eight East European countries on citizen’s commitment to 
democracy, Evans and Whitefield (1995) see commitment to democracy from two 
perspectives, namely economic and political contexts. From their two approaches, similar to 
this thesis is commitment to democracy from a political context. In their evaluation of the 
level of democracy support in the countries under study, four factors are considered; “the 
degree to which constitutional arrangements were in place; the level of institutional conflict 
between branches of government; especially president and parliament; the development of 
the party system; and the number and outcome of elections (Evans and Whitefield, 
1995:495). Their research is different from mine, while they studied citizen’s commitment to 
democracy, this thesis is interested in political elites’ commitment to democracy. Mainwaring 
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(1989) believes “this elite commitment and the resulting institutional arrangements made 
democracy possible despite formidable obstacles”.  
Scholars believe that political actors show commitment to democracy in two ways, 
through intrinsic and instrumental rationality (Bratton and Matts, 2001; Mainwaring and 
Perez-Linan 2013). The term (intrinsic) connotes that people see democracy as the best form 
of government and decide to commit to. In such a situation, political actors will ideally 
commit to sustain democracy because they see it as the best form of political regime. 
Democracy is intrinsic when the political freedoms and equal rights that it embodies are 
valued as an end in itself and democratic commitment has the capability to withstand a fragile 
political regime amidst economic meltdown and social conflict (Bratton and Matts 2001). 
Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013) are of the view that the political elites express 
commitment to democracy in their desire to embark on policy which may hurt their personal 
interest, hence their willingness to defend the competitive regime. This is referred  to as a 
‘normative preference for democracy’(Mainwaring and Perez-Linan,2013:126). On the other 
hand, when an actor’s commitment to democracy is instrumentally based, that means they see 
the regime as a means to other ends. In this regard, elites pursue their own policy preferences 
which may make or mar democratic consolidation in those societies (Bratton and Matts, 
2001). This thesis argues that the political elites may have either an intrinsic or an 
instrumental commitment to democracy. Therefore, it is important to understand which kind 
of commitment makes democracy thrive, and which undermines it.  Elite may be committed 
to democracy in order to ensure its survival or they are committed to democracy because they 
want to protect their selfish interest. This could explain why democracy succeeds in one 
country and fails in another. For this thesis, commitment to democracy by the political elites 
intrinsically is operationalized through political elite’s ability toward ensuring the credibility 
and autonomy of the electoral commission, adhering to the rules and regulations guiding 
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party financing as well as showing unbiasedness in their efforts to combatting corruption. All 
these, according to this thesis are necessary for democratic consolidation. This contrasts 
instrumental commitment where political elites place their commitment to democracy as 
determined by what they are likely to extract from democracy which shows signs of negative 
commitment that results in pseudo-democracy. However, this work deviates from Reilly’s 
stand on ‘election’ but intends to see how cohesion and democratic commitment can 
stimulate democratic consolidation. 
My decision to consider certain institutions over others stems from the importance of 
those selected. While other institutions and structural arrangements are important, electoral 
commissions, party-financing and anti-corruption institutions are most appropriate to measure 
elite commitment to democracy. Research shows the importance of elections and how useful 
elections can be in changing the government and electing new leaders (Schumpeter, 1947: 
270; Sandbrook, 1988; Dahl, 1991). When elections are executed in the right manner, it is 
likely to be considered legitimate by the citizens. When they are wrongly conducted, they are 
likely to cause crisis or political upheaval. In the centre of whether or not an election is 
conducted the right way, is the electoral commission, established by the political elites. For 
democracy to reach consolidation, the electoral commission of the country must be allowed 
to enjoy a certain level of independence. African democracy is prone to incessant election 
rigging and this looks like a similar problem facing most African countries. Democracies in 
Africa, especially in Nigeria seem to be struggling because in most cases the electoral 
commissions work under the influence of political godfathers. Hoffmann (2010) recounts on 
how the financial ability and political connections of Chris Uba of Anambra state of Nigeria 
determined the electoral outcome in the 2003 general elections. It is not possible that Uba 
could do this without collaborating with the electoral body. Elections conducted under this 
guise end up producing incapable leaders that are answerable to their political godfathers. An 
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autonomous electoral commission is important for the conduct of free and fair elections, 
which will help many fledgling democracies in Africa to consolidate, Nigeria and Ghana in 
particular. 
The political elites are of the view that the independence of the electoral commission 
boasts the popular confidence to elections. This correlates some cases and regional studies 
that demonstrate that when the electorate lack the full confidence that elections in their 
country are free and fair, this would reduce their levels of electoral franchise (Bratton and 
Van de Wall, 1997; McCann and Dominquez, 1998; Zovatto and Payne, 2003; Birch,2008 ), 
and in a worst case scenario lead them to mass demonstration (Pastor, 1999; Eisenstadt, 1999, 
2002; Schedler, 2002; Birch, 2008). On this ground, this thesis maintains that when the 
political elites are committed to democracy, they are likely to show such commitment 
through institutionalisation of an independent electoral commission.  
Among other factors, electoral conduct in particular, has been used by electoral 
observers all over the world to measure the level of electoral fairness as well as the integrity 
of the electoral body. Scholars are of the view that an independent electoral commission is 
pivotal for a successful electoral administration (Mozaffar, 2002; McCoy and Hartlyn, 2006; 
Lopez-Pinto, 2000; Birch, 2008). Therefore, the appointment of members responsible for this 
task is important as that will show the readiness and willingness of the political elites towards 
ensuring a free and fair election. In few cases, the electoral body has been used as an 
instrument through which incumbents or wealthy candidates win elections. To ensure the 
autonomy of the electoral commission, the political elites need to implement laws that would 
uphold its integrity and allows the body conduct elections without any interference. While it 
is easy for some political elites to institute a weak electoral commission which they can be 
able to manipulate, it is also possible that some political elites have decided otherwise, hence 
making a level playing field for all contestants. However, this thesis shares the views of 
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scholars like; Lehoucq (2002) and Birch (2008) who reason that independent electoral 
commissions are one of the major institutional developments that help democracy succeed 
and fail in countries. It is on this ground that this thesis argues that the political elites are 
committed to democracy when they implement laws that give autonomy to the electoral 
commission and allows it to conduct free and fair elections. In addition, political elites are 
able to arouse popular confidence in elections as well as produce a legitimate government. 
The aforementioned factors accruing from an electoral commission’s autonomy are 
conditions for democratic consolidation. 
Like the electoral commission, party financing is considered as one of the ways 
through which political elite commitment to democracy can be analysed. The issue of money 
has been a problem in African democracy. The party that has too much of money will use it 
and gain an undue advantage against other political parties. Meanwhile, a party that does not 
have enough money will be under the influence of the dominant party. This results in one 
party dominance during elections, as the party with financial power is likely to engage in vote 
buying which can determine political outcomes. Since democracy connotes politics of the 
majority, it is important for the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria to establish strong rules 
about party financing and financial regulations. When every party contesting in an election is 
giving equal rights, the political playing field will not only be competitive, it will command 
equality between every candidate and help the best candidate to win. Party financing will also 
help reduce political corruption. Like Aiyede (2008) argues, political corruption undermines 
the effectiveness of development and poses a serious threat to good governance. Some 
African politicians steal government funds and, in order to accumulate more money, associate 
themselves with political godfathers who sponsor them. When these sponsored candidates get 
elected into political positions, they may steal to pay the godfathers back. So, strong financial 
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regulation that commands the obedience of the political elites would help reduce corruption 
among political elites. 
Considering the fact that money could lead to scandal and corrupt activities among 
political contestants, the political elites have realised that state party financing can be a strong 
framework to measure elite commitment to democracy. The reason for equitable distribution 
of money among political parties is to give every political party a fair chance at winning 
elections. This thesis is of the view that if parties are not funded by the state, it may hinder 
democratic processes as well as frustrate democratic consolidation. Political elites have 
considered how damaging it can be when there is inequality in party financing. Moreover, the 
amount of money invested by wealthy politicians in the electioneering processes is likely to 
hinder politicians without strong financial base to contest against them. Fobih (2016) notes 
that without party financing, less financial privileged parties and their rights to shaping public 
opinion may cease to exist. On this backdrop, party financing is argued as one of the essential 
elements in achieving democratic consolidation and also assist emerging democracies from 
being used as an avenue for fund-raising among wealthy politicians or dominant political 
parties. The need for this is to protect credible candidates who would have performed better if 
elected. Due to the huge amount of money involved in elections, states have considered the 
importance of providing subsidies to parties. Scholars (Booth and Robbins, 2010: 632; 
Arthur, 2017) emphasise on the need for subsidies for emerging democracies, stating that 
state subsidies can be lawfully used to support weak political parties or oppositions. Other 
supporters (Nam-Katoti et al., 2011:94) are of the view that state subsidies do not only create 
a level playing field for politicians but also make ordinary parties to attract support from the 
people even when there are dominant parties .The political elites see equitable party financing 
as a strong institutional framework which does not only give a voice to political parties but 
also promote party competition which is necessary for democratic consolidation. 
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Anti-corruption is considered a strong commitment to democracy by the political 
elites, because the agency serves as a watch dog in checking the accesses of the members of 
the electoral commission and political elites that associate themselves on political corruption. 
In Africa there is inequality between the rich and the poor, and the rich are not necessarily 
rich because they work very hard, but because they embezzle government funds. African 
countries remain underdeveloped, and this may be due in part to the money some politicians 
have looted. If something is not done, this problem might persist. So, anti-corruption will not 
only expose and recover stolen monies from government officials but it will make politicians 
shew with caution in an attempt to involve in political corruption. This research believes that 
if the political elites can commit to democracy through giving maximum support to the 
electoral commission, party-financing and anti-corruption efforts, African democracy will 
improve a great deal. 
The political elites’ commitment to democracy through anti-corruption measures can 
be seen in their desire to building a strong anti-corruption agency to curb corrupt practices, 
especially within the offices of political leaders. Meagher (2005) agrees that when corruption 
abounds, anti-corruption agency has always become an instrument of remedy or reduce it to a 
minimal level. Though corruption can be seen in all works of life; be it a private corruption 
where some individuals engage in immoral behaviours, such as scamming or duping others of 
their possessions. The worst form of corruption which this thesis intends to build upon is the 
corruption against the state by those working for the state. This falls within political 
corruption and the culprits in this form of corruption are the political elites. The political 
office holders use positions entrust in their hands by the masses to milk state resources and 
public goods dry. This thesis reasons that it is unethical for few government officials to use 
resources meant for the public to their own personal aggrandisements. While this tricky 
acquisition of state resources does not only impoverish the African states, it also makes 
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development in these states impossible. It is on this ground that this thesis considers anti-
corruption measures for curbing corruption practices. This thesis further analyses how 
democratic consolidation can be actualised by the political elites through checking the 
excesses of politicians who engage in corrupt activities against the states they are suppose to 
protect. Meagher (2005) observes that political leaders’ attempt at instituting an anti-
corruption agency comes with mixed feelings as it is not very clear what their real intentions 
and ‘expectations’ are. So, when political leaders institute genuine anti-corruption agencies, 
they are in essence bent on fighting corruption to a standstill.  Also, when political elites are 
genuine in taking measures against corruption practices, in essence, they are fighting against 
themselves since they are the ones associated with political corruption. Therefore, the 
instituitionalisation of corruption agencies is to their detriment. The quest by the political 
elites to ensure a politically corrupt free society and their unalloyed commitment to 
democracy via anti-corruption agencies are conditions for democratic consolidation.  
Major scholars have theorized about democracy to understand those important factors 
that help countries to achieve democratic consolidation, especially in Europe and Latin 
American countries (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1971). Their studies found that democracy is more 
likely to succeed in countries with economic buoyancy, where national unity allows for 
tolerance of different ethnic divisions, where there is a diversified social structure with a 
dominant middle class. Amidst all these factors considered, democratic consolidation, socio-
economic conditions were given more importance as Lipset (1959) shows that the more well 
to do a nation, the more chance democracy is establishes in a such system. Other studies have 
shown that democracy flourishes in an environment where the leaders are supportive of 
democracy. Linz and Stepan (1978) show that democracy is successful where the ruling elites 
and the opposition groups are committed to the implementation of democratic principles, 
which are capable of giving credence to democratic arrangements. The notion is that 
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democracy is likely to fail if the political elites are unable to establish those factors that 
conditioned effective and promising democracy. It is also important that the transiting elite 
must embrace those characteristics which will be useful in taming ethnic divisions that might 
result in societal crisis. In ethnically divided societies, elections might produce a populist 
leader who may gain support of ethnic voters through manipulation (Snyder (2000). In such a 
situation, the system could suffer further factionalism and this could be a threat to the success 
and survival of democracy and its consolidation. Based on this, it becomes necessary to 
discuss few hypotheses with reference to elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy.  
3.1.5 Theoretical Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. 
High levels of elite coherence combined with a high level of commitment to democracy are 
necessary to consolidate democracy  
Hypothesis 2 
A low level of elite coherence as well as a high level of commitment to democracy is 
conducive to consociational democracy 
Hypothesis 3 
A high level of elite coherence combined with a low level commitment to democracy is 
necessary to pseudo democratic regime 
Hypothesis 4 
A low level of elite coherence and a low level of commitment to democracy are conducive to 
competitive authoritarianism. 
3.6 Summary of Literature and Theoretical Reviews 
This chapter has reviewed various theoretical approaches of democratization, 
democratic consolidation, elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy. Various 
hypotheses are constructed in line with the discussions as well. In the early stage of this 
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chapter, this thesis carefully set out how regime on transition reaches consolidation and 
deviated at some point. This thesis views democratic consolidation from different 
perspective- elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy is a condition for democratic 
consolidation. The next discussion shall highlight some important concepts from the 
theoretical framework followed with the understanding of some conceptual variables and 
their measurements. 
3.2  Democratic Consolidation: Conceptual Definition  
 Scholars like O’Donnell (1996) and Schedler (2001) are at loggerheads especially in 
agreeing to acceptable measurement of democratic consolidation as it is characterized as 
“inconsistent” and “empirically untraceable”. Guillermo O’Donnell (1996a, 1996b) 
contradicts the views of many other scholars who believe in regime consolidation. According 
to O’Donnell, measuring consolidation can be “confusing” and “inconsistent” as it relies on 
“unwarranted generation” which is “casually drawn” with “empirical untraceable” that results 
in unreliable indicator of “extreme ambiguity”. 
  As a matter of fact, it is difficult to operationalize this variable or as Schedler notes 
“once we resolve the question of how to define democratic consolidation, we run into the 
even more intricate problem of how to observe it” (Schedler, 2001: 67). Building on his 
argument, “the way political actors handle instances of alternation in government constitutes 
an excellent indicator of their democratic commitment”.  
However, for the purpose of this research, we shall operationalize democratic 
consolidation building on the work of Huntington (1991) which considers democracy to be 
consolidated when there are “two turnover tests” According to him, democracy is 
consolidated when political party that wins in the first election, contested again and loses to 
an opposition party and the same opposition party contests election again and loses to the 
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party it previously takes power from and transfers power freely back to the party that wins in 
the first election (Huntington,1991). 
 From the above perceptions of democratic consolidation, it is obvious that this concept is 
very slippery and one must be cautious using it as any single approach to measure it might 
attract some criticisms. By this means, using African countries, Ghana and Nigeria as 
benchmarks, this work will measure democratic consolidation from the views of Samuel 
Huntington.  
However, the reason for using Samuel Huntington’s theory of two two turn over tests 
is because all indicators of democratic consolidation are flawed. Take for instance, Resnick 
(2012); Levitsky &Way (2005); Carothers (1999); Mainwaring & Scully (1995): Sandbrook 
(1996); Randall and Svassand (1999) proposed for civil society/ foreign assistance and 
political party’s institutionalization respectively as benchmarks for measuring democratic 
consolidation. Therefore, finding appropriate indicators for measuring democratic 
consolidation is not an easy one. According to O’Donnell (1996) and Schedler (2001), 
measuring democratic consolidation can be “confusing” and “inconsistent”. For the purpose 
of this thesis, Samuel Huntington’s “two turnover test” is more appropriate as it reflects on 
the elite commitment to democracy. This is because the highest sign of elite commitment to 
democracy is their willingness to turn over power. For instance, in the early period of 
transition in Africa, one of the problems facing African democracy at the time was whether 
the incumbent would accept defeat at the poll. As observed by Bratton (1998) in Second 
Elections in Africa, African incumbents actually accepted the external norm for “competitive 
elections” but this was in a way to hope they would find a means to manipulate the electoral 
process. Bratton’s view depicts the nature of African political elites at the time of 
democratisation processes as well as reinforces their unwillingness to leave their political 
positions. So, when they decided to turnover power to the extent of accommodating two 
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turnover tests as Huntington postulated, this show huge improvement on the side of the 
political elites and it displays their commitment to democracy. It does not matter whether the 
turnover of power is once or twice but what matters is whether the leaders are accustomed to 
doing so.  
This work will consider the level of unity among competing actors, understand if 
democracy has been recognized by the competing actors as the only game in town as well as 
see election as the only means of changing the government.  
3.2.1  Pseudo Democracy: Conceptual Definition 
This concept can be referred to as illiberal democracy, also called a 
partial democracy, low intensity democracy, empty democracy, or hybrid regime, in which 
the governing system organizes elections at intervals but the citizens have restricted 
knowledge about the events going on by those who perform real governmental functions 
because there is no civil liberty. In pseudo democratic regimes, the government deploys 
strategy to contain the opposition and its single dominant party is largely an avenue to attract 
support for the government. 
 In this system, there is high level patronage because dominant parties can use state 
resources to satisfy the elites who in turn give support through mobilizing voters from their 
communities for the ruling party. The government also wants the support of the masses and 
will carry out major projects that are likely to promote the interest of the people who return 
this favour by giving the government the necessary support to succeed. In this kind of system, 
Diamond (2002) notes that the regime is neither obviously democratic nor conservatively 
authoritarian. Pseudo democracies promote some elements of democracy but these elements 
are not systematically practiced or adhered to.  
Therefore, political contestation in this type of regime is not open, free or fair. This 
ensures that the ruling party is not displaced in an election even though the electorate no 
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longer have confidence in the ruling government. Diamond (2002) observes that despite the 
difficulty surrounding the victory of opposition parties in this type of regime, through serious 
opposition mobilization, unity, skill and heroism, the opposition is capable of victory in a 
democratic election in a pseudo democratic regimes. Examples of recent and old pseudo 
democratic single party dominated regimes countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Japan 
Taiwan, Mexico, Senegal and South Africa. Among those countries above, Malaysia and 
Singapore remain contemporary pseudo-democracies.   
In his study of Malaysia, Case (2004) identifies Malaysia as one of the strong pseudo-
democracies where the ruling government is always controlled by single dominant party and 
though the system allows for a multi-party system, it does not accord the same resilience 
enjoyed by dominant parties to other parties. In pseudo-democracies, government in most 
cases neglects civil liberties as well as using coercion to command obedience from the 
people. Before the 1999 elections the Malaysian government began to limit civil liberties in 
such a way as to claim control over the media which persistently condemned the opposition. 
Case (2001) notes that Mahathir did not just limited civil liberties and manipulated the 
electoral processes in Malaysia but also launched a media attack which he used to suppress 
the opposition and accused it of attempting political disorder and national violence. This 
helped the Barisan Nasional Front to win 55 percent of the total votes cast. For this reason, 
scholars have warned that in order to leave a level playing field, government under a 
dominant single party should endeavour to loosen up on civil liberties. Among these scholars 
is Solinger (2001) who argues that governments must cease restrictions on civil liberties and 






3.2.2  Competitive Authoritarianism: Conceptual Definition 
This kind of regime became famous after the Second World War. This type of regime 
spread to many countries in Africa and to the old Soviet Union under the tutelage of single-
party rule. A few countries became competitive authoritarian states because democracy broke 
down as their elected heads of states used plebiscites to consolidate their hold on power after 
manipulating the playing field. Many striking examples of countries in this category are from 
Latin America.  Among such autocrats in Latin America are Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chaves, who conducted a series of elections and referenda so as to assume control over the 
state’s resources which in return, was instrumental in the politics of the country playing out 
the way Chaves wished. In this kind of regime, formal democratic institutions exist but are 
used as an instrument for gaining access to power.  
In competitive authoritarianism or electoral authoritarianism, elections are held at 
intervals but these elections do not meet the democratic standards of individual freedom and 
fairness. The outcome of elections conducted under this system always favours the incumbent 
leader. The incumbent in this system has a strong-hold on political activities in such a way 
that elections organized serve characteristically authoritative functions and the government 
institutions only exist to consolidate the interest and chances of the incumbent. This 
explanation is clearer in the concept of competitive authoritarianism by Levitsky and Way. 
They argue that in achieving and performing their political functions, incumbents in 
competitive authoritarian regimes disregard normal democratic processes in such a way that 
the regime fails short of ingredients democratic value is known for (Levitsky and Way, 
2002). Democratic principles are in place but incumbents overlook them to achieve their 
goals which are always authoritative and against the constitution or they amend the 
constitution to suit their whims and caprices. The early 90s, many countries were under this 
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kind of regime, among them, Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, under the regime of Vladimir 
Putin of Russia, Peru under Alberto Fujimori etc.   
Schedler (2015) ; Levitsky and Way (2002)  observe that while parties organize 
frequent elections to elect the chief executive and members of the national assembly in 
competitive authoritarianism, they also disrupt  the principles of liberal democracy such as 
freedom and fairness to serve the interest of autocratic leader instead of safeguarding the 
“elections”. Competitive authoritarianism encourages regular elections which is usually free 
from massive fraud but allows the incumbent to abuse state resources. In most cases 
opposition is tolerated but to a certain degree so long it does not stop the incumbent from 
rigging electoral outcomes. Describing the kind of elections that exist in competitive 
authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way (2010.7)note that  elections are often marred in the form 
of voter list’ manipulation as was the case of the Dominican Republic in 1994, stuffing of 
ballot of boxes in the case of Ukraine in 2004, alteration of election verdicts and results as in 
the case of Belarus, Cameroon and Gabon or in the form of intimidation of political 
opponents like the cases in Cambodia, Kenya and Zimbabwe where opposition parties are not 
allowed to campaign in some regions .  
Levitsky and Way (2010) describe this kind of regime as one where basic civil 
liberties exist to some extent but are threatened in practice. While it allows for the freedom of 
opposition groups to function, give the independent media freedom to operate, and allows the 
opposition to hold public meetings and demonstrations as well as criticise the government. 
These civil liberties can be violated at will as are the cases in Belarus and Cambodia where 
opposition members were arrested and in some cases these opposition members are killed as 
in Cambodia, Haiti, Kenya and Zimbabwe or where independent media are shut down 




3.2.3  Consociational Democracy: Conceptual Definition 
In his work titled ‘Consociational democracy’ referring to the theory of crosscutting 
cleavages, Lijphart (1969) argues that Switzerland and Austria are expected to show signs of 
instability because the two countries are highly fragmented as subcultures are inherently 
divided due to ethnic divisions yet the two countries show some level of stable democracy. 
According to Lijphart (1969) “consociational democracy means government by elite cartel 
designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”. 
 This system is feasible in a polarised society of ethnic, racial, religious and regional 
divisions which by nature are relatively antithetical to stable democracy. The theory of 
consociational democracy was propounded in the late sixties by Arendt Lijphart (1969) to 
illustrate the possibility of stability in ethnicised society. According to Lijphart (1969) 
consociational democracy disrupts the attitude of majoritarianism but does not disconnect 
much from democratic normative theory. This encompasses the ethical basics of democracy 
and its institutions. All the principles of democracy exist in this system but it face the 
problem of uniting the fragmented actors. Elites here thrive to promote common 
understanding that could make democracy work despite their differences. 
This system is successful where; the elites are capable of accommodating different 
‘interests and demands’ amidst their subcultures; they have the capacity of bringing divided 
elites together for collective action; where this collective action reflects their commitment to 
maintain the system to ensure improvement of its cohesion and stability and all things being 
equal, elites understand the dangers associated with political fragmentation. The norms that 
promote inter-elite cooperation are firmly created when they do not represent a deliberate 
departure from competitive responses to political challenges and Lehmbruch (1974) reasons 
that these norms can be instrumental in the part of “political socialization of the elites and 
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thus acquire a strong degree of persistence through time”. The degree of elite coherence with 
associated level of democratic commitment is cross-sectionally shown below: 
3.3  Theoretical Framework 
Figure 2. Elite Coherence and Democratic Commitment  
 High coherence Elite Low Coherence Elite 
 
High Demo Commitment 
Consolidated democracy Consociational 
democracy 
 





    Source: Author’s compilation (2018). 
The diagram above shows the relationship between elite coherence and elite 
commitment to democracy. The importance of this figure is to highlight how democratic 
consolidation and other variables can be achieved. The figure places high coherence and low 
coherence elite on the top corner and places high democracy and low democracy commitment 
in the left side of the diagram. The figure reveals that when there is high elite coherence and 
high elite commitment, democratic consolidation is most possible. In the same vein, when 
there is elite low coherence and high democracy commitment, the result is consociational 
democracy. However, if there is high elite coherence and low elite commitment to 
democracy, the system of the regime becomes pseudo-democratic in nature. Finally, if there 
is low elite coherence and low elite commitment to democracy, the regime becomes a 
competitive authoritarianism. 
3.3.1  Elite Coherence: Conceptual Definition and Measurement 
Like Anderson in Janda (1980) discussed earlier, coherence means congruence among 
people in a state. The degree of congruence referred to in this definition reflects the attitude 
and behaviour of the political elites especially in fragmented societies. Scholars generally 
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agree that when the elites are fragmentally structured, they exhibit little or no coherence 
(Ruostetsaari 1993:332; Higley et. al., 1981; 2001). With this in mind, it would be hard to 
imagine that opposition political parties would mingle with the incumbent political party. 
Like Janda (1980) observes coherence to mean congruence, this means agreement or 
harmony. For elite congruence to take place elite must be willing to corporate and implies 
elites’ ability to tolerate themselves. Despite their differences, the political elites were able to 
form Alliances/coalitions and tolerance to help them achieve government of national unity. 
This is evidence on how fragmented political elites exhibited coherence that largely 
influenced elections of 2000 in Ghana and the recent, 2015 elections in Nigeria. Tolerance 
encompasses recognition and respecting the rights of others and this will give political elites 
that sense of belonging which Bollen and Hoyle (1990) in their discussion of cohesion in the 
earlier chapter. Political elites that ignore their fragmented nature are able to tolerate other 
political elites from opposing camps. The ability of elites to agree on certain issues as well as 
compromise on their differences raises the level of their coherence. In most societies, we 
have the ruling political elites and the opposition political elites who are fragmentally 
structured and their agreement on the rules governing democracy stem from their level of 
coherence. 
Measurement 
To better understand the nature and degree of congruence among political elites in 
Ghana and Nigeria, the cohesion index developed by Stuart A. Rice (1928) is used as a 
method of measurement. The index is calculated as: 







where N Yes = Number of “Yes” and N No is the number of “No” responses. The data used 
in calculating the index score is extracted from the conducted interviews in Ghana and 
77 
 
Nigeria to access the degree of coherence among the political elites in achieving democratic 
consolidation irrespective of their differences at the time of transition. The behavioural 
factors such as alliance/coalition and tolerance are used to measure the degree of coherence 
among political elites in this study for considered countries.  







Source: Janda (1980, pp. 119) 
The categories of coherence reported in Janda (1980) are shown in the table below. 
For instance, an index measure ranging between 0.7 and 0.89 indicates high coherence 
through tolerance and alliance among political elites.  
 Using the aggregate responses from the interview, the average degree of coherence is 
calculated for Ghana and Nigeria as follows: 
Table 2 Coherence Index Indicating Tolerance and Alliances/Coalitions. 
Degree of Coherence Division 
(Support vs. Opposition) 
Estimated Index 
Completely Cohesive 100 – 0 0.90 – 1.0 
Highly Cohesive 90 – 10 0.70 – 0.89 
Somewhat Cohesive 80 – 20 0.50 – 0.69 
Not Cohesive 70 – 30 0.30 – 0.49 
Divisive 60 – 40 0.10 – 0.29 
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Source: Author’s computation (2018) 
 The estimated coherence indices indicate that there is high degree of agreement and 
compromise to differences among political elites in Ghana and Nigeria for achieving 
democratic consolidation. The variation in the political elites’ search for democratic 
consolidation in the two countries is while the political elites are committed to democracy 
through building strong institutional structures, the political elites in Nigeria are not. 
3.3.2  Elite Commitment to Democracy: Operational Definition and Measurement 
Operational Definition  
The commitment of the elite to democracy can be conceptualized as the political elite making 
the important choices and policy-decisions on the grounds of the advancement of institutional 
or structural factors that support democracy, and they become habituated to acting that way. 
This similarly implies the process through which the political elites show support for 
democracy, especially to ensure that the system does not roll back to an authoritarian regime. 
Gunther, Montero and Torcal emphasized that when democracy gets the necessary support, it 
helps in democratic stability which is the engine room for a sustainable democracy (Gunther, 
Montero and Torcal, 2004:1). 
 Measurement  
 Elite commitment to democracy can be measured by looking at the electoral 
commission’s independence, the presence of party financing and its regulation, the presence 
of anti-corruption, and the autonomy the agency enjoys. Having seen election as a major 
factor that improves democracy and to guide against the political elites misusing election 
against their political opponents, it becomes apparent that the elites create a body devoid of 







why the Electoral commission should be given independence is to ensure a credible and 
effective election. For example, electoral independence allows the institution flourish without 
fear or favour. When the electoral commission is effectively independent, no ruling party can 
have an undue advantage over other political parties in elections, non-rigged elections are 
able to be conducted, and equality is given to citizens to vote and be voted for. On the other 
hand, party financing helps give life to political parties, as a lot of resources is required to 
make political parties function properly. Research suggests that to enhance a competitive 
political system, there is a need to finance political parties (Nassmacher, 2003; Ayee et al., 
2007). Other scholars believe that amidst resource shortages, democracy can improve when 
there is sustainable and equitable distribution of party financing (CDD, 2005a; Nam-Katoti et 
al., 2011). Their assertions underscore the importance of party financing and why it is 
important to use it to measure political elite commitment to democracy. This thesis shall 
examine the party financing in both Nigeria and Ghana, and see whether the political elites 
comply with the rules and regulations guiding party financing. Furthermore, in order to 
consider political corruption among political elites, the thesis shall examine the presence of 
anti-corruption offices, understand the mode of appointment of their members, and see how 
this impacts their performance and autonomy. When an anti-corruption agency is established 
with the necessary freedom to function, it becomes a tool through which corruption can be 
fought. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000: 37-39) advise that people in a democratic system 
should strongly shun corruption. Being defiant to corruption is likely to work if certain 
people do not have influence over the anti-corruption body. This thesis shall consider whether 






3.3.3 Independent Electoral Commission: Conceptual Definition and Measurement 
 The management and administration of the Electoral Commission can be influenced 
by the structure of electing the commission board members, tenure, mode of appointment and 
membership formation. These factors determine the independence of the Electoral 
Commission from the ruling government. The selection process of the members that manage 
the affairs of the Commission can dictate the influence of the President in controlling the 
electoral process in its favour. This can as well be regarded as “Electoral Commission 
Autonomy” and has been widely discussed in literature. For instance, Dworkin (1988:14) 
describes autonomy as an individual rationality to make a knowledgeable decision without 
being influenced or forced by any other person. Also, Debrah (2011:28) conceptualised the 
autonomy of the Electoral Commission as the ability of the governing members to critically 
analyse issues using facts and draw unbiased insights in other to have abundant feasible 
options. In the context of this thesis, Electoral Commission independence is defined as the 
self-awareness and self-regulation of the administration members of the Commission in 
making critical decisions that favours the people using all available information and 
actionable insights. In turn, this will help to increase the Electoral Commission integrity and 
earn the confidence of the people that trust the body to conduct free and fair election to 
promote democratic consolidation. In agreement, Goodwin-Gill (1994:80) notes that an 
attempt to getting election problems resolved does not depend on just the competency of the 
independent and impartial authority but the timing through which decisions are made on time 
to avoid delay of electoral results.  
 On this basis, this thesis measures the independence of the Electoral Commission 
using the highlighted three factors (tenure of office, appointment and membership structure) 
to ascertain the level of autonomy in Ghana and Nigeria. This thesis looks at the tenure 
granted to the members of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria and Ghana as this can help 
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give members of this body the confidence that their job is secured despite election outcomes. 
The appointment of members can determine the outcome of the elections too. If the 
appointment is not seriously examined, somebody (such as the president) may appoint loyal 
members and in such situation, electoral conducts might be influenced. Membership structure 
needs to be examined. This is because, as this is the body that conducts election in countries 
with ethnic diverse, membership structure needs to be equitably selected to avoid ethnic bias. 
However, this type of approach helps to determine the autonomy of the governing body of the 
Electoral Commission in both countries as shown below: 
Table 3 Tenure, Appointment &Membership Structure of E C. 
Country Tenure Appointed By Membership 
Structure 
Ghana Unlimited President in 
consideration of the 
parliamentary 
recommendations 
7 (1 Chairman, 2 
Deputy Chairmen, 
and 4 Other 
members) 
Nigeria Limited and can be 
terminated anytime 
at the discretion of 
the president 
President  13 (1 Chairman and 
12 other National 
Commissioners 




Qank7awAg&q=electoral+commission+in+nigeria&oq=electoral+commission+in+&gs_l=psy ab.  
In the table above, this thesis has shown the structures of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria 
and Ghana. While the members of the Electoral Commission in Ghana has an unlimited tenure of 
office that gives the members the confidence that their job is secured, the members of the 
Electoral Commission in Nigeria do not enjoy such right as their positions can be terminated at 
any time. Another structure shown on the table is the mode of appointment. The appointment of 
the Chairman, two-deputy chairmen and four other members of the commission in Ghana is by 
the president on the advice of the committee set up in the parliament to scrutinize them before 
final approval. This is different in Nigeria where the chairman and the twelve National 
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Commissioners are direct appointees of the president. While the membership of the Electoral 
Commission in Ghana is made up of one chairman, two-deputy chairman and four other 
members, Nigerian Electoral Commission in comprised of one chairman and twelve other 
National Commissioners. There is a possibility that the Electoral Commission chairman might 
work in favour of the president that appoints him. In such situation, the electoral body is likely to 
compromise in Nigeria. 
3.3.4  Party Financing: Conceptual Definition and Measurement 
 Party Financing Measurement 
Some scholars consider the best form of party financing to be the old form, where 
mass parties finance their parties (Katz, 1997). This kind of contribution is generated through 
membership fees and donations that members render to their own parties. Parties that raise 
money this way are likely to be less dependent on state subventions. However, scholars that 
argue for state subventions see public funding as an ideal form of achieving equal 
competition among political parties as well as promote the effectiveness of multiparty 
democracy (Lewis, 2017; Van Biezen, 2003). A study by Mietzner (2007: 241), shows that 
the African region has the lowest level of state financing in the world, as 44 percent of 
democracies in this region offer public funds to political parties. 
This thesis is interested in two important questions with regards to party financing. 
First, does the ruling party have more access to finance than the opposing parties? Second, is 
the state regulation guiding party financing and spending of political parties efficient and 
effective? By state regulation of political parties, this thesis refers to the party financing 
mechanism which is under the control of public law or the constitution. In advanced 
democracies, political finance regulation is prioritised to ensure that parties are not hijacked 
by major donors. Biezen and Kopecky (2007: 239-240) suggest that public regulation of party 
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financing is needed for promoting transparency in party financing, especially in countries 
where corruption is apparent and rampant. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the degree and presence of uneven party financing is 
measured using ‘rules about party financing’ to understand the extent to which political 
parties adhere to the state’ rules on party financing. The thesis will also see if there is a state 
subsidy on parties, and whether parties get equal shares. Access to the media is also 
important when measuring public financing, as this determines if one political party is given 
a free run on media when compared to others. The thesis shall also see if there is transparency 
on the rules about party financing. 
 Olarinmoye (2006; 2008) believe that elections are usually undermined by political 
parties and politicians through the illegal use of money, physical force and governmental 
patronage deployed through political agents. Under such circumstances, one can believe that 
political parties are not adhering to state rules on party finance regulations. For the benefit of 
this thesis, party financing can be measured looking at the rules about party financing, state 
subsidy, access to media and transparent donations/financing. 
Table 4 Party Financing Measurement 
Measures Ghana Nigeria 
Rules about party financing Highly constitutionalised Fairly constitutionalised 
State subsidy 
Fairly provided by the 
state 
Poorly provided by the 
state 
Access to media Medium/average access Low access 
Transparent donations/financing 
Highly transparent and 
accountable 
Fairly transparent but not 
accountable 
Overall 
Highly regulated and 
structured 




Source: Author’s (2018). Other sources: Nam-Katoti et al.(2011), Ukase, (2015). 
Transparency in party financing in both Ghana and Nigeria is assessed using some 
selected measures (such as party financing rules, state subsidy, media access, and transparent 
donation), as documented in the interview in the two countries. Evidence gathered from the 
country case studies used highy to demonstrate the solidity of the percentage given, fairly 
means that something exist but not in fullness. Poorly and low means there is state subsidy 
and media access by political parties in Nigeria but not enough to compare with Ghana. As 
shown on the table above, the rules guiding party financing in Ghana constitutionally exist 
and are highly regulated, more so than its counterpart West Africa country, Nigeria. 
On the average across other party financing measures, Ghana out performed Nigeria. 
Financing of elections are highly transparent and well-regulated in election fairly exist in 
Ghana compared to Nigeria where transparency and rule of law guiding the financing of 
parties are not transparent. With regards to complying to the rules guiding party funding in 
Ghana, Nam-Katoti et al.(2011) note that Political Parties Act of 2000 (Article 23) mandated 
that 75% of Ghanaian citizens, firms, partnerships or enterprises are able to make any kind of 
contribution to political parties. Their study reveals that all parties rely on the contributions of 
their members for party financing even though their contributions are not enough (Nam-
Katoti et al. 2011). Compare to Nigeria, Ukase (2015) notes that various laws have been 
propounded with regards to campaign/ party financing but these are yet to yield any 
meaningful results especially as political parties continue to sabotage the processes.   
3.3.5 Anti-Corruption: Conceptual Definition and Measurement 
 Corruption can be defined as the abuse of entrusted political power for private gains. It 
can take various forms depending on its costs to the society (Transparency International, 2017)
1
. 
                                                          
1
 https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define  
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It consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies enabling political 
elites to benefit at the cost of public resources. Similarly, some notable scholars such as Uslaner 
(2005), De Graaf (2007) and Rothstein (2009) view corruption as a behavioural norm among 
political elites to use government resources for personal gain and to oppress the opposition. 
Corruption has become a serious political and economic problem in most developing countries 
such as Ghana and Nigeria, and has been accepted as a means by political leaders to enrich 
themselves. The high level of corruption has prompted most of these countries to institute anti-
corruption bodies (such as Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 
and Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) in Ghana, and Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) in Nigeria. The anti-corruption agencies are entrusted with the responsibility of 
independently prosecuting political elites or individuals that mismanaged or embezzled 
government funds for personal use. The establishment of these anti-corruption agencies is to 
provide surveillance in the form of checks and balances as well as encourage accountability by 
the political elites. Yet, if these agencies are not adequately empowered to perform their 
functions effectively, it can hinder democratic commitment which is a concern to democratic 
consolidation according to this thesis. 
 In determining the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in both countries, this 
thesis measures its efficiency using four factors (serious fraud office, mode of appointment, 
composition of membership, tenure of office) to establish the level of political elites’ 







Table 5 Anti-Corruption Measurement 
 Ghana Nigeria 
Serious Fraud Office Yes Yes 
Appointment of the 
Executive Members 
By the President By the President 
Composition of the 
Executive 




Tenure of Office Permanent Dismissible at anytime 




The table above shows that in both countries, the political elites are serious in 
combatting corruption for establishing anti-corruption agencies. The mode of appointment of 
the chief executive of the agencies in the two countries is the president. In Ghana, the chief 
executive is composed of three persons, chief commissioner and two deputy commissioners. 
In Nigeria, there is one chairman. While the tenure of the office of the CHRAJ members in 
Ghana is permanent, members of the EFCC in Nigeria can be removed at any time.  
Here, various definitions have been provided for the key concepts from the theoretical 
framework. The thesis has also given a detailed discussion on the key variables, elite 
coherence and elite commitment. While elite coherence discusses and measures elite 
alliances/coalitions and tolerance, elite commitment discusses and measures electoral 
commission, party-financing and anti-corruption. 
In the next chapter, this research will discuss how this thesis hopes to analyse this 
topic building on elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy leading to democratic 
consolidation and see if some contextual factors that form the indicators of elite coherence 
and commitment to democracy can explain the attitude of the political elite towards 






Resilient Coherence and Ethical Commitment to Democracy: Experience of Ghana 
Political Elites on Consolidation of Democracy.  
4.1 Elites Commitment to Democracy through Electoral Commission                    
 Introduction 
This chapter shows how the elites in Ghana and Nigeria have worked towards 
consolidating their democracies, by looking at the Electoral Commission (EC), party 
financing, and anti-corruption. These factors give democracy its potency, and are important 
should countries like Ghana and Nigeria want democracy to survive in their countries. An 
analysis of the electoral commission, party financing and anti-corruption may analyse 
whether or not the elites in Ghana and Nigeria are committed to democracy. Scholars suggest 
that the choices these elites make determine the success, or breakdown, of democracy 
(Malloy 1987; O’Donnell et al. 1986; Lopez-Pinto 1987). 
This analysis begins with the Ghanaian case. Because the two cases (Ghana and 
Nigeria) focus on similar factors, a general introduction for each of the three factors (the EC, 
party financing, and anti-corruption) shall be made in the Ghanaian chapter.Here this research 
talks about the Electoral Commission (EC), which is a legal framework and institution 
through which elections are conducted, especially in emerging democracies. With this in 
mind, it is important to ensure that the electoral body which manages and regulates 
democratic elections is autonomous and impartial. For the EC to be considered legitimate by 
the people, it must show credibility in managing elections. This would give the government 
emerging from such elections the needed legitimacy to be accepted by the people, as well as 
making leaders responsible in performing their duties. So, this chapter questions, to what 
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extent have the elites in Ghana and Nigeria used the electoral commission to foster 
democratic consolidation?  
This research deals with two important issues. First, whether the electoral commission 
is given the needed autonomy to discharge its duties, without any undue political influence. 
Second, whether the electoral commission has the independent capability to allow the citizens 
of Ghana and Nigeria to enjoy their civic and political rights, without the interference of 
political elites. 
4.1.2 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Ghana via the Electoral Commission  
 Before the 1992 presidential elections, one of the key problems facing the polity was 
ensuring that the electoral commission organised a credible election while ensuring that there 
was a level playing field for all competing parties. The reason behind this key problem is 
further discussed by Jeffries and Thomas (1993:332) who note that a regime where the 
incumbent is one of the contestants during an election, it is possible that the processes of such 
election might go in his favour as he is likely to make the rules guiding the electoral 
competition to suffocate the chances of the opposition. This was why the elites in Ghana 
deemed it important to establish an electoral commission that would be independent, to 
enable it to discharge its electoral duties without fear or favour. When Ghana had its first 
transition elections in 1992, it was the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) that 
conducted the elections. As those elections witnessed various irregularities, which eventually 
led to the boycott of the subsequent parliamentary elections by the opposition political 
parties, it became obvious that a new beginning was needed. This led to the establishment of 
the EC in accordance with the Electoral Commission Act (Act451) of the Ghanaian 
Constitution. The EC is made up of seven members, comprised of the chairman, two deputy 
chairmen, and four other members. These officers enjoy unlimited tenure in office. The 
Ghanaian Constitution specifies that when the members of the EC are appointed, they will 
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not be dismissed by anyone unless a member dies or is incapacitated due to ill-health 
(Republic of Ghana 1992:27). The body responsible for nominating the members of the EC 
of Ghana is the office of the president. To ensure that members are not selected due to bias by 
the President, a committee is set up in the parliament to examine every member nominated by 
the President. Article 46 of the Ghanaian Constitution of 1992 clarified the autonomy 
bestowed on the EC: Except as provided in this Constitution or in any other law not 
inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions the EC shall not be 
subject to the direction or control of any person or authority (Republic of Ghana 1992:39) 
In an interview, with regard to the impact of the EC on the consolidation of 
democracy in Ghana, and how he rates the EC a university lecturer in Ghana responded: 
The success that the Ghanaian democracy has enjoyed 
since 1992 was due to the autonomy the government gave 
to the Electoral Commission as well as the kind of people 
appointed to stir the affairs of the commission. The 
Interim National Electoral Commission that conducted the 
1992 presidential elections was established to doom the 
polity but the emergence of Electoral Commission and its 
independence is the reason Ghanaian democracy has not 
suffered major electoral issues compare to other African 
countries.” In a similar vein, a retired member of the 
Electoral Commission stated: “Apart from the Electoral 
Commission that has enjoyed a high level autonomy in 
discharging it duties, the Ghanaian people and government 
have given them so much that rigging election[s] to favour 
a particular person or party is never considered by the 
commission as the commission’s prime responsibility at 
all time is to uphold the trust and confidence repose on 
them by the people of Ghana.” (Interview, University 
lecturer1, Accra, May 2013). 
In highlighting why the Ghanaian Electoral Commission has been a huge success to 
the country’s democratic consolidation, scholars like Debrah (2011) and Omotola (2013) 
have their opinions. For Debrah (2011: 25) “the making of the electoral process transparent, 
fostering agreement on the rules of the game and asserting its autonomy in relation to the 
performance of its mandates.” Another view that validates the claim that the electoral 
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commission in Ghana has impacted democracy consolidation is from Omotola (2013) who 
reasons:  
“Ghana’s Fourth Republic has a reputation for having a 
reasonably high degree of institutionalisation in election 
administration. Its electoral and democratic success stories 
have largely been associated with the autonomy-enhancing 
institutional design and leadership of the Electoral 
Commission of Ghana (ECG), which engender a degree of 
public confidence and trust”.   
As the university lecturer pointed out above, the electoral commission in Ghana has 
been the reason the country’s democracy has not experienced reversal from the democratic 
processes in recent times. In the 1992 parliamentary elections, the opposition political parties 
boycotted the elections for the reason that the electoral commission was working for John 
Jerry Rawlings and his party-NDC. For them to participate in the future elections, the 
opposition parties demanded for electoral reforms that could give the Electoral Commission a 
certain level of independence. On this ground, the government created an electoral 
commission devoid of the influence of anyone. In order to appease the acrimony that has 
existed since 1992 parliamentary election boycott, the electoral commission according to 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Whitfield, 2009) created inter-party advisory committee which 
responded to making sure that parties settle their discrepancies for the success of future 
elections. After this period, the Electoral Commission made sure that in subsequent elections, 
starting from the 1996 general elections, there must be a level playing field for all political 
parties. Evidence showed that the elections of 1996 had limited irregularities compared to the 
1992 elections. Furthermore, the autonomy or independence of the Electoral Commission, 
Ayee (1997) notes that the Electoral Act of 1993 was designed to uphold the independence 
and autonomy of the Electoral Commission. To elaborate the provisions from the Act to the 
Electoral Commission, Jeffries (1998) notes that from the Act, the Commission is not going 
to be subject to the control or authority of anyone; the members of the commission are given 
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a security of tenure of office once appointed but can only be dismissed on reasons of 
infirmity or insanity only when it is established by an independent medical board; the 
commission’s fund will come directly from the Consolidated Fund; though the appointment 
of members have presidential influence, they are also done on the advice of the Council of 
State who are partly elected and appointed. This thesis reasons that the argument from the 
case analysis stem from this aforementioned information about autonomy the Electoral 
Commission has enjoyed which enabled it conduct a credible, free and fair elections. The 
electoral independence ensures that the electoral processes are not unduly influenced by 
anyone as witnessed in the 1992 Presidential elction which led to the boycott of the 
parliamentary elections by the oppositions.  
 In a similar scenario, one civil society group member confirmed that:  
Ever since the Ghana Electoral Commission caught itself 
in the web of election irregularities in 1992, subsequent 
elections have been minimal and if you compare what we 
have in Ghana to other African countries, you will know 
that Ghana is far ahead. This is because the government 
has done well in providing the necessary tools for the 
commission to be successful, especially allowing the 
commission the independence to function and decide 
electoral outcomes which other African countries have 
seen as herculean task (Interview, civil society activist1, 
Accra, May 2013). 
 
However, despite the fact that the 1996 general elections were successful, accusing fingers 
were pointed at the ruling party for using state media and resources to gain the upper hand 
over other political parties. The election outcomes were given the seal of approval from 
opposition political parties that accepted the result and gave their support to the ruling party, 
but insisted on restructuring the electoral body for future free and fair electoral conduct. 
On the government effort to ensure a popular consensus, on the ways to improve the 
transparency of the electoral body, it became a matter of urgent attention for the ruling 
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political party and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which allowed the 
electoral commission to adhere to opposition parties’ request for their members, to be 
included as representatives on the EC. For example, in the event of the inauguration of the 
EC, the opposition political parties requested the inclusion of party representatives in the new 
EC, arguing that their inclusion would help achieve free and fair elections (Oquaye 1995; 
Gyimah-Boadi 1999; Debrah 2011). 
The EC actually responded to this clarion call from the opposition political parties, to 
the dismay of some of respondents who reasoned that by accepting this request, the then 
Ghanian President (Rawlings), was actually digging his grave before future elections. Some 
respondents applauded Rawlings’s deep sense of commitment to making democracy survive 
in Ghana. For example, a retired army general who served under the Rawlings’ 
administration stated:  
We never believed that Rawlings actually wanted to give 
power to the civilians. But, the moment we saw changes in 
the electoral body in 1993 which largely made the 
electoral competition quite open, then we began to 
understand that Rawlings meant business with Ghanaian 
democracy and the chances of other party wrestling power 
from the incumbent government increased (Interview, 
Retired army general1, Kumasi, May 2013). 
 The respondent was satisfied with the amendments in the electoral body, noting:  
Rawlings’stance on these amendments made the major 
opposition party (NPP) [believe] that the ruling party 
(NDC) was committed to Ghanaian democracy.” He also 
stated that, “Rawlings’s party’s endorsement and 
acceptance of the outcomes of the presidential elections of 
1996 was because they started to believe in the system 
with the hope that his party’s chances of winning election 
was not too far”( Interview, Retired army general1, 
Kumasi, May 2013). 
In its effort to sustain credible elections in Ghana, the EC formed the Inter-Party 
Advisory Committee (IPAC) in March 1994, to encourage consensus among the opposing 
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political parties. In an interview conducted by Debrah on Ghana on the reason behind the 
foundation of IPAC, Paul Boateng and Lawrence Sarpong (EC members) who responded to 
Debrah note that the establishment of this body meant to achieve two primary goals: ‘to 
diffuse conflict and tension arising from the ruling party and opposition political parties and 
ensure that all political parties in Ghana establish common compromises on the possible rules 
of electoral game’ (Debrah, 2011:37) One of my respondents, Civil society activist, in the 
interviews, with regard to the importance of the IPAC in ensuring party understanding, 
stated: 
IPAC worked like a miracle because of its effort in 
promoting unity, which is at play among all political 
parties in Ghana and the elites in particular, as it was easy 
to reach a compromise through dialogue, hence the 
presence of IPAC as every political party has resorted to 
IPAC for fairness and justice. The Electoral Commission 
for its effort in using IPAC in settling some heinous 
conflicts confronting ruling parties and their oppositions in 
Ghana since IPAC inauguration in 1994 (Interview, Civil 
society activist2, Ashanti, May 2013). 
These success stories have placed the IPAC as a framework for building trust and 
confidence among the political elites, with regard to managing election conduct. They have 
also provided an avenue through which political parties and other stakeholders can deepen 
their confidence, and trust the Electoral Commission (Ninsin 2006:64). Political elites’ 
involvement in the IPAC has enabled them to easily reach consensus on the rules of the 
game, and encouraged them to be committed to democracy, resolving to accept elections as 
the only legitimate means of affecting an alternation in Ghanaian politics (Ninsin 2006; 
Frempong 2008). However, as stated above, electoral institution deficiency has been a serious 
problem for emerging democracies, especially when looking at other neighbouring African 
and Latin American countries. The trust the people of Ghana have in the electoral process is 
commendable, compared to the broad distrust in Latin American countries such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. Irregularities, including a lack of clear rules, imbalanced media 
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access by the parties, registration issues, and vote-buying, have hindered smooth electoral 
processes in the continent (Carreras and Irepoglu 2013). A member of one community leader 
in Ghana stated:  
The constitutional independence to the Electoral 
Commission in Ghana has given the people the right to 
cast their votes during elections without fear or favour, 
hoping that their votes would count in changing the 
government and believing that the Electoral body will 
always deliver without bias (Interview, Traditional 
leader1, Volta Region, May 2013). 
The successes of the EC are obvious in its numerous elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 
2004, 2008, 2012 and both elections in 2016. Apart from the transition elections of 1992, 
which resulted in a brief rift with opposition parties threatening to boycott further elections, 
elections in these years were generally accepted. 
4.1.3 Elite Commitment to Democracy and Party Financing 
Introduction 
Scholars generally describe political parties as a foundation through which a fledgling 
democracy enjoys a certain level of stability, where the majority organisational base of 
political parties forms the government, and a viable minority of the opposition becomes an 
alternative government (Kelly and Ashiagbor, 2011; Gyampo, 2015). Boafo-Arthur (2003), 
and Chibber and Kollman (2009) reason that the heart and soul of democracy is political 
parties, because of their functions in government formation, the raising of future national and 
state leaders, as well as serving as a watchdog to the ruling government when in opposition. 
Democracy is expensive to run. To avoid corruption from creeping into the political 
system, elites have worked to establish a modal through which parties can be financed. Ilo 
(2004:23) argues that money is very important to the events of any political party.  Eme and 
Anyadike (2014) note that limited finances will handicap a political party and make it 
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irrelevant. Unlimited access to finances gives a particular party an undue advantage over 
other political parties, and turns the whole process into an auction where a party with the 
highest financial capacity wins. Election campaigns and political party organisations require a 
lot of money, and mounting regulations on how to administer these would reduce inequality 
among candidates and one-party dominance in elections. It would be unfair for parties with a 
wealthy support base to be competing with political parties with less financial advantage. 
These wealthy political parties, if not properly checked, might end up using their strong 
resource base to grab votes across the country, hence the importance of party financing. 
Scandals associated with the illegal financing of political parties have been common 
in new democracies, especially, in Latin America, Southeast Asian countries and Sub-
Saharan African countries. Party financing scandals have destroyed the reputation, credibility 
and legitimacy of democracy in some countries. For instance, as late as 1974, party financing 
was unregulated in Italy to such an extent that the elites, on several occasions, diverted public 
money into party accounts. This gave elites opportunities for dubious party-funding (Pujas 
and Rhodes, 1999). African countries are not alone in this struggle, especially as the corrupt 
financing of political parties, particularly campaign financing, has become more predominant 
ever since the re-emergence of multiparty politics in the early 90s. Multiparty system has 
created a democratic circle that promotes inter-intra political competition. This has 
necessitated opportunities for scandalous political financing, which poses a threat to the 
continent’s emerging democracies (Mwangi, 2008). Scholars who debate about party 
spending have always contended that inequalities in the financial capabilities of political 
parties could distort political competition, as the wealthiest parties always claim victory. If 
these parties are not properly regulated, it is hard to have a level playing field for competing 
political parties, and this has a negative consequence for equal political participation. 
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Research shows that party spending is correlated with positive electoral outcomes (Fisher, 
1999). 
Consequently, 88 per cent of countries in Latin America officially recommended 
direct public financing of political parties. As early as 1928, Uruguay introduced public 
financing into their body polity. Second to Uruguay was Costa Rica in 1949, then Argentina 
(1957 indirect and 1961 direct) and Peru (1966 indirect and 2003 direct). Direct public 
funding in Nicaragua followed in 1974 and in Mexico in 1977 
www.idea.int/sites/default/files/.../funding-of-political-parties-and-election-campaigns.pd. 
Countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada, Germany, and post-
communist Eastern Europe, also have systems that support public funding. African countries, 
such as Lesotho, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Botswana receive some funding from 
the state (Gyampo,2015), while there is less in countries from the Caribbean, Asia, and 
Pacific regions (Doorenspleet, 2003). Research still shows that campaigning and party 
financing come with scandals and controversies, especially in Botswana and South Africa, 
where donations to political parties from both private and foreign bodies are not subject to 
any state regulations. As a result, dominant (ruling) political parties have regular advantages 
over opposition political parties, which in turn stifles the chances of these oppositional parties 
winning (Doorenspleet, 2003: 182). 
 Therefore, this research is interested in understanding the degree and presence of 
uneven party-financing, a political party’s access to finance, and financial regulation. In the 
interview questions, there are two principal questions. First, does the ruling party have more 
access to finance than the opposition parties? Second, is the regulation guiding the financing 
and spending of political parties effective and efficient? 
4.1.4 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Ghana via Party-Financing  
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As far back as the early 70s, Gyimah-Boadi (1979) decried the lack of clear 
guidelines through which political parties were funded in Ghana and that the four Republican 
constitutions in Ghana had failed to draw a clear guideline with regards to party funding. This 
led to a situation where political parties generated revenue for the party through individuals 
or parastatals (Gyimah-Boadi, 1979). On this background, Article 55, section 3 of Ghana’s 
1992 Constitution enshrined political parties in Ghana as being shaped to the political will of 
the people, designed to help spread information on socio-economic and political ideas, and 
help candidates who want to assume political positions in elections. The 1992 Political 
Parties Law, for instance, stipulates that: 
every political party shall within 60 days after the issue to 
it of a final certificate or registration submit to the Interim 
National Electoral Commission (INEC) — a written 
declaration giving details of all its assets and expenditure, 
— including all contributions or declarations, whether in 
cash or in kind made or to be made to the initial assets of 
the party by its founding members in respect of the first 
year of its existence (Party Law, 1992). 
It was on this backdrop that the Political Parties Law of 1992 initially stipulated that 
the maximum amount to be contributed to political parties by individuals should stand at just 
GHc 200,000. But this figure raised controversy among political parties, because of the level 
of inflation in Ghana and high exchange rate which crippled Ghanaian Cedies at the time. 
According to one respondent in Ghana: 
Party financing created serious controversy when it was 
first introduced in Ghana. This was because the economy 
was so bad that the inflation in Ghana reduced our 
currency to nothing. So people requested that the amount 
(GHc 200,000) was too small especially as elections and 
campaign run into millions of Ghanaian Cedies and that if 
government insisted on this amount, it implied its desire to 
influence elections in Ghana because the government can 
use state resources against helpless opposition political 
parties. However I must confess that financial imbalance 
is never a problem in Ghana’s election since the 1996 
general elections, because it is hard to notice that one 
98 
 
party enjoys more access to money than other political 
parties as I am sure if this exists, opposition parties will 
not tolerate that. I think the government is trying to give 
every political party the same right; of course, this can be 
the reason behind the various alternations that have taken 
place in Ghanaian democracy since 1992 (Interview, 
Traditional head 2, Kumasi, May 2013). 
Ayee (1993) notes that the PNDC subsequently requested an amendment to the Law 
through the INEC, which set the limit to what individuals, can contribute to parties. After 
much deliberation, the amount was fixed at GHc 1 million, which was not satisfactory to 
political parties as they wanted between GHc 10 million and GHc 20 million. 
The requirement needed for each political party to enjoy this benefit, involves having 
party branches in the various regions of Ghana, and in no less than two-thirds of the districts. 
Therefore, achieving this goal is considered difficult due to the fact that the campaign 
logistics run into billions of Ghanaian Cedies. This made political parties that were trapped as 
a result of having not much access to enough money; rely on individual contributions (Ayee, 
1993). Like in other African countries, Ghanaian political parties rely on the donations of 
Ghanaians for party funding, particularly, the opposition political parties in the 1996 general 
elections. Relying on individual contributions is not seen as a good idea and for three key 
reasons according to Ayee (1993) who warns that: Firstly, contributions may affect policy-
making by making parties alter their policies and administrative decisions to fit the interest or 
demands of the big donors. Secondly, “control over party funds by a few people may affect 
the internal power structure of power within a political party.” Lastly, “the high cost of 
campaign may give undue influence over political recruitment to the big donors” (Ayee, 
1993:251-252). From the first point, that is, allowing some people to determine a political 
party’s financial situation may breed corruption because the big men who contributed for the 
well -being of parties are likely to ask for a return of their investments. In some cases, these 
big men may influence the government in power to make policies that will protect the interest 
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of heavy financiers. In the second point, this is true in a party sponsored by certain 
individuals.  When some policies are taken by the government and maybe, does not represent 
the interest of the populace, then, it favours the interest of the sponsors to the detriment of the 
party leadership and ruling government.  
According to Key (1964) "hijacking" the administration of the party by big donors 
will not only make the leadership of the party become entertainers but it will also make 
members loose interest in the party and conversion of members to the party very difficult. In 
the last point, the high cost of campaign may dwarf the chances of a better candidate. In a 
party where two people are to run for a particular office, there is a possibility that members of 
such party will consider nominating a candidate capable of paying for the campaign bills. To 
recoup the money that these politicians spent in the elections, candidates might engage in 
vote buying from the people, which is antithetical to democracy. In the end, one political 
party has undue advantage over other parties, especially when the party in question controls 
the government as an incumbent and makes the political field unplayable for opposition 
political parties. In his response to the ways through which political parties in Ghana have 
had even party financing and having party branches in Ghana, he posited that: 
In recent years, political parties in Ghana have been able 
to respond positively to the demand of having party 
offices in all the regions in Ghana. In the initial stages, it 
was difficult for parties to perform this task, but I think 
government subventions to parties have made this possible 
in Ghana. This is why the recent clamour for the public 
financing of political parties in Ghana is a welcomed 
development to many Ghanaians, because through which, 
the gap between the ruling political party and the 
oppositions would be reduced drastically (Interview, Civil 
society activist1, Accra, May 2013). 
 This research supports the last respondent who highlighted the chances of opposition 
amidst party financing. It is true that when parties have access to fund, respect the rules and 
regulations guiding party funding, the chances that any party can win in the election is 
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possible. The call for public funding for political parties in Ghana, according to Sakyi and 
Agomor (2016), came about because two political parties, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) 
and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), found it very hard to fund their operations 
through private sources. The case is slightly different when a particular party controls the 
government, because that party will use the state apparatus during elections. A serving party 
leader responded: 
It is important to point out that this country has been 
working so hard since the military relinquished power to 
measure up with advanced democracies. We considered 
how damaging uneven party financing can be to Ghanaian 
democracy and various governments in this country have 
worked to ensure that this problem is addressed positively. 
I must commend Ghanaian politicians for working in 
accordance with the regulations guiding party spending 
during campaigns and elections, as this has reflected on 
the democracy on ground today. This government will not 
lose focus stabilising party-financing which reflect the 
popularly ongoing public financing. In the election that 
got this government into power, I can remember vividly 
that NDC,my party, gave us and the opposition political 
parties’ even financial assistance and I cannot deny the 
opposition party because they gave us the same right when 
John Kufour was in power (Interview,Party leader1, 
Kumasi, May 2013). 
What the Minister has spoken about regarding Ghana is the very opposite to the cases 
in Malaysia, and some countries in Latin America, where state resources and state media are 
used to finance campaigns, especially when the ruling parties take these advantages to sustain 
their clientelistic networks. Take for instance, before Malaysia’s 2013 election, the regime of 
Prime Minister Najib Razak spent a total of MYR 58 billion (Malaysian Ringitt) on salary 
augmentation in support of his populist policies, where workers received MYR 500 salary 
increase cash vouchers (Welsh, 2013). The abuse of state power can come in various forms, 
like the case in Venezuela where the media was used for partisan purposes. In a 2012 election 
campaign, Venezuelan President (Hugo Chavez) enjoyed 60 hours of airtime, as 47 television 
networks gave him an average of 47 minutes of coverage every day, while the opposition 
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party candidate (Henrique Capriles) had just 3 hours and 30 minutes and was allowed just 3 
minutes a day (Garay and Salcedo-Albaran, 2012). Another twist in abusing the resources of 
a state comes from the extraction of donations through deductions from the public servants.  
There are cases in both Nicaragua and Bolivia where ruling parties have made 
legislations that subject civil servants to mandatory salary deductions in order to support 
government parties. El Diario (2011) notes that the former Vice Minister of Mining in 
Bolivia enforced a 10 per cent deduction from civil servant wages in order to finance the 
campaign of the Movimiento Al Socialismo Bolivia (MAS). In Nicaragua one quarter of 
public servant salaries were deducted (Alvarez, 2010). Using state resources in this way 
negatively impacts opposition parties in elections, because it leaves them financially stifled. 
Because of this, opposition political parties in Ghana requested that states subsidise party 
financing (Ninsin, 2006). Ninsin (2006: 17-18), argues that political parties in Ghana support 
state funding of political parties, especially when those parties are not the ruling party. From 
1992 to 2000, when NPP was an opposition party, it vehemently supported state funding of 
political parties. When NPP became the ruling party, the previous ruling party NDC, now in 
opposition to NPP, collaborated with other parties to promote state funding of political 
parties. It looks like state funding of political parties does not favour the incumbent party, but 
that it could also be used to cripple opposition political parties during elections. 
 In line with Ninsin’s (2006) argument, a university lecturer from Ghana states: 
 The reason why public funding has gathered momentum 
in Ghana is because both opposition and ruling parties 
have used it to unsettle either government in power. So, it 
has become a popular slogan in Ghanaian politics and 
each government has worked to ensure that parties are 
given equal opportunities. Compare our country with other 
African countries and you will see that Ghana is a unique 
case where party financing and regulation are effective 
and efficient. While parties with access to finance have 
continued to win elections in other countries, the case of 
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Ghana is different because before the 2000 general 
election, NDC was the ruling party but in the election 
proper, NPP, which was the opposition, defeated NDC’s 
candidate. The same thing was reflected in the elections of 
2008 where opposition parties won. (Interview, University 
lecturer2, Accra, May 2013) 
 Ghana's Public Funding of Political Parties Bill was arranged through the Economic 
Affairs (EA) and the Ghana Political Parties Programme (GPPP), during John Kufour’s 
regime. The bill was completed in 2008, when it was handed over to the President after two 
years. Both John Kufour and Evans Atta Mills showed great commitment towards ensuring 
that the bill passed into law in 2010. One primary concern was whether the political elites and 
Ghanaians would welcome the bill and be willing to support it. The importance of promoting 
multiparty politics and the development of democracy in Ghana necessitated the need for 
public financing of political parties (Arthur, 2016). For (Sakyi et al. 2016: 73; Arthur ,2016), 
public financing of political parties helps manage the influence that individuals with private 
money may have over politics. Arthur (2016) maintains that introducing a system where 
political parties can get assistance through public funding encourages and ensures a party-
centred, rather than a candidate-centred, approach to electoral campaigning.  
 However, in Ghana, the law provides just two ways through which political parties 
can receive funding from the public: free airtime through the state-owned media, which 
political parties enjoy when presenting their programmes and campaign messages, and free 
vehicles made available to political parties during elections, depending on the number of 
candidates each political party fields in the election. These provisions were made possible by 
the Supreme Court of Ghana, which legally enforces this responsibility (Magolowondo et 
al.,2012). So far, research shows that the only sources through which the public finances 
political parties in Ghana come via indirect support, which does not involve taxing their 
incomes, but does involve the direct support of vehicle allocation from the Electoral 
Commission to political parties involved in elections (Gyampo, 2015). 
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4.1.5 Elite Commitment to Democracy and Anti-Corruption  
Introduction 
In regards to corruption, scholars have started with a definition of the concept. This 
thesis will build on the definition of corruption by Samuel Huntington, who posits that 
corruption happens when government officials serve their interests by displaying certain 
behaviours that are antithetical to accepted norms (Huntington, 1989). Scholars such as, 
Rothstein et al. (2005), Uslaner (2005), and Rothstein (2009) argue that corruption is a sticky 
phenomenon that remains in systems where it occurs. Rothstein et al. (2005) provides a 
reason for why corruption is regarded as a sticky problem, reasoning that the status quo has 
been persistent in paying for bribes or demanding a bribe. 
The rationale here is that everyone in the system seems to be culpable of this action. 
So if some people improve their behaviour, it will not be easy to get everyone behaving in the 
same way. Reacting to this argument, Myrdal (1968) posits that the ordinary low level officer 
would reason like in a society where people thrive on corruption, he is not supposed to be 
only innocent one among (Myrdal, 1968:409). While this thesis agree that corruption is sticky 
when it occurs in a system, it strongly believes that ‘no condition is permanent’ with regards 
to tackling systematic corruption. A country that wants to fight corruption must adopt strong 
structural reforms capable of bringing corruption to a standstill. It is on this backdrop that this 
research builds on the work of Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000:37-39), who suggest that a 
system with a democratic culture should be defiant of corrupt behaviour. 
Fortunately, Ghana and Nigeria are among the countries in Africa where democracy 
has been in practice since the 90’s, and as such, should have success stories on anti-
corruption crusades, especially when Singapore and Hong Kong, under authoritarian regimes, 
have success stories on fighting corruption. For the purpose of this thesis, serious fraud 
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office, appointment of the executive body, composition of the executive and tenure of office 
are considered to either mar or promote the objectives and effectiveness of anti-corruption 
agencies in Ghana and Nigeria.  
 4.1.6 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Ghana through Anti-Corruption. 
Several legislative acts in Ghana forbid at any attempt made by office holders to use their 
offices to make private gains, to the detriment of the public. The Customs and Exercise and 
Preventive Service (1993) (Management Law, PNDCL 330), the Audit Service Act, 2000 
(Act584), the Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act654), and the Internal Audit Agency 
Act 2003 (Act 658).  In the year 2000, the Political Parties Law (Act 574) was adopted to 
ensure that all political parties and their office holders in Ghana complied with the legal 
procedure that demanded the declaration of personal assets, sources of funds, liabilities, and 
expenditures in the national Gazette, especially with regards to elections.  
Anyone found to have defrauded the government in these assets declaration would be 
disqualified in the election or expelled from office. There is also a Public Procurement Act, 
2003 (Act 663), which promotes transparency in government procurement, and ensures that 
due process is followed, especially when awarding government contracts. The massive 
money laundering in the mid-2000s among politicians in the continent, facilitated the passage 
of the Anti-Laundering Law Act, 2008 (Act749) in Ghana. This Act was designed to stop 
people (especially politicians) from the illicit transfer of money looted in their countries to 
foreign accounts. Instant punishment of a fine of 5,000, or a custodial sentence of 12 months 
to 10 years, is to be given to offenders for such an offence. 
However, these Acts would not be effective if there were no institutions to enforce 
them. Since the mid-1990s, there have been various international anti-corruption creativities 
(Kaufmann, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Onuigbo & Eme, 2015), and in recent years, 
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African countries have developed approaches created upon national and local action such as 
anticorruption agencies, public inquiries, inspector-general systems, legal and quasi-legal 
trials, complaints procedures, and public awareness campaigns (Heidenheimer, LeVine and 
Johnston, 1989; Onuigbo & Eme, 2015). The key factor responsible for assessing the 
effectiveness and sustainability of such approaches is the commitment of the political elites to 
act effectively in combatting corruption (Klitgaard, 1997; Onuigbo & Eme, 2015).  
It is on this backdrop that several anti-corruption institutions emerged in March 13, 
2001, under the umbrella of the Ghanaian Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC). GACC is a 
unique cross-sectoral grouping of public, private and civil society organisations (CSOs), with 
the vision of projecting a new Ghana devoid of corruption, where transparency, 
accountability, integrity and tolerance are upheld. The motive for the creation of this coalition 
body stemmed from the fact that corruption had become prevalent and common, and Ghana 
required an integrated approach to fighting corruption. In this regard, Johnston and Kpundeh 
(2004) warn that such a social coalition does not thrive everywhere and to be successful, such 
an action requires a functioning state, rather than states under dictators; a patriotic leader with 
intent to serve is more capable of turning things around than unpatriotic leaders who are bent 
on exploiting their societies. There is a consensus among literature on corruption that anti-
corruption reforms are bound to fail when there is no strong political will to enforce those 
reforms (Williams and Doig, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2000; Pope and Vogl, 2000; Abdulai, 2009). 
The political will in this context refers to the government’s genuine interest and agenda to 
combat corruption. Johnston and Kpundeh (2004) again state that for social coalition action 
to function, there must be an orderly environment because social action coalitions cannot be 
effective in a socially disintegrated environment. This is because if an environment 
guarantees civil liberties, freedom of association and organisation, and freedom of expression 
it gives the people the security to oppose governmental corruption (Isham et al.1997).  
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In the Ghanaian constitution of 1992, two institutions that investigate corruption were 
created. These were the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), 
and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), while CHRAJ does not have the power to directly tackle 
corruption, the constitution of Ghana allows the chairman and his two deputies to have tenure 
of offices as accorded the the judges in Ghana. Short (2015) observes that all the Ghanaian 
stakeholders in the fight against corruption unanimously adopted a policy for fighting 
corruption in a ten-year plan (2015-2024), under the umbrella of the National Anti-
Corruption Plan (NACAP). 
The Ghanaian government’s effort to fight corruption has received some criticism 
because the (CHRAJ) responsible for checkmating corruption are lacking prosecutorial 
autonomy, as investigations for prosecution are in the office of the Attorney General. In his 
article, ‘Has CHRAJ been an anti-corruption failure’ Kofi (2013) notes that during Kufour’s 
regime, CHRAJ investigated a cabinet minister for conflict of interest and corruption, but was 
stopped by the court that such a move was unconstitutional, citing that CHRAJ had no 
constitutional powers to carry out investigations into corruption on its own without prior 
complaint. On the misunderstanding between the court and CHRAJ with regards to 
investigation another scholar observed that: 
The total absence of clear legal standards to regulate how 
the Attorney-General generally exercises its prosecutorial 
discretion, especially in cases involving alleged political 
corruption or abuse of office, is unhelpful to CHRAJ's 
work and arguably also violates the spirit of Article 296 (a 
& b) of the Constitution. At a minimum, where the 
Attorney General rejects a CHRAJ request for 
prosecution, the Attorney General must be required to 
provide written reasons that shall be made public 
(Prempeh (2010: 62). 
 
In the history of Ghana, laws enacted to fight corruption date as far back as the First 
Republic in 1960, when The Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) was geared to look into 
passive bribery, the exploitation of public offices, extortion, and the use of public office to 
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enrich oneself. This means that any form of corruption in Ghana is condemned and in the 
face of Ghanaian law, taboo. 
In his political manifesto and promise as he assumed his position as the leader of the 
key opposition party that would dislodge Gen. Rawlings, neoliberal President J. A. Kufuor 
declared “Zero Tolerance for Corruption”, in an attempt to run a clean government bereft of 
corruption. The sincerity of Kufour’s government on an anti-corruption programme was 
evident in his first two years. His government demonstrated its genuine commitment in 
fighting corruption, as the regime repealed the criminal and sedition laws in July 2001, which 
over the years posed a huge threat to media freedom, and were used in prosecuting a sitting 
minister who caused financial loss to the government (Abdulai, 2009). President Atta Mills, 
who succeeded Kufour, also promised to continue with the zero tolerance to corruption that 
his predecessor initiated. The President pledged to fight corruption by first challenging all 
government appointees to declare their assets within seven days of their appointment, 
compared to the pre-existing six months. Unfortunately, this instruction was never enforced 
(Global Advice Network, 2013). President John Mahama, who took over after the death of 
Atta-Mills, has not made any effort towards fighting corruption. In the 2012 Afrobarometer 
survey, 30 per cent of the surveyed households were of the view that the government of 
Mahama showed a lackadaisical attitude towards fighting corruption. Evidence from the 2015 
Afrobarometer compiled by Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi (2015) note that during his campaign 
to become the president of Ghana in 2012, former president Mahama made strong assurances 
to curb corruption, investigate and reprimand corrupt officials who associated in corruption 
from the prior administration. However, Mahama’s government could not deliver the 
promised political and economic goods. However, this indicates that previous administrations 
were genuine in fighting corruption, especially when each government maintained that 
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elected candidates must declare their assets. This cannot be credited to some other African 
countries, where the elites don’t declare their assets. 
The impact anti-corruption agencies have had in Ghana cannot be ignored. For 
example, as at 2006, Bossman (2006) noted that ever since CHRAJ was created in 1994, 
investigate over 125 corruption cases have been completed in Ghana. These included some 
high profile investigations, such as corruption cases against ministers of state and other high 
profile government officials, which eventually led to the resignation of these government 
workers. Bossman (2006) confirmed that one of the investigations conducted between 1995 
and 1996, during Rawlings’s tenure, looked into the illegal acquisition of assets and was the 
breakthrough that created the commission’s reputation as a transparent and credible anti-
corruption institution in Ghana. 
Since the early days of its establishment (1995) the CHRAJ has managed some 
important investigations. There involved high profile government officers who illegally 
amassed wealth, alleged corrupt officials, including Mr. Osei-Wusu, the Minister of Interior, 
Mr. Adjei-Marfo, who worked in the office of the President, Mr. Victor Obeng, who served 
as an Adviser to President Jerry John Rawlings, and Mr. Ibrahim Adam, the Minister of 
Agriculture. Most of these culprits were caught after various findings by CHRAJ. Short 
(2015) posited that the government tried to reject their findings as they are contained in a 
White paper, a procedure forbidden by the law establishing CHRAJ. But CHRAJ held close 
to its verdicts, which led to the official resignation of these public officers.  
Amidst the establishment of anti-corruption agencies in Ghana, the tenure of office 
given to members of the anti-corruption agency matters most, as their official tenure accords 
them the right of permanent appointment. Because of this, it is possible to argue that 
members of anti-corruption agencies will deliver when they know their place in office is 
secured. However, this connotes a certain level of autonomy among the members of the anti-
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corruption agencies in Ghana. For example, the CHRAJ‘s ability to adhere to its verdicts on 
criminal issues without the influence of anyone stems from the institution’s tenure of office, 
granted to the institution by the government. This long term tenure has guaranteed the 
CHRAJ’s autonomy. For instance, once anyone is appointed a member of the CHRAJ in 
Ghana, that person retains that position for life. For any gross misconduct to result in the 
Presidential dismissal of an executive member of the CHRAJ, a five man committee would 
look into the case before a decision could be taken. It can be argued that anyone who has a 
permanent position is likely to deliver in the crusade against corruption compared to anyone 
whose position is fragile and likely to be dismissed at any time. The successful execution of 
projects in combating corruption is the result of the anti-corruption body in Ghana being free 
to handle corrupt cases, allowing it to fight against corruption at its own discretion. It is the 
autonomy granted to this body that enables it to prosecute high profile government officials. 
This is one area where the anti-corruption body (CHRAJ) in Ghana has excelled and this 
shows that the political elites in this country are committed to democracy. 
4.2 Elite Coherence through Coalition/Alliances 
Introduction 
According to Gabriel Almond’s (1966) theory of the political system, of crosscutting 
cleavages, it is possible to predict that countries like Ghana and Nigeria, with plural cultures 
and divisions, will show a high level of instability. But these countries are not unstable 
despite the visible fragmentation surrounding their politics before and after transitions. The 
reason is according to some scholars, like Fatton (1992), Samatar (1997, 1999), Ake (1967, 
2000) and Svanikier (2007), African political elites form a more multi-dimensional 
viewpoint, and in the process accepted the critical role they play in attempts to bring about 
regime change and stability. It is important to point out here that the cohesiveness inherent in 
some African countries is a result of the shared interest in democracy among the elites. The 
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question is, what actually made the elites coherent in the first place? For the benefit of this 
thesis, the research will answer the aforementioned question, looking at negative incentives 
like ethnicity fear of war and sanctions which were prominent in making Ghana and Nigerian 
political elites to show a high level of cohesion.   
In the period of 1980 to 1990, coalition formation was common among countries with 
emerging democracies in Europe, Latin America, and recently, African countries. The studies 
by Neto and Magar (2000), established that in Latin American states, half the cabinets in the 
80s and 90s emerged through multi-party appointments, where their main reason for co-
operation was to trade off policy ideals in order to share the spoils accrued from political 
positions. This is what Oyugi (2006) referred to as an ‘opportunistic’ kind of coalition. It is 
important to look at some theories that explain coalitions, as this affects democratic 
consolidation, and then use it to explain the approaches inherent in African democracies, 
especially Ghana and Nigeria. 
Coalition theory concentrates on size principle and policy-based approaches (Laver, 
1986). The size principle approach connotes the importance of governments enjoying 
parliamentary majorities, as it reflects the outcomes of the last elections, where the seat 
possessed by each parliamentarian gives him bargaining power in the coalition. However, in 
recent times, this approach has been reformed due to the nature of minority governments in 
Western Europe (Strom, 1990). On the other hand, the policy-based approach connotes that 
elites, through their parties, form coalitions to address a fundamental policy question which 
relates to a country’s politics, to ensure governmental stability (Pridham, 2002). It is from 
this view on government stability that this thesis can take off, to understand why coherent 
African political elites first venture into an alliance/coalition. Alliances or coalitions can take 
place within the opposition and other parties, or by the ruling party and other parties, 
depending on the situation. The alliances and coalitions common in most African states take 
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place before elections as the elites use that opportunity to maximise their chances of winning 
elections, either to consolidate sharing the spoils or in an attempt to promote political 
stability. 
The idea of forming alliances or coalitions by the elites before and after elections, 
amidst ethnic-divisions and political rivalries, indicates how cohesive the elites are. This 
shows the ability of the elites to reach a compromise and build national unity in emerging 
democracies, which in return strengthens the possibility for democratic consolidation. With 
regards to African elites, who are by nature ethnically oriented and, hold sway over their 
ethnic groups, it is difficult to predict if they will manage alliances in such circumstance. The 
ability to unmask this ethnic stigma connotes that they are willing to form alliances, which 
impacts democratic consolidation. The thesis aims to find out what the elites in Ghana and 
Nigeria did to create an enabling environment, where the opposing elites get accommodated 
to advance the consolidation of democracy against African traditional one-party system that 
is dominant in nature. Elite coherence shall focus on two major interview questions: (1) Is 
there tolerance among the political elites? (2) Is there coalition or alliance among political 
parties? 
4.2.1 Coalition /Alliances through Elite Coherence in Ghana 
Before 1996, Ghana had a long history of elite disunity, due to the existence of 
traditional political divisions between Danquah/ Busia (right-wing) and Nkrumah (left-wing). 
While Danquah/Busia’s ideology is based on political and economic liberalism like the West, 
Nkrumah is more socialist and anti-imperialist. In the eyes of many Ghanaians, the 
Nkrumahist tradition represents ethnical and social inclusiveness, a broad-based majority and 
is left-wing. On the other hand, the Danquah/Busia tradition is seen as elitist, ethnically 
limited, principally Ashanti and Akyem sub-groups of the Akan), liberal-democratic, and 
right-wing (Svanikier,2007; Whitfield, 2009). NPP is perceived to be dominated by Ashanti 
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people, and during elections the sub-groups of the region have always been a stronghold for 
the NPP. In the same scenario, the NDC has been perceived as a Ewe or Northern party. 
According to Nugent (2001), Rawlings, who is a native of the Ewe community, referred to 
the Ewe populated Volta region as his World Bank because of the number of votes he 
received from the region during elections. These two traditional political parties from 
Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah have a deep seated hatred for each other, and the affiliation of 
members to these two groups determines voting behaviour and electoral outcomes. One of the 
respondents during an interview argued:  
The maturity the two traditional groups Danquah/Busia 
and Nkrumah in Ghana have exhibited to progress 
democracy in Ghana remains the reason why we have had 
successes in our democracy. For example, Danquah/Busia 
represents New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the People’s 
Convention Party (PCP), the brainchild of Convention 
People’s Party (CPP). The Danquah/Busia and Convention 
People’s Party are two opposing groups yet they were able 
to form a strong alliance (Great Alliance) that stood 
against the ruling party of NDC in the 1996 general 
elections. Despite the deep hate that had existed between 
the two groups in the early 60s, they managed to negotiate 
a means for settling their differences which largely 
smoothed grounds for the NPP’s victory in the general 
elections of 2000, and put our democracy into its first 
alternation of power where the opposition Party (NPP) 
defeated the incumbent party (NDC) (Interview, Party 
leader2, Accra, May 2013). 
In the events that led to the elections of 1996, NPP and the People’s Convention Party 
(PCP), formed an alliance. Before this they were in opposition to each other, and both 
opposed to the ruling party National Democratic Congress (NDC), headed by John Jerry 
Rawlings. One of the reasons that led NPP and PCP to form an alliance under the Great 
Alliance (GA) in 1996 was Rawlings’ popularity. On this note, a retired military Major 
argued: 
Frankly, as at 1996, we were shocked when NDC was 
declared the winner in the general elections of 1996. Many 
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were afraid that Rawlings might become another terror 
like Idi Amin of Uganda because in his regime as the 
Military Head of States attempted coups were carried out 
but none succeeded and as he remained to win elections 
under successive civilian governments. Ghanaians feared 
that a terror had emerged in their polity. You know before 
the elections of 1992 and 1996 Rawlings had established 
himself in Ghanaian politics, bought over some major civil 
society groups as well as controlled the Media. Hardly 
would you see anyone talking about negative things in the 
Press against Rawlings, of course, this showed the level at 
which Rawlings had dominated the political system. Even 
before the elections of 2000, where external forces were 
telling Rawlings to step down, and also respect the 
constitutional regulations in Ghana for just two tenure of 
office for the president, there was anxiety across Ghana 
that Rawlings might pick a successor who may eventual 
wins the election. It was miraculous when the power of 
alliance worked against Rawlings and his party-NDC. You 
can recall that the Great Alliance surfaced in the 1996 
general elections but failed to make any meaningful 
impact in those elections but was stronger in 2000 when 
NDC was dumped to the delights of many Ghanaians 
(Interview, Retired Army Major2, Ashanti, May 2013). 
On the other hand, some authors reasoned that the political elites from Danquah/Busia 
and Nkrumah reacted against Rawlings because they began to feel a sense of shared destiny, 
from what they went through under Rawlings’s AFRC/PNDC, which unleashed human 
violations and persecution on them (Svanikier, 2000: 132). In his response, a member of 
Center for Democracy Development (CDD) in Ghana argued:  
The alliance that was formed by the opposing political 
parties in 1996 was emotional in nature. Even at their 
differences, they managed to form an alliance because of 
the anger in their hearts against the ruling government. 
Under the governments (military/ civilian regimes) of 
John Jerry Rawlings, people were brutally treated 
especially when you are in the opposition party. It was this 
very reason that in 1996 political elites from different 
orientations came together to stop Rawlings’s re-
emergence but this was not possible because the 
Progressive Alliance under the ruling political party was 
more strong than the Great Alliance under the 
NPP(Interview, Civil society activist1, Accra, May 2013). 
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Another interesting motivation for this alliance was instigated from the earlier alliance 
Rawlings’s NDC had with two other parties, the NCP and Eagle, in 1992. The PCP, which is 
descended from Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) and the New Patriotic 
Party (NPP), which tapped the ideology of Danquah/Busia’s United Party, reasoned that if 
NDC could form an alliance and win, they could do the same. While alliances were pivotal in 
1996, proven by the one between NDC and two other political parties, it was unusual to see 
Nkrumah and Danquah/Busia loyalists unite for a common goal. These two parties, PCP and 
NPP, established  common ground for co-operation in 1996, largely to unseat the incumbent 
government of Rawlings, who had being in office for fifteen years. A community leader 
member discussed this further: 
Under the Progressive Alliance, NDC won the elections of 
1996 and major other alliances formed at the time, which 
were significant as they showed evidence that democracy 
had come to stay in our country. Take for example, 
Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah loyalists have been rivals 
over the years, and as a result it was unthinkable that these 
two opposing sides could ever share anything in common. 
But because they wanted Ghanaian democracy to work 
out, they buried their political differences so that they 
could achieve a promising democracy, hence the 
formation of the Great Alliance. Though this alliance did 
not live up to expectations, it proved to the whole world 
that Ghanaians did not play politics of rancor but were 
willing to show readiness to compromise on their 
differences. Yes, it is true that the alliance did not work 
out in 1996 but this was the reason NPP emerged winners 
in the run-off elections of 2000 (interview, traditional 
leader2, Kumasi, May 2013). 
Along the same lines, Ayee (1997) blamed the opposition parties’ loss of the 1992 
and 1996 elections, on the power of incumbency. The opposition elites were unable to form a 
united front capable of dethroning Rawlings, even at the merger (Great Alliance) between 
NPP and PCP. A university lecturer noted:  
Alliances through political elites’ unity have become a 
norm in Ghanaian politics since 1992.The two previous 
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elections, especially the elections of 1996, showed how 
much an alliance can swing votes to parties. Before the 
general elections, other political parties were not happy 
with the ruling party because of what happened in the 
previous elections, where other parties boycotted the 
parliamentary elections. Yet, for the sake of unity, other 
parties managed to form an alliance (Progressive Alliance) 
with NDC. In these 1996 elections, two alliances were 
formed, the Progressive Alliance for NDC and the Great 
Alliance for NPP. The Progressive Alliance emerged 
victorious in the elections, because they had a good 
understanding with the parties that they formed the 
alliance with, and this counted in the electoral outcomes. 
NPP was defeated in that election because it looked like 
the parties that formed that alliance still had some areas of 
discrepancies which affected their chances in the election.. 
When they reconciled their differences in the 2000 general 
elections, they were able to emerge victorious at the poll. 
Political alliances I can say have really progressed our 
democracy (Interview University lecturer3, Accra, May 
2013).  
The ability of political elites to compromise on their differences was instrumental 
when opposition parties won the presidential election in 2000. In this election, only one 
alliance (Progressive Alliance) was formed, compared to the previous election of 1996, which 
pitched two alliances (the Progressive Alliance and the Great Alliance) against each other. 
The election was conducted twice to ascertain which party won. In the first election, no party 
was able to reach the required figure (50 % +1) to be considered the winner, so a run-off 
election was organised. The elites from different oppositions groups irrespective of ethnic 
affiliation, mobilised support for NPP which was  strongly opposed to the incumbent party 
(NDC) at the time. The second election favoured NPP. This result was significant for the 
country’s democracy, because an opposition party dislodged an incumbent party. In the 1996 
elections, there was a merger that did not play out between Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah 
groups due to their fundamental differences. But in the 2000 run-off elections, which 
eventually brought the NPP into power, those differences were set aside as oppositions 
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groups unanimously voted against the incumbent party. According to one political party 
stalwart: 
Alliances among opposing political parties in Ghana have 
shown the level of understanding and co-operation that 
exists between political elites from different ethnic groups. 
Even in their differences, elites of these political parties 
have found common ground for interactions. The run-off 
elections of 2000, where the first election failed to present 
a candidate remains an example of where alliance was 
decisive. In that election,no candidate wins with over 
50%, so a run-off election was organized to determine 
which party to win.  It was through an alliance formed by 
Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah political elites that gave 
NPP victory over NDC (Interview, Party leader3, Sunyani, 
May 2013). 
Apart from the alliances formed by the elites in Ghana, both the elites from the two 
opposing political parties, NDC and NPP, have shown politics of inclusiveness in their 
administrations and governments. Elischer (2008) observes that though the leadership of 
NDC favoured the Western and Northern regions in terms of appointments, there were cross-
cutting cleavages across ethnic lines. This was despite the fact that John Jerry Rawlings 
handpicked a candidate from his geographical location (West) as his successor during the 
2000 elections. In an attempt to reinforce the politics of communal existence among the 
political elites in Ghana, a NDC stalwart noteed: 
I will not deny that there is no coalition or accommodation 
of opposing parties in our country. I can vividly remember 
that our members were involved in the government of 
John Kuffour of whom we remained strong opposition to. 
When the government of the NPP assumed power in 2000, 
it carried out the popularised inclusive policy which 
opened avenue for politics of compromise and 
cooperation. To enhance common representation of all 
elites irrespective of political affiliations, the government 
of NPP has appointed members of opposition political 
parties which include the appointment of P.V Obeng, who 
was a former member of PNDC/NDC, into the public 
service. Another notable appointment was the former 
member of PNDC/NDC (Joyce Aryee) as the Chief 
Executive of the Ghanaian Chamber of Mines. These 
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appointments were carried out even at the mounting 
differences between the two rival political parties 
(Interview, Party leader4, Volta, May 2013). 
This act of mutual cooperation and compromise of elite differences has exhibited a 
high level of coherence towards establishing democratic consolidation in Ghana. Of course, 
the relative relationship that has existed between the different elites in Ghana has been 
reflected in the country’s democracy; when the two major political parties have produced the 
president of the country, either neither of the parties have challenged the election outcomes at 
the court, or when they do it has been resolved peacefully. In the next discussion, we shall 
talk about how elite tolerance sustains democratic consolidation. 
This thesis can deduce that the cohesive nature of Ghana’s elites is reflected in the 
various alliances that have taken place in the country since 1992, mainly because those elites 
are like-minds in their quest for democratic consolidation. Laver and Schofield (1998) and 
Riker (1962) hold that most African coalitions are interested in seeking political positions, 
rather than pursuing policies. This thesis disagrees with this notion because the political elites 
in Ghana have pursued alliances to advance elite coherence, which is spot on the country’s 
consolidation of democracy. So, It does not matter whether it is ruling elites against the 
opposition, or opposition elites against the ruling elites. Instead, the alliances have resulted in 
a relatively cohesive atmosphere among the elites, which promote stable democratic 
outcomes. 
4.2.2  Elite Coherence through Tolerance 
Introduction  
A necessity of democracy is the readiness of different ethnic groups in a country to 
recognise and respect the rights of other groups who do not share the same political 
affiliation, or hold different views in a political process. When citizens tolerate the rights of 
others, it goes a long way in securing the rights of all and reinforces democratic values and 
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democratic citizenship. As Sniderman et al. (1989: 25) argued, "The more tolerant citizens 
are of the rights of others, the more secure are the rights of all, their own included; hence the 
special place of political tolerance in contemporary conceptions of democratic values and 
citizenship." So, for democracy to be considered balanced, Frempong (2008) notes that all 
political players must have a certain level of cooperation to enable them compete effectively. 
If democracy is to be effective, Diamond et al. (1995:19) notes that democracy must be 
legitimate, opposition political parties must be tolerated, parties must be willing to 
compromise with other political opponents, there must exist cooperation among all 
competing political opponents, there must be fairness in political positions and partisan 
identification, and there must be civility of political discourse and efficacy that promotes 
participation, emanating from the norm of political equality. 
If tolerance entails allowing others their rights in democracies, for the benefits of this 
thesis, this research looks at the extent to which the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria have 
tolerated the opposition political parties. It will also consider their relationships with other 
opposing groups, like the media and civil society groups. This thesis shall find out if civil 
society and the media have enjoyed the maximum right to express their views, with regards to 
how democracy has been practiced in these countries, and whether the ruling governments in 
the two countries are willing to accommodate the constructive views of these groups, be it 
negative or positive. Keller (1999) describes the characteristics of the civil society as an 
autonomous association created upon a civic agenda, born as civic organisations, but moved 
by circumstances to engage in politics. They might demand constitutional reform, 





4.2.3 Elite Coherence through Tolerance in Ghana 
In interviews conducted in Ghana, on tolerance among the elites and political parties, the 
results show that Ghanaian elites seem to show tolerance to opposing political elites.  While 
22 out of 25 respondents agreed that there is high level of tolerance in Ghana, only 3 
respondents held a contrary view. 
One of the respondents (a university lecturer) who held a contrary view about the high 
level of tolerance among the political elites in Ghana, reasoned that: 
There is a high level of intolerance in Ghana especially as 
the parties still practice the so called attitude of the 
‘winner takes it all’ syndrome. For example, first, the 
opposition political parties are ineffective in Ghana, 
Secondly, the government has not tolerated the civil 
society, maybe, because of their critical manners which of 
course, help democracy consolidation in advance 
countries. So, the political elites in Ghana must endeavour 
to collaborate other opposing views.” In a similar view, a 
media member posited: “how can one talk about tolerance 
among the political elites in Ghana while since transition 
there has been ethnicity problems and divisions in the 
politics of this country especially between the Ewe tribe 
and Akan tribe, which are the two strongest tribes where 
the two major political parties in Ghana have their 
stronghold. We will need to break these divisions and then 
argue that the political elites in this country have a high 
level of tolerance. Many have talked about tolerance in our 
politics but I shall not subscribe to that until acrimonies 
between these two tribes ceased to exist (Interview, 
University lecturer4, Cape Coast, May 2013). 
 
One of the respondents thought there was a high level of tolerance among the political 
elites in Ghana:  
There is a high level of tolerance due to the 
competitiveness the political parties have engaged into 
over the years, that has resulted in the opposition political 
party asserting its authority, which enables it to capture 
power many times in Ghana. Added to that, our 
organisation, the Centre for Democracy Development and 
other civil society groups, have enjoyed maximum 
tolerance from the elites. As a matter of fact, the political 
elites have sensitive attitudes towards the civil society and 
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this is why they try to co-opt our group (Interview, Civil 
society activist3, Tamale, May 2013) 
 In a similar vein, another respondent argued:  
Ghana’s democracy would not have been this positive 
without the understanding the politicians have shown so 
far. I must commend them for showing positive tolerance 
to other opposing views. Lack of tolerance among political 
elites has been a bane on democracies in African 
continent. Their efforts in the establishment of the Inter-
Party Advisory Committee is worthy of emulation by 
other struggling democracies in Africa because this body 
has helped the opposing political elites and parties to 
remain peaceful through working on possible means to 
settle opposing views, and the result is obvious in many 
general elections where the two major political parties 
have had various alternations. Apart from 2008 where we 
had some misunderstanding between parties, since 1996, 
defeated parties have gone home and congratulated the 
winning parties and, of course, this kind of tolerance 
cannot be found in some African countries (Interview, 
Party leader5, Bolgatanga, May 2013) 
 
Still on the issue of political elites’ tolerance in Ghana, a community leader who is also a 
staunch member of NPP, posited: 
Over the years, Ghana has proved to the world that they 
have matured in every aspect of their democracy and the 
issue of political tolerance has been in existence since 
1996, even though the incumbent was still in power after 
what some of us saw as a scam in the election of 1992 
which we boycotted. Opposition political parties have 
enjoyed maximum tolerance from the various ruling 
parties since transition. Since 1996, there has been equal 
access to political campaign resources which was absent in 
1992 where opposition parties were starved of the 
government media. Recently, the government has allowed 
for freedom of private media. On the other hand, the elites 
have shown tolerance to the civil society. After all, Afro 
barometer supports my view that the elites in Ghana have 
tolerated the civil society (Interview, Traditional leader3, 
Cape Coast, May 2013). 
 
 In a similar view, a former retired Retired Army general agreed that: 
The opposition political parties are not facing any 
restrictions especially during elections. There is freedom 
among opposition political parties where they enjoy free 
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media, free association and the two turn overs are an 
example that opposition parties are allowed to muscle with 
the incumbent political party. Tolerance is all about live 
and let live. It is not about our different ethnicities but the 
culture of playing politics with less bitterness, so that 
unanimously Ghana would build a democracy worthy of 
emulation. Good a thing our political players understand 
this and so far, I have no regret that we left political arena 
for the civilians (Interview, Retired Army General3, 
Accra, May 2013). 
 
From the interview answers, this thesis found that some respondents used the post-
election crisis of 2008 in Ghana to argue that the political elites lack tolerance. It is important 
to shed a little light on that election. Before 2008, NPP had succeeded itself in power in the 
elections of 2004. So, in the elections of 2008, it looked like NPP which was the opposition 
party to NDC between 1992 and 2000, was becoming a dominant party because it had ruled 
from 2000 to 2008. Therefore, the new election was seen by many as a test to ascertain the 
maturity of Ghanaian politics, and see if the political elites could maintain, or even 
consolidate, their own record of elite tolerance and unity. Therefore, the elections of 2008 
came amidst several controversies, like the anxieties and tensions from the opposition party 
(NDC) which claimed that the voters’ register in the Ashanti Region, supposedly a NPP 
stronghold, was bloated. The NDC requested the IPAC’s urgent attention in looking into the 
issue, threatening to contest the outcome of the elections if IPAC failed to address their 
concerns. Another concern was about the People Amendment Bill which conformed with the 
Peoples Law of 1992 (PNDC LAW 284), and was tabled in 2004 by NPP for amendment so 
it could give voting rights to Ghanaians of the diaspora in the elections. However, this idea 
was refuted by NDC who threatened to contest the election results should the NPP go ahead 
on passing the bill into law (Asante, 2013). However, despite these differences during the 
2008 election Gyimah-Boadi (2009) notes that the electoral playing field was not only level, 
but that the government tolerated all the competing parties as they pursued their campaign 
objectives without the interference of any opposing elite. The outcome of the 2008 election 
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was significant in Ghanaian politics, as it marked another turn-over test which Samuel 
Huntington describes as important to consolidated democracy.  
The institution that the Electoral Commission, with the help of donors, established to 
ensure peace and tolerance within the various opposing political elites and parties was the 
Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). It was formed in March 1994, mainly to address 
any would-be or existing controversy that could deter democracy. This recognised political 
institution (IPAC), set out the rules for how various elites and their parties could compromise 
on the political game within the institution’s framework. The reason for establishing the 
IPAC, was to allow for elite interactions during and after elections, and to resolve the 
negativity that surrounded elections, like the 1992 parliamentary elections which resulted in 
the boycott of the subsequent elections and the post-election crisis in 2012. Gyimah-Boadi 
and Yakah (2012: 7) highlighted the importance of IPAC, in that through IPAC the 
opposition parties succeeded in negotiating for transparency mechanisms in Ghanaian 
elections, the inclusion of more polling station vote counting, and the use of transparent ballot 
boxes in elections, where party agents were allowed to represent their parties at polling 
stations. These agreements were reached by the political elites and the Election officials. The 
implementation of the various reforms, as suggested by the elites through the IPAC, was 
instrumental in curtailing voter fraud and improved the relative reliability of Ghanaian polls. 
There are communication links through which members of the elites interact, especially when 
they want to push or defend their interests during decision-making (Higley and Gunter, 
1995). The goal of this elite interaction can be said to have been achieved in Ghana, going by 
the various problems which could have undermined degenerated the country’s democracy but 
were handled peacefully by the IPAC. One respondent who talked about the impacts of the 
IPAC in Ghana’s politics noted: 
The politics of Ghana are on the right track today because 
of the establishment of the IPAC. When we talk about 
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tolerance among opposing elites in this country, 
commendation shall be given to donor countries who 
through our Electoral Commission established the IPAC, 
which has been responsible for resolving crisis and 
sustaining peace among the political elites and parties. The 
establishment of IPAC has served as a unifying factor 
among politicians in this country and the outcomes of few 
elections in Ghana show that the political elites tolerate 
themselves hence the turn overs between main opposition 
parties (Interview, Civil society activist4, Kumasi, May 
2013). 
 
Ghana’s democracy accommodated various actors in their agenda for peace and unity 
through the IPAC. In its monthly meetings, IPAC has representatives from the country’s 
political parties, the electoral commission of Ghana and, in some cases, extends invitations to 
the country’s key donor players. This could bring everyone onto the same page and promote a 
wide-ranging campaign for unity. In this meeting, the Electoral Commission that discharges 
the functions of the IPAC narrates its activities with the political parties and raises any 
activity from the parties that negates IPAC modus operandi and in return, political parties 
will raise their own concerns to the Electoral Commission which finds a way to address their 
concerns amicably. 
However, despite the deep hatred confronting the ruling government and the opposition 
elites, the immediate impact of the IPAC in stabilising peaceful co-existence among political 
actors came after the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, where the cohesive 
relationship that the IPAC established for the elites was responsible for the general 
acceptance of the 1996 election verdicts and the re-election of John Jerry Rawlings. The 
general mood following the election of 1996, the declaration of Rawlings as the president, 
and the acceptance of the result by the opposition parties, confirmed the fact that the 




In the midst of the mistrust that surrounded the elites and their parties in the 2000 
elections, the IPAC did not deter the promotion of confidence-building among the key 
players in regulating the behaviour and the actions of the political elites. It could be argued 
that in the 2000 elections, the incumbent political parties (NDC) which had ruled twice, took 
into consideration the advice from the IPAC, which supported politics of tolerance and 
accommodation of opposition political parties. For instance, in Ghana’s 2000 elections, the 
country overcame the first hurdle that countries must overcome to be considered 
consolidated, which O’Donnell (1996) describes as power alternation between competing 
political rivals. 
The framework reached by the IPAC representatives for future elections materialised 
during the 2000 elections, because for the first time since the country’s transition, an 
opposition party (NPP) overcame the incumbent party (NDC) in a transparent election. This 
resulted in the first power alternation, which invariably set the path for consolidated 
democracy in Ghana. The unique thing that happened was that John Evan Atta Mills, the 
ruling NDC’s presidential candidate for the 2000 elections, conceded defeat to the NPP 
candidate John Kuffuor with warm congratulations. Mills also participated in the 
inauguration of the new President, curtailing ethnic and political strains and promoting 
national unity (Gyimah-Boadi 2001; Asante 2013). Ninsin (2006: 64) notes that the IPAC 
became a framework for building trust and confidence among the political class, with regards 
to conducting elections. It also became a platform that has promoted deep trust towards the 
Electoral Commission. Events of the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004 
indicated a serious controversy over the creation of 30 additional constituencies for the 
elections and increasing the parliamentary seats from 200 to 230. These actions provoked yet 




Unfortunately, the relationship of the elites went sour during the 2012 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, as the results were contested, as they were in 1992. The event that 
led to the mistrust was a report from the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which accused the 
government of conspiring with the electoral officers and manipulating the electoral results, as 
well as the Electoral Commission side-lining the IPAC when major reform decisions about 
the 2012 elections were taken (Asante,2013). Against this background, the opposition party 
(NPP) contested the outcomes of the results. The actions of the Electoral Commission looked 
like ground work to the elections for the New Patriotic Party in the elections. However, The 
National Democratic Congress reclaimed their verdicts in court, and John Dramani Mahama 
was made President, despite the charges heaped on his party by NPP. It is important to note 
that even amid controversy the opposition party resorted to the court for justice, instead of 
using political violence. 
4.3     Chapter Summary 
Discussions so far have shown that the political elites in Ghana possessed a high level 
of democratic commitment and a high level of elite coherence. The elites of Ghana, in the 
interviews conducted, responded that in relation to commitment to democracy, the electoral 
body is given independence and autonomy, both of which are evident in the many successful 
elections in the country. The unlimited tenure of office granted to the members of the 
electoral commission shows that the political elites in the country are determined to giving 
the body the needed independence to function without any interference. In the area of party 
financing, rules about party financing, state subsidy, access to media and transparent 
donations/financing are used to measure the transparency of party financing. Ghana scored 14 
percent out of the available 16 percent and this indicate a high level of political elite 
commitment to democracy. The interview responses in Ghana are in agreement with the 
results from the measurement.  With regards to anti-corruption, serious fraud office, mode of 
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appointment, composition of membership, tenure of office are used to measure the 
effectiveness, fairness and unbiasedness in the prosecution of corrupt political elites and other 
political offenders. In this regards, the political elites in Ghana fared well too. 
Elite coherence is discussed, looking at alliances/coalition and the tolerance that exists 
among the political elite which has largely helped in promoting understanding and agreement 
to compromise their differences. In the discussion about the level of party alliance/coalition, 
23 out the 25 interview respondents were of the view that alliances had not only formed a 
means of interaction for political parties, but that alliances have helped the development of 
Ghanaian democracy. With regards to tolerance, 22 respondents out of the 25 interviewed 
agreed that there is a high level of tolerance among the political elites of Ghana. 
Looking at the level of elite commitment to democracy exhibited by the Ghanaian 
political elites, and the level of elite coherence, Ghana’s democracy can be said to be 
consolidated, especially as the country has had four turnovers, which this thesis uses to 












Coherence in a Degenerated Commitment to Democracy: The Case of Nigerian Political 
Elites and Consolidation of Democracy. 
5.1 Elite’s Commitment to democracy in Nigeria through Electoral Commission.   
A history of Nigeria’s democracy would be incomplete if the electoral commission’s 
role in the 1993 presidential elections was overlooked. This is because the election organised 
by the electoral commission at the time, remains the best in Nigerian history. Before this 
election, many Nigerians had become tired of military rule and sought to put a stop to it. 
Meanwhile, Nigeria’s first transitional electoral body, the National Electoral Commission 
(NEC), was established under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. The chairman of the 
Commission was Prof. Humphrey Nwosu, who introduced a candidate nomination process 
tagged option A4 formula where candidates for elections were selected from the grassroots. 
This  meant that a candidate  was qualified to contest in a general election if he  won from the 
grassroots, then went on to the national level. Two candidates contested for the seat of 
president in 1993 election namely; Alhaji Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention 
(NRC) and MKO Abiola, of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). While Ghana in its 1992 
presidential elections successfully transitioned from authoritarian rule, Nigeria in 1993 did 
not manage a successful transition. However, scholars are of the view that the 1993 
presidential elections were the fairest, most honest, and most credible election that the 
electoral body has conducted in the history of Nigerian elections (Rotimi and Ihonvbere 
1994, 672; Lewis 1994, 326; Ekanade and Odoemene 2012: 76-77). 
 Referring to the 1993 presidential elections and the impact of the electoral 
commission, a staunch member of Alliance for Democracy (AD) in Nigeria argues:  
Nigerian democracy would have been stabilise by now if 
the past and current Electoral Commissioners followed the 
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steps Prof. Humphrey Nwosu took under the umbrella of 
the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and conducted 
the most fair and honest elections in Nigeria. This was 
election organised under the supervision of a military 
regime yet it was remarkable in the ways Prof. Nwosu 
handled the whole processes. Yes, this commission does 
not enjoy the kind of autonomy and independence accrued 
to other Electoral Commissions in advanced democracies 
yet it was able to arrange credible elections for Nigerians. 
I think what transpired in the remarkable nature of that 
election was the unique way the commission members 
handled it. They showed commitment and dexterity in 
their attitude at ensuring a rig free election. Compare to 
the recent electoral commission, you will agree with me 
that even though the commission does not enjoy 
independence and autonomy, the members appointed to 
shoulder the responsibility for fair, honest and free 
elections are not responsive to this course but have from 
time to time shown lackaidecical attitude towards the task. 
Though autonomy and independence are necessary but 
free and fair elections are dependent on the members of 
the electoral commission because they have the power to 
disqualify any member who involves in vote rigging or 
electoral malpractices (Interview, Party leader1, 
Lagos,June,2013).     
Still focusing on the 1993 presidential elections, it can be deduced that the difference 
between the 1993 presidential election and the elections in contemporary Nigeria is the 
formation of political parties. In the previous elections before the 1993 elections, individuals 
formed political parties whereas the two political parties that contested for presidential 
position were heavily manipulated by the military ruling elites with the support of the people. 
The recent formation of political parties in Nigeria by the elites has not involved the citizens. 
It is reasonable to argue that the 1993 presidential election was free and fair because the elites 
supported it. They were not ready to allow anything to disrupt the processes, especially as the 
political elites felt that the people were getting tired of military rule and wanted it to end at all 
cost.  Since subsequent élections in Nigeria after the 1993 presidential elections, INEC have 
not been able to live up to people’s expectations, especially in relation to transparency and 
credibility (Anifowoshe and Babawale, 2003; Lewis 2004; Kurfi 2005; Agbaje and 
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Adejumobi, 2006). The question that comes to mind is why has the INEC fallen short of it 
constitutional functions? 
Compared to the effort made by the Electoral Commission in Ghana, where the 
Electoral Commission enjoys a high level of autonomy and neutrality, which has enabled fair 
and efficient elections, the  Nigerian INEC (Independent National Electoral Commission) has 
not measured up. This is because the INEC officials are answerable to the President.  While 
the seven members of the Electoral Commission in Ghana are appointees of the President, 
with the Ghanaian Parliament scrutinising them before they could take up their duties, the 
appointment of the INEC’s chairman and the Nigerian twelve national commissioners, are in 
the hands of the President, with endorsement of the Senate. The Resident Electoral 
Commissioners (RECs) in Nigeria for the thirty-six states of the Federal Republic, and one 
allocated for the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja are all direct appointees of the 
President. The President also guarantees the funding of the body through the Ministry of 
Finance who is also an appointee of the President. It was on this backdrop that a former INEC 
chairman in Nigeria argued: 
My friend, I must tell you here that while I was the INEC 
boss I sincerely worked to protect my reputation as a good 
citizen of this country that enjoys good governance and 
pure democracy. The problem I had at the time was that 
when I gave out orders, somebody somewhere is 
countering those orders and when that person is seen by 
my INEC commissioners as someone more powerful than 
I am, they are likely to fault my orders. See, it is not that 
we cannot say something and stand by it but you should 
also know that the majority of the politicians we have in 
this country are capable of anything. These men can kill 
anyone who stands in their way to political positions and 
as INEC officers; we have children and wives who do not 
want to loose us to untimely deaths. In this country, 
nothing is real. If the government tells you tomorrow that 
they have given independence or autonomy to the 
Electoral Commission, I tell you that such existed only on 
Nigerian newspapers. But in practice, it is not true at all. 
One thing I must let Nigerians know is that I regretted 
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assuming the position of INEC boss because it made me 
compromise my reputation (Interview, Election officer1, 
Port Harcourt, June 2013).  
From what the former INEC boss said, it can be seen that the Independent National 
Electoral Commission in Nigeria has not enjoyed the needed autonomy to supervise or 
conduct elections in Nigeria, because structural factors have hindered its ability to act as a 
neutral body. Another respondent from the opposition party-All Progressive Congress (APC) 
said: 
Our party is not losing elections because we are not 
capable of competing or challenging the ruling party but 
because the electoral body is bias in handling elections in 
this country. They are not to blame though because the 
ruling government has made them an instrument for 
winning elections. For an  opposition party to start 
competing and winning elections in this country,, there is 
the need to restructure the electoral body, especially, 
granting it the needed independence that would make the 
electoral body discharge their duties without being 
influenced by the President who appointed its members. 
Of course the constitution of this country is clear on this 
autonomy question for the commission, yet in practice, it 
is not possible because the president controls the body, 
and finances it through the Federal Ministry of Finance 
who is also an appointee of the President (Interview, Party 
leader2, Kano, June 2013) 
Based on what this staunch APC member reasoned, it appears that the President will 
influence the decisions of the electoral body during elections. On the other hand, the 
President might appoint people who are loyal party members and are always ready to work in 
his favour. The President, in order to gain the upper hand in elections, may wish to reward the 
chairman and RECs of the thirty-six states in Nigeria and because these appointees want to 
keep their jobs, they are likely to obey any instruction from the President. The reaction of 
respondents with regards to the capability of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria was 
negative. They affirmed that the inability of the body to conduct credible elections is external, 
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that is, the INEC is not to be blamed completely for the irregularities in elections, but the 
system. According to a former party leader in the government of Chief Olushegun Obasanjo: 
The irregularities in elections stem from the structure of 
the INEC which is structured in such a way it could play 
to the whims and caprices of the forces behind its 
formation. You cannot expect the members of the 
commission to give election verdicts that contradicts the 
interest of those that brought them in such position. My 
concern is that Nigeria is not learning from advanced 
democracies where the electoral commission has a high 
level of autonomy that enables it discharge its duties 
without fear or favour (Interview, Party leader3, Owerri, 
June 2013).    
He bemoaned the capacity of the body to conduct free and fair elections when it lacks 
autonomy and is funded completely by the government. This research reasons along line the 
former party leader the deplorable state of the EC in Nigeria as the commission lacks the 
capacity for managing a free and fair elections. For someone who worked with the ruling 
party under president Obasanjo to say this about EC he and his boss (Obasanjo) once 
controlled, then, the electoral commission in Nigeria may be worse than he reckoned.  
  In order to bridge this relationship between the President and the electoral body, 
Nigeria has enacted some electoral acts, like the one of 2006. But this move has not done 
much to neutralise the power relationship between the executive arm and the Electoral 
Commission in Nigeria. In his observation, Lewis (2003) notes that in 1999, the elections 
conducted in Nigeria witnessed widespread manipulation. This sapped the trust and 
confidence people had in the INEC's credibility, as a neutral body. Some of the problems 
facing the commission were: “erratic funding, poor logistics, and wrangling over the electoral 
framework hindered the work of building an effective electoral system for a huge, crowded, 
diverse, and highly complex country. Problems accumulated from early 2002, when it 
became clear that the Commission was not ready to stage the local-government elections” 
(Lewis, 2003).  
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In a similar vein, the 2003 and 2007 Presidential elections were arguably the worst 
elections INEC has conducted. The two elections were not just non-credible but blatantly 
fraudulent; as almost all observers described it as the worst they had witnessed anywhere. 
The election of 2007 was a calculation of the outgoing President Obasanjo to impose his 
successor on Nigerians when his plot for a third term failed. With the help of the INEC 
Chairman (Prof. Maurice Iwu) who President Obasanjo nominated, the election was rigged in 
favour of the incumbent political party- Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). When the election 
observing team decried that the election was rigged, INEC was furious, claiming that the 
observation team were over-stepping its boundary. INEC stated that “election observation is 
different from election monitoring” and maintained that the power to monitor elections in 
Nigeria is permitted constitutionally to the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(Abuja: INEC,2007). One of respondent in Nigeria said the elections in Nigeria were a one 
man show:  
Immediately the President appoints his INEC chairman, 
election rigging starts, and anyone who the President 
appoints for that position must promise to deliver for the 
President and whoever he wants to emerge successful in 
elections organised under this guise must win.” This ugly 
situation will not happen if the people are to elect INEC 
chairman and other members, give them life-time tenure 
where no one has the discretion to remove them from the 
office. It is unfortunate that men of integrity are made 
electoral commission’s boss and they suffer the 
humiliation of destroying their reputation, because they 
want to satisfy the interest of the person that appointed 
them into the position. Our electoral body has suffered 
because there is no autonomy that would at least neglect 
the directions or influences of the cabals (Interview, 
University lecturer1, Lagos, June 2013). 
The longitivity of tenure for electoral officers may be crucial here. Especially, as 
witnessed in Ghana, the members of the Electoral Commission seem to enjoy a certain level 
of job security. No member of the Electoral Commission can be dismissed from their duties 
by anyone, members only lose their positions due to health related issues or death. Compared 
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to Nigeria, INEC officials come and go, and in some cases, are dismissed for no reason. 
Another respondent, with regards to electoral commission, noted:  
The idea of the President funding INEC through the 
Ministry of Finance is wrong because it would make them 
work in favour of President’s instruction.. Members of the 
electoral body will not welcome anything capable of 
making them to lose their job. If the Independent Electoral 
Commission must function independently, Nigerians have 
to decide on how the commission’s members are to be 
selected, elected and paid to avoid the influence of the 
commission by anyone. If this is not tackled, the body 
must always be answerable to the President and I am 
afraid, election malpractices will be permanent in this 
country. We have tried to protect the interest of the people 
and guide their votes but my brother; you will not 
understand the kind of pressure we are as INEC officers. 
The problem is that Nigerians fail to look at the bigger 
picture each time there is election rigging or failed 
elections but they blame INEC officers for incompetency 
(Interview, Civil society activist1, Uyo, June 2013). 
 This is true when compared to Ghana, where the government funds the Electoral 
Commission with the approval of the elected members of the Parliament. Notwithstanding, 
the Independent National Electoral Commission has managed six elections in 1993, 1999, 
2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The outcome of most of these elections have been contested in 
the tribunal, as candidates who think the elections were rigged resort to court to seek to 
reclaim stolen mandates. 
5.1.2 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Nigeria Through Party Financing. 
In Ghana, donations from individuals and public support have been sources for 
political party financing, despite the recent calls for public financing. Likewise, Nigerian 
political parties, since 1999, have relied on individual donations and government annual 
subsidies to political parties for party financing, especially during elections. This move for 
state subventions by the National Assembly in Nigeria replicates party financing policies, in 
many countries in the Asian region, where states subsidise financing for political parties. 
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Research shows that the most generous funding regimes are from North-East Asia. In total, 
eight countries, Indonesia, Japan, the Maldives, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Timor-Leste, regularly give state subsidies to political parties 
(www.idea.int/sites/default/files/.../funding-of-political-parties-and-election-campaigns.pd.).  
However, lack of adherence to party financing regulations and illegal funding of 
political parties, through the use of state and administrative resources, have become a concern 
in Nigeria and other countries. As a result, scholars have suggested that monitoring and 
supervising political party financing have been a global problem due to the complexity of 
monitoring political parties’excesses (Pinto-Duschinsky,2004). Various researches conducted 
in the United States, Canada, Germany and Italy have shown there have been problems in 
financing political parties across countries (Alexander, 1989; McSweeney, 2000; Palthiel, 
1989; Saalfeld, 2000; Ciaurro, 1989).  
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, section 228(c) empowered the National Assembly to 
provide an annual grant disbursement to political parties through the Independent National 
Election Commission (INEC). This Commission also has the constitutional responsibility to 
oversee the monetary standing of political parties, conduct an annual examination, audit the 
funds of political parties, and publish a report for public information. In reaction to this, a 
respondent from one prestigious University in Nigeria argued: 
Yes, the Nigerian constitution was clear on party financing 
with regards to the financial regulation of political parties 
and politicians. As usual, this country and its political 
players hardly conform to the rules guiding financial 
regulations during campaigns and elections. See, 
regulation of the amount of money a particular party can 
spend, or a politician can spend, is not visible in a system 
where the winner takes everything and the loser looses 
everything. No law in this country can be strong enough to 
stop politicians from buying votes and influencing voters 
with money for their votes. This norm is so strong that 
when you weigh parties financially, it would be easy to 
135 
 
predict the electoral outcomes and Nigerians have formed 
the habit of going with the party with strong financial 
capability. Of course, this is because people believe that it 
is good to milk politicians dry when they are hunting for 
their votes, with the hope that these politicians will not 
remember them when they assume political positions 
(Interview, University lecturer2, Enugu, June 2013). 
Thus the influence of money in Nigerian politics, and the inability of political parties 
to adhere to the legal framework governing party financing, characterises Nigerian politics 
with a winner-take-all mentality. Losing elections in Nigeria is like being ostracised 
completely from politics. To avoid being in this situation, individuals and parties have 
endeavored to succeed in elections by all means possible.  Politics in Nigeria have been 
dominated by the elites who have the financial ability to influence elections, to the detriment 
of many Nigerians. In their research into how political parties in Nigeria financed their 
activities from 1999 to 2007, the Centre for Democratic Research and Training revealed that 
the political activities in the country had been hijacked by men with financial influence. 
Within the period under examination, it is understood that parties with financial muscle 
outsmarted other financially weak political parties during elections, through financial 
manipulation (Centre for Democratic Research and Training, 2008: 89). 
 In 2003, a coalition of civil society organisations reported that during the primary 
elections, PDP, ANPP, UNPP and NDP were involved in the “widespread bribery of 
delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes” (The Transition Monitoring 
Group, 2003). Money politics has been a bane to the development of the country’s political 
system. The laws about party financing and regulation are not effective, seemingly because 
there is a weak political culture, and a lack of a strong institutional framework to regulate 
how political parties are financed and to limit election expenses. Take for example, on the 
regulation of political party financing, the Independent Nigerian Electoral Commission is 
charged with the responsibility of checking the activities of parties with regard to finance. 
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Ukase (2015:10-11) posits that though section 225 sub section 2 of the 1999 constitution of 
Nigeria empowered the INEC the responsibility of regulating political party’s finances in 
Nigeria, INEC has not been playing this role since Nigerian transition in 1999.  Democracy 
preaches equality, but in the case of Nigeria, unequal access to resources, and unregulated 
campaign financing are responsible for the uneven political playing ground. The gap between 
the poor and the rich in Nigerian politics has enabled politics of godfatherism, which 
perpetuates unequal expenditure during elections. Explaining the role of the godfathers with 
regards to party-financing, a party leader posits: 
It is not possible to regulate how money is spent during 
elections in Nigeria because there are classes of 
individuals in Nigeria, some are rich, some very rich, 
some poor and some very poor. A rich man may want to 
contest an election, but for him to win he needs a very rich 
man (godfathers) who will help him work into the corridor 
of power. The situation in Nigeria does not give the best 
candidate the chance to win, but allows a candidate with a 
very rich godfather to win so long as he can bribe his way 
through. The majority of elections conducted in this 
country have gone in favour of candidates with a strong 
support base of the godfathers, and in this situation it will 
be very difficult to regulate party-financing in this country 
(Interview, Party leader4, Jos, June 2013). 
With regards to the politics of godfatherism which have characterised Nigerian politics, a 
popular traditional leader argues:  
Nigerian politics have become an investment by the 
godfathers who have their political godsons all over the 
country and they (godfathers) expect all their godsons to 
deliver at the poll. The godfathers don’t invest their money 
to allow their godsons to loose elections. The kind of 
money they shell out during elections could even make 
them shed blood, especially if someone dares stand in their 
way. With these godfathers struggling to deliver their 
candidates, electoral rules guiding party-financing are 
likely to bend, which of course, are the ways of life in 




However, the electorate has not helped matters. They trade their votes for candidates 
with financial muscle, without considering the implications on the country’s democracy. 
When money is placed above everything else, the chances of electing a credible candidate is 
hampered. It appears to be the electorate no longer believes in the manifestos of political 
parties, as those promises are not fulfilled once the parties are elected. It is against this 
backdrop that politicians and their parties have entered into reckless spending, which 
sometimes results in electoral violence. During the election of 1999, civic groups decried the 
large amount of money political elites were donating to political parties. Observers of 
Nigerian democracy have unanimously linked party financing to corruption, which has been 
endemic to the country’s democracy. This has affected the chances of consolidating 
democracy. 
In order to curtail the problems associated with party financing in Nigeria, the 
National Assembly has passed several Electoral Acts. This includes the Acts of 2002, 2006 
and 2010 (and some amendments), which guided the conduct of the 2003, 2007, 2011, and 
the 2015 general elections. It was only the 2015 general elections that did not witness a new 
Electoral Act, as the Independent National Electoral Commission relied on the 2010 Electoral 
Act. Unfortunately, these Acts could not reduce or regulate illegal party finance. In the 
history of Nigerian democracy, the 2015 general elections were unique because before these 
elections, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) had been in power for four tenures (16 years). 
This time, the elections were highly contested because the opposition parties formed a strong 
coalition under the platform of All Progressive Congress (APC). This included some key 
members of the ruling party who decamped to APC, while some party members stepped 
aside, perhaps because they were having issues with their party or the ruling government. The 
two major political parties, PDP and APC, as well as twenty-six other political parties, were 
involved in accumulating resources for the elections. This occurred despite the INEC warning 
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that the Electoral Act of 2010 was designed to monitor the activities of all the political 
parties. However, the figures observed in the fund raising of 2003 and 2015 elections by the 
political parties leave room for thought, as to whether these political parties considered those 
rules regulating a political party’s spending. The tables below show that the political parties 
listed did not obey the rules guiding party financing and expenditure, as shown in the 
donations made by individuals to political parties. The tables show the Electoral Acts of 2006 
and 2010 mapped out the financial limitation of each position.  In the 2003 election alone, the 
table shows some selected individual donations by some party members. There is also 
another table describing the list of campaign expenditures of Peoples Democratic Party and 
All Progressive Congress for the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. 
In order to justify the interviews on party financing in Nigeria, it is important to draw 
from the experience of other scholars. The survey conducted in Nigeria by Aluaigba (2009) 
in 2007, suggested that most political parties in Nigeria are starved with money from the 
government instead their revenues come from individuals. He bemoaned the inefficiency in 
monitoring and regulating party financing by the Independent National Electoral 
Commission, lack of internal democracy and political godfathers as reasons why corrupt 
activities hinder party-financing in Nigeria (Aluaigba, 2009).  In a similar reaction, Nwatarali 
and Dim (2015) observed that during their  interview with the INEC chairman in Nigeria, he 
confirmed that the electoral commission has not done much in monitoring and regulating 
party financing rather the commission has established capable staff members empowered 






Table 6 Electoral Act on Legal Limit for Party Expenses in Nigeria 
2006 Electoral Act Party Financial Limit 
In Nigerian Currency 
2010 Electoral Act Party Financial Limit 
In Nigerian Currency 
President 500 million President One billion 
Governorship One hundred million Governorship Two hundred million 
Senatorial Candidate Twenty million Senatorial Candidate Forty million 
House of Reps Ten million House of Reps Twenty million 
State Assembly Five million State Assembly Ten million 
LG Chairman Five million LG Chairman Ten million 
Councillors  Five hundred thousand Councillors One million 
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria Electoral Acts of 2006 and 2010 (Modified) ,  Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral 
Act 2010 and Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act 2006 
 Table six shows the presence of electoral acts on the legal limit on the amount of 
money every political position is allowed to spend on campaigns and elections in Nigeria. 
Take for instance the 2006 electoral acts, which placed a financial limit of five hundred 
million naira (Nigerian currency), for those vying for the position of the President. People 
vying for governorship positions were supposed to raise up to a hundred million naira, 
senatorial candidates were tasked to raise twenty million naira, and members going for 
positions in the house of representatives were to raise ten million naira. Meanwhile the state 
house of assembly members and local government chairmen were allowed up to five million 
naira respectively. 
 These figures were improved in the 2010 Electoral Acts. The financial limitation for 
anyone contesting for the position of the President was placed at one billion naira, double of 
what it was in 2006 electoral acts. The same amendment was made on the financial regulation 
of governorship candidates who were then tasked to raise two hundred million naira. Also 
under these new regulations, senatorial candidates and members for the House of 
Representatives were to raise forty million and twenty million naira respectively, and 
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members of the State House of Assembly and local government chairmen were to raise ten 
million naira apiece. 
Table 7 Selected Donations to Individual Party Candidates in the 2003 Elections 
Candidates Positions Political Party Amount (Nigerian 
Currency 
Obasanjo/Atiku President PDP #5.5 billion 
James Ibori Governor PDP #2.3 billion 
Bola Tinubu Governor AD #1.3 million 
Bukola Saraki Governor PDP #160 million 
Great Ugboru Governor AD #200 million 
Lucky Igbenedion Governor PDP #500 million 
Ghali Na’Abba House of Reps. PDP #150 million 
Chibodum Nwuche House of Reps. PDP #500 million 
Source; Kura, S. Y. B. (2011). Political Parties and Democracy in Nigeria: Candidate Selection, Campaign and Party 
Financing in People’s Democratic Party. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 13(6), 268-298 
 
 Table seven shows evidence that the political elites in Nigeria defy rules and 
regulations guiding party financing. The individuals listed on the table alongside their 
donations show that some parties are more dominant than others. For example, before the 
Nigerian general elections of 2003, the President and his deputy donated over five billion 
naira to their party PDP. Some other candidates vying for governorship and House of 
Representatives’ positions made huge donations to PDP. AD chieftain, Bola Tinubu made a 
cash donation of over one billion naira, while a governorship aspirant from AD donated two 
hundred naira to the party. These donations are above the estimated figure allowed to be 





Table 8 List of Campaign Expenditure by Presidential Candidates of the PDP and APC 
in 2015 Elections 
Reason for the Expenditure Peoples Democratic Party All Progressive Congress 
Campaign and Rallies  #1,280,374,879.00 #671,062,200.00 
Billboards #473,160,000.00 #190,380,000.00 
Electronic Media Campaign #532,100,000.00 #410,050,000.00 
Electronic Media Advert #3,988,822,125.00 #1,064,706,850.00 
Print Media Campaign #2,475,228,301.00 #579,647,687.00 
Total #8,749,685,305.00 #2,915,846,737.00 
Source: Centre for Social Justice,2015 or Guardian, March 12, 2015. 
 The table highlights the gigantic expenses made by two political parties, PDP and 
APC. The figures listed refer to campaigns, rallies, billboards, electronic media advert, and 
printed materials, and they show that each party spent huge amounts on just campaigning. 
While the PDP spent over a total of eight billion naira, the APC, the opposition party at the 
time, spent over two billion naira. With this evidence, it looks like the two parties went 
contrary to the rules guiding party financing. 
Comparatively, in an attempt to regulate political party finances, both the Electoral 
Commission in Ghana and the Independent National Electoral Commission in Nigeria, have 
requested that political parties provide reports on their activities. In Ghana, it is uncommon 
for political parties to fail to meet this task, but the information rendered is always incomplete 
as the reports do not account for all those that contributed to the party. That is, the financial 
standing of the parties is not fully disclosed to the public. In Nigeria’s case, the only thing 
that is made available to the public is a summary as parties rarely file their reports on a 
regular basis. In 2011, out of 23 political parties, only 2 filed their annual reports (IDEA, 
2016). According to IDEA (2016) there is little control of the party finances by the Electoral 
Commission in Ghana. Evidence shows that political parties’ accounts in Ghana have not 
been investigated or audited as at 2011, as the Electoral Commission lacks the capacity to 
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sanction any party that violates the law, even though several violations have occurred (IDEA, 
2016). Compared to Nigeria, there is evidence of weak enforcement because the Independent 
National Electoral Commission suffers from capacity constraints. This has large effects on 
any active oversight of political finances; even when there are obvious signs of violations, the 
Commission fails to investigate or imposed sanctions (IDEA,2016). 
The cost of politics in Nigeria is the reason why the elites have sabotaged every effort 
to implement policies to regulate party financing. Parties in Nigeria have become money 
making machines. For instance, before someone becomes a party’s flag bearer in elections, 
that person should first and foremost support his party financially. Parties start making money 
for their campaigns by selling forms to members who have indicated an interest in running. 
The gigantic prices placed on party positions are evidence as any credible member who does 
not have the money to buy the forms will not stand a chance of nomination, no matter their 
popularity. The money spent on form purchasing is an entrance and has no direct bearing on 
what every candidate is likely to spend during elections. Therefore, the political elites in 
Nigeria show limited commitment to democracy as politicians always fight to win political 
positions, not minding if they violate rules guiding party financing. 
5.1.3 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Nigeria through Anti-Corruption. 
Some scholars believe that corruption, in the form of misappropriation, bribery, 
embezzlement, nepotism, and money laundering, in Nigeria partly resulted because of the 
failures of the first (1960–66) and second (1979–83) republics (Obuah,2010). Since 1975, 
there have been various crusades against corruption, ranging from the confiscation of 
illegally acquired assets by Nigerians under Murtala’s regime, the establishment of a code of 
conduct for public servants under Shehu Shagari’s regime, a war against indiscipline during 
Buhari’s/Idiagbo regime, and Babaginda’s ethical and social mobilisation crusade. It was 
against these backdrops that Nigeria, under a democratically elected government, initiated 
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two anti-corruption commissions: the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC), and  the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC).One remarkable thing about these crusades against corruption was that, apart from 
the civilian regime of Shehu Shegari that was truncated in a military coup led by Gen.Buhari, 
other anti-corruption crusades took place during military regimes. However, this discussion is 
limited to Nigeria after its transition.  
Like President Kufour, who came into power and promised zero tolerance of 
corruption, President Obasanjo was aware of the decades of systematic corruption that had 
engulfed the country. He was also aware of the various political regimes, and the negative 
effects those regimes had on Nigeria’s economic survival, and decided to reinforce the 
prevailing anti-corruption laws. Similar to Ghana, Nigeria embraced anti-corruption reforms 
which established all-inclusive legal frameworks, under several acts: the Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related Offences Act No.5 of 2000, which resulted in the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission (ICPC); the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). 
Gen. Obasanjo’s first bill was the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, which 
he sent to the National Assembly for deliberation. It was signed into law in June 2000. Once 
this Act was established, like the CHRAJ in Ghana, which was established to look into 
various forms of human right violations and other corruption-related cases, the ICPC was 
charged with the responsibility of receiving and investigating reports of corruption, educating 
Nigerians about corruption and how to fight it, and prosecuting lawbreakers.  
However, in Ghana the Attorney General is able to interfere with the prosecutorial 
powers of the CHRAJ. The 2000 Act against corruption in Nigeria bestowed on the ICPC the 
power to prosecute offenders, where the Attorney General does not have the power to 
interfere in the powers of the anti-corruption body. After the establishment of the EFCC Act 
in 2002, Ogbeidi (2012) notes that in 2003, another anti-corruption commission was 
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established under EFCC designed to address the request from the Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering (FATF). FATF named Nigeria among twenty-three non-
cooperative countries that appeared to frustrate the efforts of the international community on 
fighting global money laundering. Unlike the ICPC, the government of Nigeria charged the 
EFCC with the responsibility of looking into Nigerians, in various sectors that live above 
their incomes.  
While the CHRAJ and EOCO in Ghana have the constitutional rights to investigate 
the president and other top government officials, the Nigerian EFCC, among other 
challenges, has to face claims of chief executive immunity, where the president, vice 
president, state governors and their deputies, cannot be arrested or prosecuted even in a clear 
indictment. The legal defense counsels of some of these state governors have interpreted the 
provisions in the 19999 Constitution, subsections 308(1) and 308(2) where this immunity 
clause is enshrined, to give complete immunity. This includes serious criminal acts that 
require immediate prosecution, and this make it impossible for deputy governors, governors, 
the vice president and the president to face prosecution while still in office. Obuah (2010) 
considers this immunity absurd, largely because it contradicts the basic reason for 
prosecuting corrupt members of government who have stolen and plundered the economy of 
Nigeria. He also reiterated that despite immunity under subsection 308(1), the provisions 
under the civil law enshrined in subsection 308(2) stipulates that governors can be 
prosecuted, Obuah (2010) also decries the significant delays, frustrations, and waste of 
resources as another challenge facing the EFCC in Nigeria. 
Given the prosecution recorded in Nigeria so far, it looks like the EFCC has not handled 
issues relating to corruption equally. Apart from the Attorney General, who antagonised 
CHRAJ and other anti-corruption bodies in Ghana with regards to prosecution, we did not see 
where the chief Eexecutive tried preventing or influencing the constitutional functions of 
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Ghana’s anti-corruption bodies. However, the case is different in Nigeria. It looks like the 
EFCC handled the cases of former governors, Alamieyeseigha and Dariye of Bayelsa state 
and Plateau state differently.  A good example of the type of prosecution by an anti-
corruption body on public officers who are no longer friends with the President Obasanjo can 
be derived from the words of Inikoba and Ibegu (2011). According to them, Alamieyeseigha 
(then governor of Bayaser state) had strong relationship with president Obasanjo in his first 
tenure but their relationship grew sour when Alamieyeigha started agitating for resource 
control and also was a loyalist to the Vice President Atiku who was at the time having 
problem with President Obasanjo on grounds that Atiku wanted to contest for the seat of 
president in 2007, defying all pleas from Obasanjo who wanted to run for the third time in 
2007(Inikoba & Ibegu, 2011). So, president Obasanjo decided to use EFCC to hunt anyone 
who wishes to run for the presidency or supports any other person over himself.  
However, Alamieyeseigha is dealt with through EFCC because he was perceived as 
an opposition to president Obasanjo (Inokoba and Ibegu,2011:289). This is the case where 
the president appoints the chairman of the anti-corruption without granting it a strong tenure 
of office. Like in Ghana where the executive members are appointees of the president with a 
permanent tenure of office, the executive of the anti-corruption body in Nigeria has no such 
right and this made them live at the mercy of the president who can dismiss them at any time. 
Unlike in Ghana, where the Chairman and two deputies enjoy permanent tenure of office, the 
EFCC Chairman in Nigeria can be dismissed at any time by the president. For instance, by 
the end of 2007 the government granted Nuhu Ribadu study leave and on his return, Ibrahim 
Lamorde had replaced him in an interim capacity. Scholars believed that the removal of Nuhu 
Ribadu has political undertone. According to (Adeniyi, 2011; Mikai,2016) “the removal of 
Malam Nuhu Ribadu as chairman of EFCC by President Yar’adua is due to Ibori’s corrupt 
scandal which manifest the political interference of the political elites against combating 
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corruption”. Maybe, this was an attempt to stop him against investigating Ibori further on his 
corruption cases. Then Farida Waziri, in May 2008, was appointed to replace Lamorde, who 
was later re-appointed on 23 November, 2011 by President Goodluck, who dismissed Waziri. 
Currently, the position is occupied by Ibrahim Magu. Under these circumstances, it appears 
that these chairmen are likely to be vulnerable to the President who appoints them so they can 
be considered for future appointments. Also, the inconsistencies in their appointment could 
lead to abuse of their position since the appointment does not last. Ekpo et al. (2016:69) note 
that a onetime EFCC chairman, Mr. Ibrahim Lamorde was dismissed in November 9, 2015 
from the office by president Buhari on account of diverting one trillion naira (Nigerian 
currency) recovered from looters.  
 In Ghana, the Attorney General always counters the decisions of the CHRAJ, 
especially by questioning its legal standing in investigating and prosecuting offenders. This is 
the same scenario in Nigeria, where the EFCC is not able to enforce its decision without 
recourse to the traditional judicial process. It has become the norm for defense attorneys to 
frustrate both substantive cases and financial cases, or delay proceedings brought to the Anti-
corruption commissions. Ribadu (2004b), once the EFCC Chairman and now the governor of 
Kaduna state, notes where a request by an Attorney to truncate an anti-corruption case is not 
granted, which is when the defense Attorneys accuse the judges of bias and request that the 







Table 9 Comprehensive List of all the EFCC Chairmen / CHRAJ Commissioners 
Number Name Country Duration in the office 
1. Emile Short Ghana 1993-2010 (Retired) 
2. Nuhu Ribadu Nigeria 2003- 2007 
3. Ibrahim Lamorde Nigeria 2008 (Acting Chairman) 
4 Waziri Farida Nigeria 2008-2011 
5 Lauretta Lamptey Ghana 2011-2015 (Dismissed) 
6 Ibrahim Lamorde Nigeria 2011-2015 
7. Whittal Joseph Ghana 2015 till date 
8 Ibrahim Magu Nigeria 2015 till date. 







 The table identifies a few members who have occupied anti-corruption positions in 
Nigeria and Ghana, in order to show the duration anti-corruption commissioners in both 
countries. From the table, evidence shows that Emile Short assumed the position of CHRAJ 
commissioner in 1993 until she retired in 2010. She was in the office for over seventeen 
years. Her successor Lauretta Lamptey came into office in 2011 and was dismissed in 2015 
for a gross misconduct. Whittal Joseph, who replaced Laurretta, has been in the office since 
2015 and may keep ahold of the position for a longer period of time. Comparatively, the table 
shows that Nigerian chairmen can assume this position and get fired the next day. No 
chairman of EFCC in Nigeria has held the position for over five years. Commissioners are 
replaced and changed in Nigeria, as it pleases the President. This situation may affect the 
performance of the body, compared to the longer tenure that the commissioners in Ghana 
enjoy, which accounts for the agency’s stability and autonomy. 
In spite of the shortcomings facing the anti-corruption bodies, there are some notable 
achievements. While the CHRAJ and the EOCO have made some remarkable achievements 
in Ghana, the achievements of EFCC and ICPC are seen from divergent views. Some believe 
that EFCC and ICPC have done well. According to Sowunmi et al. (2010), few Nigerians are 
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of the view that the EFCC has made a positive impact on its fight against corruption, not just 
their ability to apprehend and investigate corrupt individuals but as well as arraign corrupt 
government staffs, politicians and private persons in court. On the contrary, many disagree, 
suggesting that the anti-corruption bodies are just paying lip-service to the rules. From the 
scholars who disagree that EFCC has made impact in curbing corruption, Lewis et al.(2002) 
and Folarin (2009) believe that Nigeria’s image, with regards to corruption, has been 
significantly worse in the international society than locally. Folarin (2009) notes that some of 
the achievements the local media report with regard to EFCC impact on eradicating 
corruption are not really true but mere propaganda. Other scholars, Kew (2006) and 
Adeyemo (2006) criticise EFCC for not observing the rules, unless administering a case that 
would frustrate an opponent. According to another scholar: 
The question is not whether we should wage a war against 
corruption or not, my quarrel is that the fight should be 
waged within the context of the constitution … This is 
what the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) under Nuhu Ribadu did not appreciate, perhaps, 
because Obasanjo did not believe in the constitution. 
Hence, the commission was viewed as an instrument of 
vendetta. It was so selective that if you were a friend no 
matter how corrupt you may be, nobody would touch you, 
and if you were an enemy, real or imaginary, the 
commission would go after you (Nwabueze, 2008). 
This thesis supports scholars who are of the view that the Nigerian government has 
not done well in reducing corruption through anti-corruption agencies. It appears that 
corruption cases are heard every day in Nigeria and that people, government officers in 
particular, are often in the net of the anti-corruption bodies involved in exonerating him or 
herself from corrupt charges. Inikoba and Ibegu (2011) point out that the EFCC in Nigeria 
hunts political opponents or enemies of President Obasanjo, this is because the body lacks the 
autonomy to make certain fundamental decisions on its own. This thesis believes that there is 
serious fraud  in the mode of appointment, composition, and tenure of office in Nigeria’s 
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EFCC body, compared to Ghana. The Nigerian anti-corruption agency is lagging behind its 
Ghanian counterpart. The commitment of the Ghanaian  political elite  in combating 
corruption is shown in the permanent tenure granted to the members of the country's anti-
corruption agencies. This is different in Nigeria, where appointment does not come with any 
tenure of office, that is, members can be dismissed at any time by the President.As scholars 
have pointed above, because the Nigerian anti-corruption agency lacks the independence to 
execute its functions, it is ineffective. On the above backdrop, this thesis argues that the 
political elites in Nigeria do not show high levels of commitment to democracy by combating 
corruption, compared to their Ghanaian counterparts. 
5.2     Elites Coherence in Nigeria 
 Introduction 
Like Ghana’s political elites, Nigeria‘s political elites turn from divided to coherent 
due to some negative incentives. This is because Nigerian elites were confronted with the fear 
of war and sanctions, and chose to erase these memories of war and avoid more sanctions by 
seeking for national integration. This move of restoring national unity could be the reason 
why the military in Nigeria considered relinquishing power to the civilian government. 
Before 1999, when the PDP evolved out of the calculations of the elder statesmen tag G-34 
selected from the different ethnic groups and which also, are pivotal in making sure that Gen. 
Abacha failed in his attempt for self-succession. These groups of elites considered the unity 
of the country and decided to work cohesively, especially when the country had survived a 
civil war that lasted for three years where millions of Nigerians lost their lives. In their study 
about the civil war in Nigeria, Akresh et al. (2012) note that the Biafra war, fought between 
1967 and 1970, revealed that several generations of Nigerians, especially women, still carry 
the stigma of their exposure to war. Apart from the issue of war, Nigeria has been sanctioned 
in the past over human right violations orchestrated by the regime of Gen. Sani Abacha. 
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Notable, among these human right violations were the executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
nine other Ogoni members, which gave Nigerian states pariah status, which hampered the 
country’s trade relationships (Falola and Heaton, 2008).  
Against this backdrop, the travails of the political elites have been to sustain the unity 
of the country, even at the triple traps of religious cum ethnic hatred, unprecedented 
corruption, and a high level of military domination which brought mayhem to the country’s 
economy before transition. According to Uwazuruike (1997), if democracy is to survive there 
is need for inter-ethnic harmony, which will enable democrats to succeed in the unplanned 
power struggle with authoritarian types. This calls for the need to start from the beginning, 
especially to resolve deep seated crisis through an early compromise. To address this, elites 
came up with a kind of structure that could represent the interest of all nationalities: rotational 
government, power-sharing, as well as the unreserved solidarity shown in the Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP), which dominated the politics of Nigeria until 2015, when the 
opposition power formed a strong alliance and captured power from the incumbent PDP. In 
the next discussion, this thesis shall talk about how the elites engage in a relationship. 
In contrast to Ghana, Nigerian elites see the power sharing arrangement as one of the 
factors that would bring stability into their emerging democracy, during the early days of the 
transition.  
The elites in Nigeria have made every effort to structure a Nigeria in which every 
citizen can have equal right, this is particularly to avoid ethnic advantage that characterised 
Nigerian politics since independence in 1960. This was the reason the political elites 
considered zoning formula system, power sharing and rotational presidency. These structures 
were considered by the political elites to give every ethnic group in Nigeria a sense of 
belonging. Therefore, the designs of the countries’ electoral systems and constitution have 
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often reflected incentives that promote elite integration and national unity. A striking 
evidence of power sharing in Nigeria comes from state creation. The rationale behind state 
creation is to give identity to ethnic societies, in an attempt to correct imbalances against 
some minority states who may feel marginalised by the bigger tribes of Hausa, Yoruba and 
Igbo. It is assumed that when allocations are shared, bigger ethnic groups are likely to quash 
the minor ethnic groups, and if more states are created, these minority groups are likely to be 
given a new state. This will invariably give them the upper hand during state allocation. As at 
1996, the politics of state creation eclipsed to 36 states from the 3 regions created at Nigerian 
independence in 1960.  
5.2.1 Elite Coherence through Coalition /Alliances in Nigeria 
Like in Ghana, where the elites used alliances to overcome deep seated hatred 
between Nkrumah and Danqua/Busia’s supporters, the framers or the so-called G-34 elder 
statesmen of Nigeria created a multi-party coalition under the umbrella of Peoples’ 
Democratic Party (PDP). Though some alliances worked out during the transition, the first 
move to bring every ethnic group under the umbrella of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
by the political elites in Nigeria was remarkable. According to a Lagos based civil society 
activist: 
Before 1999 presidential elections, many never believed 
there would be a common ground for Nigerian politicians 
to agree on certain issues. It was surprising how the 
political elites under PDP gathered all core politicians 
from different ethnicgroups to form their party. This 
particular move was the strongest coalition ever to be 
witnessed in Nigeria. Before this time, there were 
problems resulting from the June 12 election that was 
annulled, people of Niger Delta were campaigning for 
resource control and the South East were talking about 
marginalisation, but amidst all these problems the elites 
through coalition, united every ethnic group and this is the 
reason for the understanding the Elites in Nigeria have. 
They understood that unity among ethnically divided elites 
in Nigeria is one thing that can engineer democracy and 
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this they fought to settle as early as 1999 (Interview, Civil 
society activist, Lagos2, June 2013) 
In 1999, while ANPP and AD were seen to represent the interests of some Northern 
and Western ethnicities, the PDP was seen as a party for all Nigerians because it had 
strongholds in every part of Nigeria except in the West. This was particularly true in 1999, 
when the people were not happy that Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who eventually won the 
election, was working for the cabals who by conviction annulled the June 12 Presidential 
elections won by MKO Abiola, a fellow westerner. According to a respondent who reasoned: 
In the 1999 Presidential elections, you can see that elites 
in Nigeria used the first transition elections to come 
together and reconcile their various differences. Though 
there are two strong political oppositions, but the 
collaboration of different ethnic groups into the umbrella 
of PDP was a strong indication that there was no rancour 
among the elites from different ethnic group in the 
country. Even though there might be some problems the 
ability of the political elites to overlook them showed a 
huge commitment by them to settle their differences and 
push our democracy to a certain level. Yes, June 12 
aftermaths must have created apathy in some Nigerians, 
especially people from the Western part of Nigeria who 
were against our party (PDP) because they felt we were 
working for those who truncated The June 12 Presidential 
election’s result.But in subsequent elections, these 
aggrieved parties reconciled with the ruling party for our 
democracy to be sustained (Interview, Army general1, 
Abuja, June 2013). 
Despite President Obasanjo not being accepted by his own Yoruba people, other 
ethnic nationalities from other regions in Nigeria threw their support behind his candidacy. 
From this the thesis can deduce that the national solidarity Obasanjo received by almost all 
the elites in Nigeria could be to promote stability and peace in the Western region of Nigeria 
whose people have shown displeasure with the way MKO Abiola’s victory was cancelled 
even when the election is regarded as the most peaceful election Nigeria has ever conducted 
in its history. A civil society activist confirmed this in an interview: 
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The unity and understanding that the political elite in 
Nigeria share in spite of various oppositions are because 
they (Elites) realised that disunity and their inability to 
compromise on their differences are responsible for the 
crisis Nigeria’s democracy is facing. The civil war, 
incessant military coups and election crisis and rigging, 
especially, the June 12 made Nigerian politicians to have a 
common ground to dialogue on their differences and so 
far, this has yielded some positive outcomes. Look at 
some of our elections and the way our politicians reconcile 
their differences to ensure nothing goes wrong for our 
democracy. In 2003, when President Obasanjo was 
coming for his second term, like in 1999 when the people 
in the West did not vote for him but formed strong alliance 
with PDP and elected him even when their party (Alliance 
for democracy) was an opposition political part. 
(Interview, Civil society activist3, Abuja, June 2013). 
 
In 2003, the number of political parties that contested increased this time from 3 
political parties to 30 registered political parties. This time PDP became adopted/included 
many ethnicities in Nigeria. According to the All Nigerian Peoples Party’s (ANPP) chieftain 
in Lagos State: 
After the elections of 1999, people realised that the 
military was serious about democracy and began to form 
parties. Many political parties were formed and contested 
in the elections but the PDP made a difference because the 
party had been grounded in all the states in the country. It 
was easy for PDP to sweep the poll because other political 
parties could not dialogue for a strong alliance. The 
problem was that some retired army officers and other 
civilians were in the running and ego could not let them 
reach an agreement on a possible way of getting rid of 
ruling party. Recently, ANPP and AD are considering 
merging in the presidential elections of 2015, I am sure 
that this merger might rewrite the political history of this 
country. People are saying that the merger will not work 
and I keep asking them why it won’t work especially as 
political parties are no longer playing ethnic politics. 
Politicians in Nigeria at the moment are more 
accommodative compare to our independence politicians 
who were more or less ethnic oriented (Interview, Party 
leader5, Benue, June 2013). 
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 This is why Kendhammer (2010:50) notes that PDP’s ruling coalition cuts across 
ethnic and religious lines to integrate not only elites from the largest ethnic groups – the 
Hausa and Fulani (North), the Yoruba (West), the Igbo (East) – but also those from minority 
groups that have been agitating for autonomy and protection from the federal government, to 
prevent them from being dominated by major ethnic groups. The popularity of PDP increased 
in 2003 when South-Western Nigeria, which did not vote for President Obasanjo in 1999, 
formed a last minute alliance with PDP. In the said election, there was no presidential 
aspirant from the Alliance for Democracy (AD), as the region voted massively for the PDP. 
In response to the alliance between AD and PDP, a staunch All Nigerian Peoples Party’s 
member argued:  
The possibility that my party would win in 2003 became 
slimmer when we saw the moves between PDP and 
Alliance for Democracy (AD) to form alliance. While we 
were busy campaigning in the North and in the Eastern 
part of the country, with the hope that Alliance for 
Democracy, a party from the West where Obasanjo comes, 
would field a candidate for the presidential elections, they 
were actually having underground plans to vote massively 
for President Obasanjo. In our party, we believed that 
Obasanjo, who was the flagbearer of PDP, and any 
candidate AD fielded would split votes from the West and 
our massive votes from the North where our party holds 
sway and the scramble we make from other minority 
groups will help us win the election. Unfortunately, the 
people of the West who did not vote for Obasanjo in 1999, 
this time, gave him sympathy votes and our party could 
not measure up at all(Interview, Party leader6, Benin, June 
2013) 
It looks like All Nigerian Peoples Party was thinking that ethnic politics would be at 
play in 2003 presidential elections. From the last respondent, they made the northern part of 
Nigeria and the east their political strongholds but this was altered by PDP who was busy 
uniting all the ethnic groups through alliance especially from the Yoruba ethnic group which 
was against Obasanjo in 1999 presidential election.  
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5.2.2    Elite Coherence through Tolerance in Nigeria 
Available data from my interviews show that there is a high level of tolerance among 
the political elites in Nigeria. Their views look valid, when examined alongside what scholars 
have written about the opposition and ruling political parties. Take for instance, Ghana, 
where the government gives opposition political parties access to political campaign 
resources, and in some cases free media. Likewise, in Nigeria, the opposition political parties 
are given yearly support, especially during the election period. They are given the freedom to 
campaign, use government media, and enjoy access to political debate with the ruling 
political party. In reaction to this, one of the respondents observed:  
If you ask me, I will say there is nothing like the 
oppositions in Nigerian democracy because you hardly 
notice any bridge between the opposition and the ruling 
party. This could be mainly because the so called 
opposition political parties have good relationships with 
the ruling party, and as such have the freedom to do 
whatever they[deem] very useful to them. Sometimes 
people talk about ethnicity, but the way the political elites 
tolerate themselves in this country, you would hardly see 
that Mr. A or Mr. B are from different tribes in Nigeria, 
yet they work collectively as one entity. The politics of 
Nigeria have gone beyond intolerance as we witnessed in 
the early these of our independence in the 1960swhere 
political parties were built ethnic origins which made 
politicians at the time fend for their state of origins. This is 
a time when a Yoruba man will not tolerate an Igbo 
President or a Hausa man tolerating a Yoruba man as the 
President. At this period, NPN, NPP and UPN never 
tolerated themselves but in recent years, political parties 
have given themselves room for positive competition 
devoid of hatred and rancor (Interview, Traditional 
leader2, Owerri, June 2013). 
In a similar response, to whether the elites tolerate the opposition in Nigerian politics, 
an academic Professor reckoned that: 
The power structure in Nigeria is built in such a way that it 
is hard for someone to recognise who are the ruling elites 
and who the opposition elites are. For example, the elites 
in Nigeria whether in the ruling party or in the opposition 
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have always found a way of coming together, they recycle 
from time to time and this is why you see a lot of party 
switching and carpet-crossing among Nigerian politicians. 
There is nothing wrong among the political elites in 
Nigeria because they have a common understanding 
among themselves. Anytime you hear that one political 
elite is in loggerheads with other political elites, know that 
the problem will not last but is a mere misunderstanding 
that can be settled behind closed doors. Their tolerance is 
evident in the way PDP and APC members switched 
allegiances with parties (Interview, University lecturer3, 
Lagos, June 2013). 
According to a former Army General in the Nigerian, with regards to the tolerance 
among the political elites:  
I regret the system of democracy in Nigeria today because 
the Nigeria the departed military regime craved for is 
different from what is on the ground today. The first 
attempt at restoring democratic government in 1993 failed 
because my fellow Army officers were greedy and refused 
to relinquish power even when there was agreement in the 
barracks to leave the scene for the civilians. I frown at my 
fellow Army officers who are still in the corridors of 
power today as this was not our plan,, but I am sure the 
quest for more money is dragging them back to power. 
With regards to tolerance, there is no problem at all when 
it comes to their relationship with other elites. For one 
particular elite to succeed in making more money in this 
country, he must collaborate with other elites and this will 
continue to give the political elites in this country that 
extreme sense for tolerance (Interview, Army General2, 
Lagos, June 2013). 
 
Like in Ghana, where the elites were sensitive about the civil society groups and wished 
to co-opt them, the political elites in Nigeria have a profound regard for civil society too. 
According to one Nigeria’s famous activist: 
The truth is that the political elites in Nigeria carry 
everyone along and this is evident in the way they have 
allowed for Press Freedom, in such a way so we can say 
whatever we deemed to write about. This is why we have 
craved for democratic government all these years. The 
democracy we have got today is the type that gives every 
hook and cranny that sense of belonging unlike the one we 
had in the early days of independence that was 
characterised with a high level of intolerance due to ethnic 
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politics. With the way the political elites tolerate 
themselves in this country, it is easy to predict that 
Nigerian democracy is on the right path. I applauded our 
politicians for creating a system where parties are no 
longer ethnic based but parties identify everyone from the 
six geo-political zones. Yes, in some cases, we have seen 
parties gone to court as this is expected but such situation 
has not degenerated into a serious misunderstanding or 
warrant any political unrest in the country. I never 
believed that the ruling party would allow for a situation 
where elections would be thrown open with the 
opposition, and in some cases the oppositions have won 
elections under this situation, yet the political elites did not 
give up on tolerance even though it went against them in 
some cases (Interview, Civil society activist4, Warri, June 
2013). 
 
In a related scenario, another respondent in Nigeria, a university lecturer posited: 
In 2007 presidential elections again, almost eighteen 
political parties contested, but this time, President 
Obasanjo, who won 1999 and 2003, stepped down due to 
constitutional limitations on tenure of office and Late. 
President Umaru Yar’Adua won the election in a highly 
controversial manner, which would have resulted in a 
serious crisis across the country. But the oppositions 
tolerated the result because we wanted our democracy to 
survive. I will tell you here that our ruling party is not 
greedy; this is because you will never hear cases where 
opposition parties are suffocated by the PDP. I will score 
the political elites in this country a strong point when it 
comes to promoting unity and understanding, which has 
been reflected in their level of tolerance since 1999. Look 
at the way politicians change parties and the way the new 
political parties they run to accepted them. If you are not 
in the winning party today, you may be in the winning 
party tomorrow and this understanding has given political 
elites that sense of oneness which made their day to day 
interaction possible (Interview, University lecturer4, Port 
Harcourt, June 2013). 
According to the last respondent, who is a member of the opposition party and for him 
to speak with such respect with regard to the ruling party, it shows the level of understanding 
between ruling party and the opposition. It shows that the elites in Nigeria do not see 
themselves as enemies especially when they are free to swap parties from time to time. Like 
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the respondent right put, party switching is common among Nigerian politicians and this has 
helped in building this spirit of oneness among them. 
5.3 Summary 
In the case of Nigeria, it would be impossible for one to think of elite cooperation, 
especially when the divisions are marked by cultural and religious differences. The later can 
be said to be responsible for the instabilities suffered by those regions where these factors are 
visible. Therefore, in the quest for establishing a representative democracy, Nigerian political 
elites have worked to create that sense of belonging to everyone. In the early days of 
independence, under a federation, they structured the country around power-sharing and 
zoning. This was an attempt to give each state in the country a sense of belonging.  
In recent times, elite coherence has been inherent in party coalitions and alliances, 
irrespective of their religious and ethnic affiliations. This thesis highlighted cases where 
political parties, in an attempt to win elections, clamoured for the support of other political 
parties through alliances or coalitions. However, we have noticed elite fragmentations in 
Nigeria, but even then the elites have been cohesive enough that differences did not lead to 
crisis or chaos. Since 1999, Nigerian elites have made various alliances, and party-switching 
has happened in such a way that it is hard to say that one party is truly an opposition. The 
names of the parties change, but the politicians are always the same. When PDP was in 
power, there were members of AD and APC who were in Goodluck Jonathan’s 
administration, and now that APC is in power there are PDP members who are in Buhari’s 
cabinet. With the above examples, this thesis is of the view that coherence is high among the 
elites in Nigeria. But, this is not enough to state that Nigerian democracy has reached 
consolidation. This is because there is a low level of elite commitment to democracy. In a 
situation where the elites are cohesive, but not committed to promoting electoral 
independence, adhering to party financing, regulations and upholding the autonomy of the 
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anti-corruption agencies, the consolidation of democracy can be difficult as this hybrid form 
of democracy is likely to promote a pseudo-democratic system. 
Compared to the alliances witnessed in Ghana’s transition election, where the NDC’s 
Progressive alliance won the Presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, the alliances 
established by the elites of All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) and Alliance for Democracy 
(AD) in 1999 were unable to deliver at the poll, maybe because PDP was a party with a 
national base party. Ghana’s steady alliances and alternations have resulted in peaceful 
outcomes in its elections. While coalition/alliances and tolerance in Ghana have resulted in 
more turnovers, conforming to what Huntington considers democratic consolidation. 
Nigerian democracy has managed just one turnover after five general elections. The steady 
transformation in the democracy of Ghana stems from the way the elites institutionalised the 
parties. These major parties have long standing history, and elections have become highly 
competitive as elites strive to perform better each time they win elections. Nigerian elites are 
not loyal to their political parties, and this is why there are many incidences of defections in 
Nigerian politics. When the elites begin to jump around to the ruling party, it may make the 
opposition weak. This is not good for Nigerian democracy, as the opposition may bring the 
best out of the ruling party. However, this party-switching still supports the idea discussed 
above, that it is possible to switch parties in Nigeria because the ideologies formulated by 







Chapter 6   
6.1 Conclusion 
This research set out to answer one major research question, that is, to determine the 
extent that the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria had contributed to democratic 
consolidation. The main argument aligns with a range of scholarly work, among others, 
Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels and Max Weber, who advanced the 
argument that the elites play important roles in society and that for government to function 
properly, the role of the elites is the key. On this backdrop, this research argues that the 
political elites facilitate democratic consolidation in African countries, such as Ghana and 
Nigeria. The argument is that the differing attitude among the political elites in Ghana and 
Nigeria can explain democratic consolidation in the two countries. To achieve democratic 
consolidation, the thesis tries to understand how ethnically divided societies with fragmented 
elites can develop elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy to achieve democratic 
consolidation. 
There has been a debate among scholars on what facilitates democracy and 
democratic consolidation. While some scholars have suggested that democratic consolidation 
is a result of foreign influences and civil society ( Resnick, 2012; Carothers, 1999; Linz and 
Stepan, 1996; 2001; O’Donnell et al.1986; and Diamond, 1997). Another school of thought 
has proposed that the political elites help create democratic consolidation (Mainwaring, 1989; 
Hartlyn, 1988; Peeler, 1985; Rustow, 1970; Karl, 1986; Diamond, 1999; Bunce, 2000 Linz, 
1990; Huntington, 1992; Valenzuela, 1992; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Gunther et al. 1995; 
Schedler, 2001). This thesis took same position among scholars who support that the political 
elites facilitate democratic consolidation.  
This thesis uses two cases of Ghana and Nigeria which were at the time of transition 
ethnically divided with fragmented elites. In this situation, a stable playing field that thrives 
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on elite unity could not have been possible to promote democratic consolidation. This thesis 
used elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence approaches to understand how 
countries like Ghana and Nigeria can attain democratic consolidation despite its original 
state. The idea about elite commitment to democracy is that, for democracy to reach 
consolidation the elites are supposed to build those factors that could allow democracy 
developed. It is not only building them but create enabling environment to sustain them, so it 
can be able to regulate the behaviours of the political elites in a polity. On the other hand, 
elite coherence to democracy emphasises on the need for elite compromise and understanding 
to ensure a level playing field. The idea is that when the elite have common understanding, 
have easy compromise to their misunderstanding, they are likely to create politics where 
every ethnic group will have a voice and a sense of belonging. This will not only reflect in 
elites’ good interaction but will also promote their drive towards respecting those principles 
or structures that make democracy thrive. The behaviour of the political elites in Ghana 
particularly reflects the behaviours of those elites that prompted scholars to see the elites are 
facilitators of democratic consolidation. Of course, some scholars (Schedler, 2001; Diamond, 
1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Gunther et al. 1995) in the consolidation literature also 
discussed behavioural consolidation. In this thesis behavioural attributes are considered 
through tolerance, alliances/coalition. 
The research methods used in this study included mixed techniques. The thesis used 
interview data and secondary data to further support the empirical data in various parts of the 
thesis. Twenty-five persons in each country responded to some in-depth questions and their 
responses provided data in answering the research question. Added to this, secondary data 
were used to support responses from the respondents as well as to validate their answers. As 
Ghana and Nigeria are two West African countries with a lot of similarities, we reasoned that 
a Most Similar System Design (MSSD) would best fit to understand the difference in 
162 
 
democratic consolidation. With the aim of the research to find out what led to democratic 
consolidation in the two countries, the thesis disregarded all areas of uniformity in search of 
areas of difference. For example, similarities like English speaking countries, West African 
countries, British colonies, military rule with short civilian regimes, counter military coups 
and presidential system of government are eliminated so as to better understand the areas 
where the two countries differ. The research considered two areas (elite commitment to 
democracy and elite coherence) to understand how these explain the behaviour of the elites 
towards consolidating democracy in the two countries. 
 A theoretical framework was developed to determine the degree of elite commitment to 
democracy and elite coherence. The table was developed to reflect four types of regimes. The 
idea was to see how they differ on structural, institutional (party financing, independent electoral 
commission and anti-corruption) and behavioural (coalition/alliance and tolerance) variables to 
analyse political outcomes in Ghana and Nigeria. Both dependent and independent variables are 
measured. For example, elite coherence which the thesis defined as the “degree of congruence 
among political elites in Ghana and Nigeria” is measured by cohesion index and interviews 
conducted in both countries in relation to alliance/coalition and tolerance, to understand the 
degree of coherence among the elites in the considered countries. Elite commitment to 
democracy , electoral independence, party financing rules , regulations and permanent tenure of 
the anti-corruption agencies as well as interview answers are used to measure the independence 
of the electoral commission, party financing and anti-corruption agencies in Ghana and Nigeria.. 
Secondary sources are used to validate various findings. From the empirical chapters, we have 
discussed and observed that several factors, such as institutional, structural and behavioural 
factors are at play as they affect consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Nigeria. However, 
while the political elites in both countries were similar in behavioural factors, the countries 
diverged on the institutional and structural factors. From the analysis it appears that democracy is 
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successful in Ghana because there were high levels of elite coherence and elite commitment to 
democracy. These two factors shaped the foundation of Ghana’s democracy which has resulted in 
three government turnovers sufficient to meet the criteria that this work considers as a condition 
for democratic consolidation.  
Efforts to integrate the elites in Nigeria and Ghana are considered to be necessary for 
both countries. For instance, the elites in Ghana built a strong elite coherence to regulate their 
own activities, and to ensure mutual cooperation and understanding. This is evident in the 
number of successful coalitions and alliances, despite the history of enmity between 
Nkrumah political tradition and Danqua/Busia tradition. As offspring of these traditional 
political parties, the elites of NDC and NPP, for the sake of consolidating democracy, 
overlooked their differences. Through peaceful co-existence they have turned the hostilities 
inherent in Ghanaian political history into one of the most stabilise democracies in Africa, 
where elites strive to shun to ethnic divisions in search of understanding and tolerance. 
Considering the high level of commitment elites have for democracy, and the cohesiveness 
found in their answers to the interview questions, this thesis argues that Ghana has reached 
the level of democratic consolidation. 
Democracy is a process and the democracy in Ghana that was designed by the 
political elites could not deliver in the 1992 presidential elections. The Electoral Commission 
at the time gave John Jerry Rawlings the upper hand in the elections. This resulted in the 
opposition political parties boycotting the subsequent parliamentary elections. It was from 
this reason that ruling political party in Ghana at the time began to think of affecting changes 
that could transform the politics of the country. However, over the years, the political elites in 
Ghana have managed to develop a stable democracy after establishing strong institutions 
capable of restoring integrity in the country’s democracy. In recent years, the Electoral 
Commission has begun to gain influence in Ghana’s elections in such a way that the results 
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led to the three government turnovers between the ruling party and the opposition. The 
information gathered showed that the Electoral Commission keeps improving in every 
election in Ghana and has as well displayed a certain level of transparency in conducting 
elections. From the analytical chapters, we found that one of the successes Ghana’s 
democracy has enjoyed was the constitutional independence given to the Electoral 
Commission. The commission did not just have autonomy but was accorded longer tenure of 
office for its members. It can be argued that this has given members of the commission 
confidence in discharging their duties without fear and bias. However, from the interview 
responses of the elites in Ghana, the confirmed that the Electoral Commission in Ghana has a 
high level of independence.    
Conversely, Nigeria’s Independent Electoral Commission has not fared well like her 
Ghanaian counterparts. While the Ghanaian Electoral Commission has conducted three 
successful turnovers since 1992, the Nigeria Independent Electoral Commission has managed 
one turnover in 2015 since the 1999 transition elections. The reason for the failure to measure 
up like the Commission in Ghana is because the Electoral Commission in Nigeria is 
answerable to the Chief Executive (the President) who also appoints them. While the 
Electoral Commission members are given longer tenures, their counterparts in Nigeria can be 
dismissed at any time as it pleases the Chief Executive. In such circumstance, these officers 
work to satisfy their bosses to the detriment of quality elections and this can affect democracy 
consolidation. It can be argued that election manipulation and other related violence is 
because the Electoral Commission is not transparent instead it gives some political elites the 
upper hand over others. Elites’ responses with regards to the independence of the 
Independent Electoral Commission in Nigeria showed less trust for the INEC.   
 Another area the political elites showed commitment to democracy was through party 
financing. From the responses gathered through interviews organized in Ghana and Nigeria, 
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we found that political elites in Ghana stick to the rules and regulations guiding party-
financing more closely than the elites in Nigeria. In the case of Ghana with regards to party-
financing, the ruling political party and opposition have almost equal expenditure during 
elections as this thesis did not observe too much inflow of cash during elections by the ruling 
party as witnessed. Compared to the case of Nigeria, from the two tables in the Nigerian 
chapter on the list of individual donations to parties in the 2003 elections and the campaign 
expenditure by the presidential candidates of PDP and APC in the 2015 election, this thesis 
found uneven expenditure by the two parties. For example, the cash generated by members of 
the ruling party (PDP) before the 2015 general elections was four times higher compared to 
the cash raised by the main opposition party, APC. During elections, the elites from the ruling 
political parties in the two countries used state resources against the oppositions and this has 
reduced competition in those countries. However, using state money against the opposition in 
elections is more widespread in Nigeria elections compared with Ghana. The edge the 
political elites in Ghana have over Nigeria is that the elites in Ghana comply with the rules 
and regulations guiding party financing.  
Beginning two years after Ghanaian independence in 1958, in an attempt to eradicate 
corruption, the political elites formulated acts that could protect public funds against 
corruption and among these a number of legal Acts were adopted, including; in 1993, 
Customs and Excise and Preventive Service (Management Law,PNDCL 330) , The Audit 
Service Act, 2000 (Act584)  Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act654), and the Internal 
Audit Agency Act 2003 (Act 658). After all stakeholders endorsed the Commission for 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in 1992, it became responsible for 
prosecuting offenders in Ghana. When President J.A Kufuor came into power, he declared 
“zero tolerance” against corruption and from all indications he was sincere with his 
declaration. While many have criticized anti-corruption bodies for paying lip service to the 
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fight against corruption, many have also argued that the presence of donor assistance in 
Ghana has helped anti-corruption bodies to regain the potency which yielded democratic 
consolidation. 
Like Ghana, Nigeria’s efforts at eradicating corruption are evident in the 
establishment of an inclusive legal framework including the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act No. 5 of 2000, Economic and Financial Crime Commission 
(Establishment) Act No. 5 of 2002, Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 and Public 
Procurement Act of 2007. The Acts respectively gave birth to the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission (ICPC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Fiscal 
Responsibility Commission (FRC) and Public Procurement Commission (PPC). However, 
while the anti-corruption body in Ghana enjoys the constitutional right to prosecute anyone 
including the President of Ghana, the anti-corruption body in Nigeria does not have the 
power to prosecute the important position holders like the President or state governors who 
have immunity. Criticisms levelled against EFCC are that it has become an instrument of the 
ruling political party used against the opposition. The results show that Ghana has fared 
better in countering corruption than Nigeria. 
 On the behavioural factors, the evidence from the analytical chapters shows that the 
political elites in both countries have a high level of coherence when looking at 
alliances/coalition and at tolerance. There is little difference here as the political elites in the 
two countries displayed the same behaviour.  The impact of the behavioural factors adopted 
in this research was significant as it helps to unearth how fragmented elites in divided 
societies can attain agreement on their areas of differences through elite cohesion. For 
political actors to have a fair political playing field, actors must accept politics as the only 
game in town and this is a reflection of the attitude the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria 
showed when their countries were in transitional states. Secondly, when the elite design 
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institutions, structures and allow them to function, it is likely to create a stable environment 
that can provide conditions for democratic consolidation. Strong institutions supported 
genuinely by the political elites are capable of creating an enabling environment for 
democracy to thrive. Democratic consolidation is difficult in Nigeria because some 
institutions are created by the political elite to serve their own personal interest against the 
interest of all. 
The results from the analysis indicate that in Nigeria, the electoral commission did not 
have the needed independence to conduct elections, corruption is high, political corruption in 
particular, party financing is uneven and financial regulation is ineffective compared to Ghana 
with its better institutional factors. There is a high level of elite coherence in both countries. This 
implies that there is more political elite commitment to democracy in Ghana compared to 
Nigeria, even though both countries’ elites have a high level of coherence in achieving 
democratic consolidation.  
The weakness of this study is the lack of available data to study about political elites’ 
attitudes towards achieving democratic consolidation in countries. For example, to research 
about democracies in the world, there are the indices of democracy, such as the World 
Freedom Index to help understand political rights and civil rights. Yet such indices do not 
show the attitude of the political elites in countries towards achieving democratic 
consolidation. To solve this problem, this thesis considers interviewing the elites in Ghana 
and Nigeria, especially, as they are the facilitators and promoters of democracy.  So, the 
strength of this study is its ability to meet the elites for interviews, especially to understand 
what makes democratic consolidation possible in both countries. It is believed that elite 
interviews are crucial as they are able to give good quality information about the political 
events in their countries. Getting elites to disclose information about their countries is 
noteworthy. However, selection of the elites as the basis for getting information is another 
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weakness as this raises a question mark on the generalizability, especially as it is a two-case 
study. The thesis drew strength because the generalizability concern allows for thorough 
focus on process and on the attitudes of the elites. This research set out criteria for what 
constitutes democratic consolidation in the two African countries of Ghana and Nigeria. The 
two countries represented consolidated and pseudo democracies, thereby leaving two other 
areas in the theoretical framework for further study. The two other areas that need further 
study are consociational democracy and competitive authoritarianism. This research is not in 
a position to predict what the outcome of these two areas would be. Therefore, finding 
countries that can suit these areas of research would be important for future researchers. 
Mindful of the limitation of this study, further research shall concentrate on cross 
national research on the political elites’ attitude to democracy. It hopes that additional case 
studies would help to highlight the process in other countries which are useful in solving 
difficulties in generalization. Schofield (1993) notes that the possibility of considering too 
many case studies in a qualitative research are crucial for easy generalization. However, 
future research can look into other fifty-two countries in Africa, especially French speaking 
countries including Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’ivoire, Morocco and 
Senegal. It hopes that further research will help expand this topic as well as help researchers 
to understand whether there are cases in African democracy with competitive 
authoritarianism and consociational democratic system. The findings from future research in 
this area would go a long way in validating the results gather from the political elites’ 
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  Appendix: Selected Elite interviews in Ghana, organizations and locations. 
S/N Assigned Names Names of Organizations/ Professions Locations 
 
1 Civil Society Activist Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) Accra 
 
2 Civil Society Activist 
 
 
Member of National Endowment for Democracy  
 
Ashanti 
3 Civil Society Activist 
 
Labour and Trade Union Tamale 
 
4 Civil Society Activist 
 







6 Anonymous  Traditional Leader 
 
Cape Coast 





8 Anonymous  
 
University of Cape Coast 
 
Cape Coast 
9 Senior Lecturer 
 
University of Ghana 
 
Accra 
10 Senior Lecturer Ashesi University 
 
Accra 
11 Senior Lecturer 
 
 
University of Ghana Accra 
209 
 
12 Anonymous  
 
Party Leader Kumasi 
13 Anonymous  
 
Party Leader Accra 
14 Anonymous  
 
Party Leader Sunyani 
15 Anonymous 
 
Party Leader Volta Region 
16 Anonymous 
 
Party Leader Bolgatanga 
17 Anonymous 
 
Retired Army Major Accra 
18 Anonymous 
 
Retired Army Cornel  Kumasi 
19 Anonymous Retired Army General Ashanti 
 
Selected Elite interviews in Nigeria, organizations and locations. 
S/N Assigned Names 
 
Names of Organizations/ Professions Locations 
 
1 Anonymous  
Election Officer 
Rivers State 
2 Anonymous  
Army General 
Abuja 





4 Anonymous  
Party Leader 
Lagos 
5 Anonymous  
Party Leader 
Kano 
6 Anonymous  
Party Leader 
Owerri 
7 Anonymous  
Party Leader 
Jos 
8 Anonymous  
Party Leader 
Benue 
9 Anonymous  
Party Leader 
Benin 
10 Anonymous  
Traditional Leader 
South East 
11 Anonymous  
Traditional Leader 
South West 




Centre for Democracy and Development. 
 
Abuja 




Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
Warri 




Nigeria Labour Congress 
Akwa Ibom 
16 Civil Society 
Activist 
 




17 Senior Lecturer 
 
 
University of Lagos 
Lagos 
18 Senior Lecturer 
 
 
University of Port Harcourt 
Rivers 
19 Senior Lecturer 
 
 
University of Lagos 
Lagos 
20 Senior Lecturer 
 
Enugu State University of Science and Technology Enugu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
